CHRISTIANITY AND CULTURE

VOLUME TWO
in the Collected Works of

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About the Collected Works of Fr. Florovsky

The Collected Works of Fr. Georges Florovsky will be published in English and will contain his articles in Slavic studies as well as in Church History and Theology which have previously appeared in Russian, German, French, Bulgarian, Czech, Serbian, Swedish and English. Each volume will be arranged thematically. Included in the Collected Works will be his two major works on the Church Fathers (The Eastern Fathers of the Fourth Century and The Byzantine Fathers from the Fifth to the Eighth Century).
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WE ARE LIVING in a changed and changing world. This cannot be denied even by those in our midst who may be unwilling or unprepared to change themselves, who want to linger in the age that is rapidly passing away. But nobody can evade the discomfort of belonging to a world in transition. If we accept the traditional classification of historical epochs into "organic" and "critical," there is no doubt that our present age is a critical age, an age of crisis, an age of unresolved tensions. One hears so often in our days about the "End of Our Time," about the "Decline of the West," about "Civilization on Trial," and the like. It is even suggested sometimes that probably we are now passing through the "Great Divide," through the greatest change in the history of our civilization, which is much greater and more radical than the change from Antiquity to the Middle Ages, or from the Middle Ages to the Modern Times. If it is true at all, as it was contended by Hegel, that "history is judgment" (Die Weltgeschichte ist Weltgericht), there are some fateful epochs, when history not only judges, but, as it were, sentences itself to doom. We are persistently reminded by experts and prophets that civilizations rise

and decay, and there is no special reason to expect that our own civilization should escape this common fate. If there is any historical future at all, it may well happen that this future is reserved for another civilization, and probably for one which will be quite different from ours.

It is quite usual in our days, and indeed quite fashionable, to say that we are already dwelling in a "Post-Christian world"—whatever the exact meaning of this pretentious phrase may actually be—in a world which, subconsciously or deliberately, "retreated" or seceded from Christianity. "We live in the rains of civilizations, hopes, systems, and souls." Not only do we find ourselves at the cross-roads, at which the right way seems to be uncertain, but many of us would also question whether there is any safe road at all, and any prospect of getting on. Does not indeed our civilization find itself in an impasse out of which there is no exit, except at the cost of explosion? Now, what is the root of the trouble? What is the primary or ultimate cause of this imminent and appalling collapse? Is it just "the failure of nerve," as it is sometimes suggested, or rather a "sickness to death," a disease of the spirit, the loss of faith? There is no common agreement on this point. Yet, there seems to be considerable agreement that our cultural world has been somehow dis-oriented and decentralized, spiritually and intellectually dis-oriented and disorganized, so that no over-arching principle has been left which can keep the shifting elements together. As Christians, we can be more emphatic and precise. We would contend that it is precisely the modern Retreat from Christianity, at whatever exact historical date we may discern its starting point, that lies at the bottom of our present crisis. Our age is, first of all, an age of unbelief, and for that reason an age of uncertainty, confusion, and despair. There are so many in our time who have no hope precisely because they lost all faith.

We should not make such statements too easily, however, and have to caution ourselves at least on two points. First, the causes and motives of this obvious "retreat" were complex and manifold, and the guilt cannot be shifted exclusively onto those who have retreated. In Christian humility, the
faithful should not exonerate themselves unconditionally, and should not dispense too summarily with the responsibility for the failures of others. If our culture, which we used, rather complacently, to regard as Christian, disintegrates and falls to pieces, it only shows that the seed of corruption was already there. Secondly, we should not regard all beliefs as constructive by themselves, and should not welcome every faith as an antidote against doubt and disruption. It may be perfectly true, as sociologists contend, that cultures disintegrate when there is no inspiring incentive, no commanding conviction. But it is the content of faith that is decisive, at least from the Christian point of view. The chief danger in our days is that there are too many conflicting "beliefs." The major tension is not so much between "belief" and "un-belief" as precisely between rival beliefs. Too many "strange Gospels" are preached, and each of them claims total obedience and faithful submission; even science poses sometimes as religion. It may be true that the modern crisis can be formally traced back to the loss of convictions. It would be disastrous, however, if people rallied around a false banner and pledged allegiance to a wrong faith. The real root of the modern tragedy does not lie only in the fact that people lost convictions, but that they deserted Christ.

Now, when we speak of a "crisis of culture," what do we actually mean? The word "culture" is used in various senses, and there is no commonly accepted definition. On the one hand, "culture" is a specific attitude or orientation of individuals and of human groups, by which we distinguish the "civilized" society from the "primitive." It is at once a system of aims and concerns, and a system of habits. On the other hand, "culture" is a system of values, produced and accumulated in the creative process of history, and tending to obtain a semi-independent existence, i.e. independent of that creative endeavour which originated or discovered these "values." The values are manifold and divers, and probably they are never fully integrated into one coherent whole—polite manners and mores, political and social institutions, industry and sanitation, ethics, art and science, and so on. Thus, when we speak of the crisis of culture, we usually
imply a **dis-integration** in one of these two different, if related, systems, or rather in both of them. It may happen that some of the accepted or alleged values are discredited and compromised, i.e. cease to function and no longer appeal to men. Or, again, it happens sometimes that "civilized man" themselves degenerate or even disappear altogether, that cultural habits become unstable, and men lose interest in or concern for these habits, or are simply tired of them. Then an urge for "primitivism" may emerge, if still within the framework of a lingering civilization. A civilization declines when that creative impulse which originally brought it into existence loses its power and spontaneity. Then the question arises, whether "culture" is relevant to the fulfilment of man's personality, or is no more than an external garb which may be needed on occasions, but which does not organically belong to the essence of human existence. It obviously does not belong to human *nature*, and we normally clearly distinguish between "nature" and "culture," implying that "culture" is man's "artificial" creation which he superimposes on "nature," although it seems that in fact we do not know human nature apart from culture, from some kind of culture at least. It may be contended that "culture" is not actually "artificial," that it is rather an extension of human nature, an extension by which human nature achieves its maturity and completion, so that an "under-cultural" existence is in fact a "sub-human" mode of existence. Is it not true that a "civilized" man is more human than a "primitive" or "natural" man? It is precisely at this point that our major difficulty sets in.

It may be perfectly true, as I personally believe is the case, that our contemporary culture or civilization is "on trial." But should Christians, as Christians, be concerned with this cultural crisis at all? If it is true, as we have just admitted, that the collapse or decline of culture is rooted in the loss of faith, in an "apostasy" or "retreat," should not Christians be concerned, primarily if not exclusively, with the reconstruction of belief or a reconversion of the world, and not with the salvaging of a sinking civilization? If we are really passing in our days an "apocalyptic" test, should we not
concentrate all our efforts on Evangelism, on the proclamation of the Gospel to an oblivious generation, on the preaching of penitence and conversion? The main question seems to be, whether the crisis can be resolved if we simply oppose to an outworn and disrupted civilization a new one, or whether, in order to overcome the crisis, we must go beyond civilization, to the very roots of human existence. Now, if we have ultimately to go beyond, would not this move make culture unnecessary and superfluous? Does one need "culture," and should one be interested in it, when he encounters the Living God, Him Who alone is to be worshipped and glorified? Is not then all "civilization" ultimately but a subtle and refined sort of idolatry, a care and trouble for "many things," for too many things, while there is but one "good part," which shall never be taken away, but will continue in the "beyond," unto ages of ages? Should not, in fact, those who have found the "precious pearl" go straight away and sell their other goods? And would it not be precisely an unfaithfulness and disloyalty to hide and keep these other possessions? Should we not simply surrender all "human values," into the hands of God.

This questioning was for centuries the major temptation of many sincere and devout souls. All these questions are intensively asked and discussed again in our own days. We say: temptation. But is it fair to use this disqualifying word? Is it not rather an inescapable postulate of that integral self-renunciation, which is the first pre-requisite and foundation of Christian obedience? In fact, doubts about culture and its values arise and emerge not only in the days of great historical trials and crises. They arise so often also in the periods of peace and prosperity, when one may find himself in danger of being enslaved and seduced by human achievements, by the glories and triumphs of civilization. They arise so often in the process of intimate and personal search for God. Radical self-renunciation may lead devout people into wilderness, into the caves of the earth and the deserts, out of the "civilized world," and culture would appear to them as vanity, and vanity of vanities, even if it is alleged that this culture has been christened, in shape if not in essence.
Would it be right to arrest these devout brethren in their resolute search of perfection, and to retain them in the world, to compel them to share in the building or reparation of what for them is nothing else than a Tower of Babel? Are we prepared to disavow St. Anthony of Egypt or St. Francis of Assisi and to urge them to stay in the world? Is not God radically above and beyond all culture? Does "culture" after all possess any intrinsic value of its own? Is it service or play, obedience or distraction, vanity, luxury and pride, i.e. ultimately a trap for souls? It seems obvious that "culture" is not, and by its very nature cannot be, an ultimate end or an ultimate value, and should not be regarded as an ultimate goal or destiny of man, nor probably even as an indispensible component of true humanity. A "primitive" can be saved no less than a "civilized." As St. Ambrose put it, God did not choose to save His people by clever arguments. Moreover, "culture" is not an unconditional good; rather it is a sphere of unavoidable ambiguity and involvement. It tends to degenerate into "civilization," if we may accept Oswald Spengler's distinction between these two terms—and man may be desperately enslaved in it, as the modern man is supposed to be. "Culture" is human achievement, is man's own deliberate creation, but an accomplished "civilization" is so often inimical to human creativity. Many in our days, and indeed at all times, are painfully aware of this tyranny of "cultural routine," of the bondage of civilization. It can be argued, as it has been more than once, that in "civilization" man is, as it were, "estranged" from himself, estranged and detached from the very roots of his existence, from his very "self," or from "nature," or from God. This alienation of man can be described and defined in a number of ways and manners, both in a religious and anti-religious mood. But in all cases "culture" would appear not only to be in predicament, but to be predicament itself.

Different answers were given to these searching questions in the course of Christian history, and the problem still remains unsolved. It has been recently suggested that the whole question about "Christ and Culture" is "an enduring problem," which probably does not admit of any final deci-
sion. It is to say that different answers will appeal to dif-
ferent types or groups of people, believers alike and "un-
believers," and again different answers will seem con-
vincing at different times. The variety of answers seems to
have a double meaning. On the one hand, it points to the
variety of historical and human situations, in which dif-
ferent solutions would naturally impose. Questions are dif-
fently put and assessed at a time of peace or at a time
of crisis. But on the other hand, disagreement is precisely
what we should expect in the "Divided Christendom." It
would be idle to ignore the depth of this division in Chris-
tendom. The meaning of the Gospel itself is discordantly
assessed in various denominations. And in the debate about
"Christ and Culture" we encounter the same tension be-
tween the "Catholic" and the "Evangelical" trends which is
at the bottom of the "Christian Schism" at large. If we are
really and sincerely concerned with "Christian Unity," we
should look for an ultimate solution of this basic tension.
In fact, our attitude to "culture" is not a practical option,
but a theological decision, first of all and last of all. The
recent growth of historical and cultural pessimism, of what
Germans call Kulturpessimismus and Geschichtspessimismus,
not only reflects the factual involvements and confusion of
our epoch, but also reveals a peculiar shift in theological
and philosophical opinions. Doubts about culture have an
obvious theological significance and spring from the very
depth of man's faith. One should not dismiss any sincere
challenge too easily and self-complacently, without sympathy
and understanding. Yet, without imposing a uniform solu-
tion, for which our age seems not to be ripe, one cannot
avoid discarding certain suggested solutions as inadequate,
as erroneous and misleading.

The modern opposition, or indifference, of Christians to
"culture" takes various shapes and moulds. It would be
impossible to attempt now a comprehensive survey of all
actual shades of opinion. We must confine ourselves to
a tentative list of those which seem to be most vocal and
relevant in our own situation. There are a variety of motives,
and a variety of conclusions. Two special motives seem to
concur in a very usual contempt of the world by many Christians, in all traditions. On the one hand, the world is passing, and history itself seems so insignificant "in the perspective of eternity," or when related to the ultimate destiny of man. All historical values are perishable, as they are also relative and uncertain. Culture, also, is perishable and of no significance in the perspective of an imminent end. On the other hand, the whole world seems to be so insignificant in comparison with the unfathomable Glory of God, as it has been revealed in the mystery of our Redemption. At certain times, and in certain historical situations, the mystery of Redemption seems to obscure the mystery of Creation, and Redemption is construed rather as a dismissal of the fallen world than as its healing and recovery. The radical opposition between Christianity and Culture, as it is presented by certain Christian thinkers, is more inspired by certain theological and philosophical presuppositions than by an actual analysis of culture itself. There is an increasing eschatological feeling in our days, at least in certain quarters. There is also an increasing devaluation of man in the contemporary thought, philosophical and theological, partly in reaction to the excess of self-confidence of the previous age. There is a re-discovery of human "nothingness," of the essential precariousness and insecurity of his existence, both physical and spiritual. The world seems to be inimical and empty, and man feels himself lost in the flux of accidents and failures. If there is still any hope of "salvation," it is constructed rather in the terms of "escape" and "endurance" than in those of "recovery" or "reparation." What can one hope for in history?

We can distinguish several types of this "pessimistic" attitude. The labels I am going to use are but tentative and provisional.

First of all, we must emphasize the persistence of the Pietist or Revivalist motive in the modern devaluation of culture. Men believe that they have met their Lord and Redeemer in their personal and private experience, and that they were saved by His mercy and their own response to it in faith and obedience. Nothing else is therefore needed.
The life of the world, and in the world, seems then to be but a sinful entanglement, out of which men are glad, and probably proud, to have been released. The only thing they have to say about this world is to expose its vanity and perversion and to prophesy doom and condemnation, the coming wrath and judgment of God. People of this type may be of different temper, sometimes wild and aggressive, sometimes mild and sentimental. In all cases, however, they cannot see any positive meaning in the continuing process of culture, and are indifferent to all values of civilization, especially to those which cannot be vindicated from the utilitarian point of view. People of this type would preach the virtue of simplicity, in opposition to the complexity of cultural involvement. They may choose to retire into the privacy of solitary existence or of stoic "indifference" or they may prefer a kind of common life, in closed companies of those who have understood the futility and purposelessness of the whole historical toil and endeavour. One may describe this attitude as "sectarian," and indeed there is a deliberate attempt to evade any share in common history. But this "sectarian" approach can be found among the people of various cultural and religious traditions. There are many who want to "retire from the world," at least psychologically, more for security than for "the unseen warfare." There is, in this attitude, a paradoxical mixture of penitence and self-satisfaction, of humility and pride. There is also a deliberate disregard of, or indifference to, doctrine, and inability to think out consistently the doctrinal implications of this "isolationist" attitude. In fact, this is a radical reduction of Christianity, at least a subjective reduction, in which it becomes no more than a private religion of individuals. The only problem with which this type of people is concerned is the problem of individual "salvation."

Secondly, there is a "Puritan" type of opposition. There is a similar "reduction" of belief, usually openly admitted. In practice, it is an active type, without any desire to evade history. Only history is accepted rather as "service" and "obedience," and not as a creative opportunity. There is the same concentration on the problem of one's "salvation."
The basic contention is that man, this miserable sinner, can be forgiven, if and when he accepts the forgiveness which is offered to him by Christ and in Christ, but even in this case he remains precisely what he is, a frail and unprofitable creature, and is not essentially changed or re-newed. Even as a forgiven person, he continues as a lost creature, and his life cannot have any constructive value. This may not lead necessarily to an actual withdrawal from culture or denial of history, but it makes of history a kind of servitude, which must be carried on and endured, and should not be evaded, but endured rather as a training of character and testing in patience, than as a realm of creativeness. Nothing is to be achieved in history. But man should use every opportunity to prove his loyalty and obedience and to strengthen character by this service of fidelity, this bondage in duty. There is a strong "utilitarian" emphasis in this attitude, if it is a "transcendental utility," an utter concern with "salvation." Everything that does not directly serve this purpose should be discarded, and no room is permitted for any "disinterested creativity," e.g. for art or "belles-lettres."

Thirdly, there is an Existentialist type of opposition. Its basic motive is in the protest against man's enslavement in civilization, which only screens from him the ultimate predicament of his existence, and obscures the hopelessness of his entanglement. It would be unfair to deny the relative truth of the contemporary Existentialist movement, the truth of reaction; and probably the modern man of culture needed this sharp and pitiless warning. In all its forms, religious and areligious, Existentialism exposes the nothingness of man, of the real man as he is and knows himself. For those among the Existentialists who failed to encounter God or who indulge in the atheistic denial, this "nothingness" is just the last truth about man and his destiny. Only man should find this truth out for himself. But many Existentialists have found God, or, as they would put it themselves, have been found by Him, challenged by Him, in His undivided wrath and mercy. But, paradoxically enough, they would persist in believing that man is still but "nothing," in spite of the redeeming love and concern of Creator for His lost
and stray creatures. In their conception, "creatureliness" of man inextricably condemns him to be but "nothing," at least in his own eyes, in spite of the mysterious fact that for God His creatures are obviously much more than "nothing," since the redeeming love of God moved Him, for the sake of man, to the tremendous Sacrifice of the Cross. Existential-
ism seems to be right in its criticism of human com-
placency, and even helpful in its unwelcome detection of man's pettiness. But it is always blind to the complexity of the Divine Wisdom. An Existentialist is always a lonely and solitary being, inextricably involved and engaged in the scrutiny of his predicament. His terms of reference are always: the ALL of God and the Nothing of man. And, even in the case when his analysis begins with a concrete situation, namely his personal one, it continues somehow in abstracto: in the last resort he will not speak of a living person, but rather about man as man, for ultimately all men stand under the same and universal detection of their ultimate irrelevance. Whatever the psychological and historical explanation of the recent rise of Existentialism may be, on the whole it is no more than a symptom of cultural disintegration and despair.

And finally, we should not ignore the resistance or indifference of the "Plain Man." He may live rather quietly in the world of culture, and even enjoy it, but he would wonder what culture can "add" to religion, except by the way of decoration, or as a tribute of reverence and gratitude, i.e. especially in the form of art. But as a rule, the "plain man" is cautiously suspicious about the use of reason in the matters of faith and accordingly will dispense with the understanding of beliefs. What religious value can be in a distinterested study of any subject, which has no immediate practical application and cannot be used in the discharge of charity? The "plain man" will have not doubts about the value or utility of culture in the economy of temporal life, but he will hesitate to acknowledge its positive relevance in the spiritual dimension, except insofar as it may affect or exhibit the moral integrity of man. He will find no religious justifica-
tion for the human urge to know and create. Is not all culture
ultimately but vanity, a frail and perishable thing indeed? And is not the deepest root of human pride and arrogance precisely in the claims and ambition of reason? The "plain man" usually prefers "simplicity" in religion, and takes no interest in what he labels as "theological speculation," including therein very often almost all doctrines and dogmas of the Church. What is involved in this attitude is again a one-sided (and defective) concept of man and of the relevance of man's actual life in history to his "eternal destiny," i.e. to the ultimate purpose of God. There is a tendency to stress the "otherworldliness" of the "Life Eternal" to such an extent that human personality is in danger of being rent in twain. Is History in its entirety just a training ground for souls and characters, or is something more intended in God's design? Is the "last judgment" just a test in loyalty, or also a "recapitulation" of the Creation?

It is here that we are touching upon the deepest cause of the enduring confusion in the discussion about "Faith and Culture." The deepest theological issues are involved in this discussion, and no solution can ever be reached unless the theological character of the discussion is clearly acknowledged and understood. We need a theology of culture, even for our "practical" decisions. No real decision can be made in the dark. The dogma of Creation, with everything that it implies, was dangerously obscured in the consciousness of modern Christians, and the concept of Providence, i.e. of the perennial concern of the Creator with the destiny of His Creation, was actually reduced to something utterly sentimental and subjective. Accordingly, "History" was conceived as an enigmatic interim between the Mighty Deeds of God, for which it was difficult to assign any proper substance. This was connected again with an inadequate conception of Man. The emphasis has been shifted from the fulfilment of God's design for man to the release of Man out of the consequences of his "original" failure. And, accordingly, the whole doctrine of the Last Things has been dangerously reduced and has come to be treated in the categories of forensical justice or of sentimental love. The "Modern Man" fails to appreciate and to assess the conviction of early
Christians, derived from the Scripture, that Man was created by God for a creative purpose and was to act in the world as its king, priest, and prophet. The fall or failure of man did not abolish this purpose or design, and man was re-deemed in order to be re-instated in his original rank and to resume his role and function in the Creation. And only by doing this can he become what he was designed to be, not only in the sense that he should display obedience, but also in order to accomplish the task which was appointed by God in his creative design precisely as the task of man. As much as "History" is but a poor anticipation of the "Age to come," it is nevertheless its actual anticipation, and the cultural process in history is related to the ultimate consummation, if in a manner and in a sense which we cannot adequately decipher now. One must be careful not to exaggerate "the human achievement," but one should also be careful not to minimize the creative vocation of man. The destiny of human culture is not irrelevant to the ultimate destiny of man.

All this may seem to be but a daring speculation, much beyond our warrant and competence. But the fact remains: Christians as Christians were building culture for centuries, and many of them not only with a sense of vocation, and not only as in duty bound, but with the firm conviction that this was the will of God. A brief retrospect of the Christian endeavour in culture may help us to see the problem in a more concrete manner, in its full complexity, but also in all its inevitability. As a matter of fact, Christianity entered the world precisely at one of the most critical periods of history, at the time of a momentous crisis of culture. And the crisis was finally solved by the creation of Christian Culture, as unstable and ambiguous as this culture proved to be, in its turn, and in the course of its realization.

II

As a matter of fact, the question of the relationship between Christianity and Culture is never discussed in abstracto, just in this generalized form, or, in any case, it
should not be so discussed. The culture about which one speaks is always a particular culture. The concept of "Culture" with which one operates is always situation-conditioned, i.e. derived from the actual experience one has, in his own particular culture, which one may cherish or abhor, or else it is an imaginary concept, "another culture," an ideal, about which one dreams and speculates. Even when the question is put in general terms, concrete impressions or wants can be always detected. When "Culture" is resisted or denied by Christians, it is always a definite historical formation which is taken to be representative of the idea. In our own days it would be the mechanized or "Capitalistic" civilization, inwardly secularized and therefore estranged from any religion. In the ancient times it was the pagan Graeco-Roman civilization. The starting point in both cases is the immediate impression of clash and conflict, and of practical incompatibility of divergent structures, which diverge basically in spirit or inspiration.

The early Christians were facing a particular civilization, that of the Roman and Hellenistic world. It was about this civilization that they spoke, it was about this concrete "system of values" that they were critical and uneasy. This civilization, moreover, was itself changing and unstable at that time, and was, in fact, involved in a desperate struggle and crisis. The situation was complex and confused. The modern historian cannot escape antinomy in his interpretation of this early Christian epoch, and one cannot expect more coherence in the interpretation given by the contemporaries. It is obvious that this Hellenistic civilization was in a certain sense ripe or prepared for "conversion," and can even be regarded itself, again in a certain sense, as a kind of the Praeparatio Evangelica, and the contemporaries were aware of this situation. Already St. Paul had suggested this, and the Apologists of the second century and early Alexandrinians did not hesitate to refer to Socrates and Heraclitus, and indeed Plato, as forerunners of Christianity. On the other hand, they were aware, no less than we are now, of a radical tension between this culture and their message, and the opponents were conscious of this tension also. The Ancient World
resisted conversion, because it meant a radical change and break with its tradition in many respects. We can see now both the tension and continuity between "the Classical" and "the Christian." Contemporaries, of course, could not see it in the same perspective as we do, because they could not anticipate the future. If they were critical of "culture," they meant precisely the culture of their own time, and this culture was both alien and inimical to the Gospel. What Tertullian had to say about culture should be interpreted in a concrete historical setting first of all, and should not be immediately construed into absolute pronouncements. Was he not right in his insistence on the radical tension and divergence between "Jerusalem" and Athens: quid Athenae Hierosolymis? "What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? . . . Our instruction comes from the Porch of Solomon, who had himself taught that 'the Lord should be sought in simplicity of heart' . . . We want no curious disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the Gospel. With our faith, we desire no further belief. For this is our palmary faith, that there is nothing which we ought to believe besides" (de prescriptione, 7). "What is there in common between the philosopher and the Christian, the pupil of Hellas and the pupil of Heaven, the worker for reputation and for salvation, the manufacturer of words and of deeds" (Apologeticus, 46). Yet, Tertullian himself could not avoid "inquisition" and "disputation," and did not hesitate to use the wisdom of the Greeks in the defence of the Christian faith. He indicts the culture of his time, and a specific philosophy of life, which, in its very structure, was opposed to faith. He was afraid of an easy syncretism and contamination, which was an actual threat and danger in his time, and could not anticipate that inner transformation of the Hellenic mind which was to be effected in the centuries to come, just as he could not imagine that Caesars could become Christian.

One should not forget that the attitude of Origen was actually much the same, although he is regarded as one of the "Hellenizers" of Christianity. He also was aware of
the tension and was suspicious of the vain speculation, in which he took little interest, and for him the riches of the pagans were exactly "the riches of sinners" (in Ps. 36, III. 6). St. Augustine also was of that opinion. Was not Science for him just a vain curiosity which only distracts mind from its true purpose, which is not to number the stars and to seek out the hidden things of nature, but to know and to love God? Again, St. Augustine was repudiating Astrology, which nobody would regard as "science" in our days, but which in his days was inseparable from true Astronomy. The cautious or even negative attitude of early Christians toward philosophy, toward art, including both painting and music, and especially toward the art of rhetorics, can be fully understood only in the concrete historical context. The whole structure of the existing culture was determined and permeated by a wrong and false faith. One has to admit that certain historical forms of culture are incompatible with the Christian attitude toward life, and therefore must be rejected or avoided. But this does not yet pre-judge the further question, whether a Christian culture is possible and desirable. In our own days, one may, or rather should, be sharply critical of our contemporary civilization, and even be inclined to welcome its collapse, but this does not prove that civilization as such should be damned and cursed, and that Christians should return to barbarism or primitivism.

As a matter of fact, Christianity accepted the challenge of the Hellenistic and Roman culture, and ultimately a Christian Civilization emerged. It is true that this rise of Christian Culture has been strongly censured in modern times as an "acute Hellenization" of Christianity, in which the purity and simplicity of the Evangelical or Biblical faith is alleged to have been lost. Many in our own days are quite "iconoclastic" with regard to culture en bloc, or at least to certain fields of culture, such as "Philosophy" (equated with "sophistics") or Art, repudiated as a subtle idolatry, in the name of Christian faith. But, on the other hand, we have to face the age-long accumulation of genuine human values in the cultural process, undertaken and carried in the spirit of Christian obedience and dedication to the truth of God.
What is important in this case is that the Ancient Culture proved to be plastic enough to admit of an inner "transfiguration." Or, in other words, Christians proved that it was possible to re-orient the cultural process, without lapsing into a pre-cultural state, to re-shape the cultural fabric in a new spirit. The same process which has been variously described as a "Hellenization of Christianity" can be construed rather as a "Christianization of Hellenism." Hellenism was, as it were, dissected by the Sword of the Spirit, was polarized and divided, and a "Christian Hellenism" was created. Of course, "Hellenism" was ambiguous and, as it were, double-faced. And certain of the Hellenistic revivals in the history of the European thought and life have been rather pagan revivals, calling for caution and strictures. It is enough to mention the ambiguities of the Renaissance, and in later times just Goethe or Nietzsche. But it would be unfair to ignore the existence of another Hellenism, already initiated in the Age of the Fathers, both Greek and Latin, and creatively continued through the Middle Ages and the Modern times. What is really decisive in this connection is that "Hellenism" has been really changed. One can be too quick in discovering "Hellenic accretions" in the fabric of Christian life, and at the same time quite negligent and oblivious of the facts of this "transfiguration."

One striking example may suffice for our present purpose. It has been recently brought to mind that Christianity in fact achieved a radical change in the philosophical interpretation of Time. For the ancient Greek Philosophers, Time was just "a movable image of eternity," i.e. a cyclical and recurrent motion, which had to return upon itself, without ever moving "forward," as no "forward-motion" is possible on the circle. It was an astronomical time, determined by "the revolution of the celestial spheres" (let us remember the title of the famous work of Copernicus, who was still under the sway of ancient astronomy: *De Revolutionibus Orbium Celestium*), and human history accordingly was subordinate to this basic principle of rotation and iteration. Our modern concept of the linear time, with a sense of direction or vectoriality, with the possibility of progression
and achievement of new things, has been derived from the Bible and from the Biblical conception of history, moving from Creation to Consummation, in a unique, irrevertible and unrepeatable motion, guided or supervised by the constant Providence of the living God. The circular time of the Greeks has been exploded, as St. Augustine rejoicingly exclaims. History for the first time could be conceived as a meaningful and purposeful process, leading to a goal, and not as a perennial rotation, leading nowhere. The very concept of Progress has been elaborated by Christians. This is to say, Christianity was not passive in its intercourse with that inherited culture which it endeavoured to redeem, but very active. It is not too much to say that the human mind was reborn and remade in the school of Christian faith, without any repudiation of its just claims and fashions. It is true that this process of Christianization of mind has never been completed, and inner tension continues even within the Christian "Universe of discourse." No culture can ever be final and definitive. It is more than a system, it is a process, and it can be preserved and continued only by a constant spiritual effort, not just by inertia or inheritance. The true solution of the perennial problem of relationship between Christianity and Culture lies in the effort to convert "the natural mind" to the right faith, and not in the denial of cultural tasks. Cultural concerns are an integral part of actual human existence and, for that reason, cannot be excluded from the Christian historical endeavour.

Christianity entered the historical scene as a Society or Community, as a new social order or even a new social dimension, i.e. as the Church. Early Christians had a strong corporate feeling. They felt themselves to be a "chosen race," a "holy nation," a "peculiar people," i.e. precisely a New Society, a "New Polis," a City of God. Now, there was another City in existence, a Universal and strictly totalitarian City indeed, the Roman Empire, which felt itself to be simply the Empire. It claimed to be the City, comprehensive and unique. It claimed the whole man for its service, just as the Church claimed the whole man for the service of God. No division of competence and authority
could be admitted, since the Roman State could not admit autonomy of the "religious sphere," and religious allegiance was regarded as an aspect of the political creed and an integral part of the civic obedience. For that reason a conflict was unavoidable, a conflict of the two Cities. Early Christians felt themselves, as it were, extraterritorial, just outside of the existing social order, simply because the Church was for them an order itself. They dwelt in their cities as "sojourners" or "strangers," and for them "every foreign land was fatherland, and every fatherland foreign," as the author of the "Epistle to Diognetus," a remarkable document of the second century, stated it (c. 5). On the other hand, Christians did not retire from the existing society; they could be found "everywhere," as Tertullian insisted, in all walks of life, in all social groups, in all nations. But they were spiritually detached, spiritually segregated. As Origen put it, in every city Christians had another system of allegiance of their own, or, in literal translation, "another system of fatherland" (c. Cels. VIII. 75). Christians did stay in the world and were prepared to perform their daily duties faithfully, but they could not pledge their full allegiance to the polity of this world, to the earthly City, for their citizenship was elsewhere, i.e. "in heaven."

Yet, this detachment from "the world" could be but provisional, as Christianity, by its very nature, was a missionary religion and aimed at a universal conversion. The subtle distinction "in the world, but not of the world," could not settle the basic problem, for "the world" itself had to be redeemed and could not be endured in its un-reformed state. The final problem was exactly this: could the two "societies" co-exist, and on what terms? Could Christian allegiance be somehow divided or duplicated, or a "double citizenship" accepted as a normative principle? Various answers were given in the course of history, and the issue is still a burning and embarrassing one. One may still wonder whether "spiritual segregation" is not actually the only consistent Christian answer, and any other solution inevitably an entangling compromise. The Church is here, in "this world," for its salvation. The Church has, as it were, to exhibit in
history a new pattern of existence, a new mode of life, that of the "world to come." And for that reason the Church has to oppose and to renounce "this" world. She cannot, so to speak, find a settled place for herself within the limits of this "old world." She is compelled to be "in this world" in permanent opposition, even if she claims but a reformation or renewal of the world.

The situation in which the Church finds herself in this world is inextricably antinomical. Either the Church is to be constituted as an exclusive society, endeavouring to satisfy all requirements of the believers, both "temporal" and "spiritual," paying no attention to the existing order and leaving nothing to the external world—this would mean an entire separation from the world, an ultimate flight out of it, and a radical denial of any external authority. Or the Church could attempt an inclusive "Christianization" of the world, subduing the whole of life to Christian rule and authority, endeavor to reform and to reorganize secular life on Christian principles, to build the Christian City. In the history of the Church we can trace both solutions: a flight into desert and a construction of the Christian Empire. The first was practised not only in monasticism of various trends, but also in many other Christian groups or "sects." The second was the main line taken by Christians, both in the West and in the East, up to the rise of militant secularism in Europe and elsewhere, and even at present this solution has not lost its hold on many people.

Historically speaking, both solutions proved to be inadequate and unsuccessful. On the other hand, one has to acknowledge the urgency of their common problem and the truth of their common purpose. Christianity is not an individualistic religion and is not concerned only with the salvation of individuals. Christianity is the Church, i.e. a Community, leading its corporate life according to its peculiar principles. Spiritual leadership of the Church can hardly be reduced to an occasional guidance given to individuals or to groups living under conditions utterly uncongenial to the Church. The legitimacy of those conditions should be questioned first of all. Nor can human life be split into depart-
ments, some of which might have been ruled by some independent principles, i.e. independent of the Church. One cannot serve two Masters, and a double allegiance is a poor solution. The problem is no easier in a Christian society. With Constantine the Empire, as it were, capitulated; Caesar himself was converted—the Empire was now offering to the Church not only peace, but cooperation. This could be interpreted as a victory of the Christian cause. But for many Christians at that time this new turn of affairs was an unexpected surprise and rather a blow. Many leaders of the Church were rather reluctant to accept the Imperial offer. But it was difficult to decline it. The whole Church could not escape into Desert, nor could she desert the world. The new Christian Society came into existence, which was at once both "Church" and "Empire," and its ideology was "theocratical." This theocratical idea could be developed in two versions, different, but correlated. Theocratical authority could be exercised by the Church directly, i.e. through the hierarchical Ministry of the Church. Or the State could be invested with a theocratical authority, and its officers commissioned to establish and propagate the Christian order. In both cases the unity of Christian society was strongly emphasized, and two orders were distinguished inside of this unique structure: an ecclesiastical in the strict sense and a temporal, i.e. the Church and the State, with the basic assumption that imperium was also a Divine gift, in a sense co-ordinated with sacerdotium, and subordinate to the ultimate authority of the Faith. The theory seemed to be reasonable and well balanced, but in practice it led to an age-long tension and strife within the theocratical structure and ultimately to its disruption. The modern conception of the two "separated" spheres, that of the Church and that of the State, lacks both theoretical and practical consistency.

In fact, we are still facing the same dilemma or the same antinomy. Either Christians ought to go out of the world, in which there is another master besides Christ (whatever name this master may bear: Caesar or Mammon or any other), and start a separate society. Or again they have to transform the outer world and rebuild it according to the law of the
Gospel. What is important, however, is that even those who
go out cannot dispense with the main problem: they still
have to build up a "society" and cannot therefore dispense
with this basic element of social culture. "Anarchism" is in
any case excluded by the Gospel. Nor does Monasticism
mean or imply a denunciation of culture. Monasteries were,
for a long time, precisely the most powerful centers of
cultural activity, both in the West and in the East. The
practical problem is therefore reduced to the question of a
sound and faithful orientation in a concrete historical
situation.

Christians are not committed to the denial of culture as
such. But they are to be critical of any existing cultural
situation and measure it by the measure of Christ. For
Christians are also the Sons of Eternity, i.e. prospective
citizens of the Heavenly Jerusalem. Yet problems and needs
of "this age" in no case and in no sense can be dismissed
or disregarded, since Christians are called to work and
service precisely "in this world" and "in this age." Only
all these needs and problems and aims must be viewed in
that new and wider perspective which is disclosed by the
Christian Revelation and illumined by its light.
CHAPTER II

The Predicament of the Christian Historian

Veritas non erubescit nisi *abscondi*.
—Leo XIII

"**CHRISTIANITY** is a religion of *historians.*"* It is a strong phrase, but the statement is correct. Christianity is basically a vigorous appeal to history, a witness of faith to certain particular events in the past, to certain particular data of history. These events are acknowledged by faith as truly eventful. These historic moments, or instants, are recognized as utterly momentous. In brief, they are identified by faith as "mighty deeds" of God, *Magnolia Dei.* The "scandal of particularity," to use the phrase of Gerhard Kittel,³ belongs to the very essence of the Christian message. The Christian Creed itself is intrinsically historic. It comprises the whole of existence in a single historical scheme as one "History of Salvation," from Creation to Consummation, to the Last Judgment and the End of history. Emphasis is put on the ultimate cruciality of certain historic events,
namely, of the Incarnation, of the Coming of the Messiah, and of his Cross and Resurrection. Accordingly, it may be justly contended that "the Christian religion is a daily invitation to the study of history."3

Now, it is at this point that the major difficulties arise. An average believer, of any denomination or tradition, is scarcely aware of his intrinsic duty to study history. The historical pattern of the Christian message is obvious. But people are interested rather in the "eternal truth" of this message, than in what they are inclined to regard as "accidents" of history, even when they are discussing the facts of the Biblical history or of the history of the Church. Does not the message itself point out beyond history, to the "life of the Age to come"? There is a persistent tendency to interpret the facts of history as images or symbols, as typical cases or examples, and to transform the "history of salvation" into a kind of edifying parable. We can trace this tendency back to the early centuries of Christian history. In our own days we find ourselves in the midst of an intense controversy precisely about this very matter.

On the one hand, the essential historicity of Christian religion has been rediscovered and re-emphasized, precisely during the past few decades, and a fresh impact of this reawakened historical insight is strongly felt now in all fields of contemporary theological research—in Biblical exegesis, in the study of Church history and liturgics, in certain modern attempts at the "reconstruction of belief," and even in the modern ecumenical dialogue. On the other hand, the recent plea for a radical demythologizing of the Christian message is an ominous sign of a continuing anti-historical attitude in certain quarters. For to demythologize Christianity means in practice precisely to de-historicize it, despite the real difference between myth and history. In fact, the modern plea is but a new form of that theological liberalism, which, at least from the Age of the Enlightenment, persistently attempted to disentangle Christianity from its historical context and involvement, to detect its perennial "essence" ("das Wesen des Christentums"), and to discard the historical shells. Paradoxically, the Rationalists of the Enlightenment
and the devout Pietists of various description, and also the
dreamy mystics, were actually working toward the same pur-
pose. The impact of German Idealism, in spite of its historical
appearance, was ultimately to the same effect. The emphasis
was shifted from the "outward" facts of history to the
"inward" experience of the believers. Christianity, in this
interpretation, became a "religion of experience," mystical,
ethical, or even intellectual. History was felt to be simply
irrelevant. The historicity of Christianity was reduced to
the acknowledgement of a permanent "historical significance"
of certain ideas and principles, which originated under
particular conditions of time and space, but were in no sense
intrinsically linked with them. The person of Christ Jesus
lost its cruciality in this interpretation, even if his message
has been, to a certain extent, kept and maintained.

Now, it is obvious that this anti-historical attitude was
itself but a particular form of an acute historicism, that is,
of a particular interpretation of history, in which the historical
has been ruled out as something accidental and indifferent.
Most of the liberal arguments were, as they still are, his-
torical and critical, although behind them one could easily
detect definite ideological prejudices, or preconceptions.
The study of history was vigorously cultivated by the Liberal
school, if only in order to discredit history, as a realm of
relativity, or as a story of sin and failure, and, finally, to ban
history from the theological field. This "abuse of history"
by the liberals made even the "lawful" use of history in
theology suspect in the conservative circles. Was it safe to
make the eternal truth of Christianity dependent in any way
upon the data of history, which is, by its very nature, in-
extricably contingent and human? For that reason Cardinal
Manning denounced every appeal to history, or to "antiquity,"
as both "a treason and a heresy." He was quite formal at
this point: for him the Church had no history. She was ever
abiding in a continuous present.�

After all—it has been persistently asked—can one really
"know" history, that is, the past? How can one discern,
with any decent measure of security, what actually did happen
in the past? Our pictures of the past are so varied, and
change from one generation to another, and even differ from one historian to the next. Are they anything but subjective opinions, impressions, or interpretations? The very possibility of any historical knowledge seemed to be compromised by the skeptical exploits of the learned. It seemed that even the Bible could no longer be retained as a book of history, although it could be kept as a glorious paradeigma of the eternal Glory and Mercy of God. Moreover, even if one admits that Christians are, by vocation, historians, it can be contended that they are bound to be bad historians, or unreliable historians, since they are intrinsically "committed" in advance. It is commonly agreed that the main virtue of a historian is his impartiality, his freedom from all preconceptions, his radical Voraussetzungslosigkeit. Now, obviously, Christians, if they are believing and practicing Christians, cannot conscientiously dispense with their formidable "bias," even if they succeed in preserving their intellectual honesty and integrity. Christians, by the very fact of their faith and allegiance, are committed to a very particular interpretation of certain events of history, and also to a definite interpretation of the historic process itself, taken as a whole. In this sense, they are inevitably prejudiced. They cannot be radically critical. They would not agree, for instance, to handle their sacred books as "pure literature," and would not read the Bible simply as the "epic" of the Jews. They would not surrender their belief in the crucial uniqueness of Christ. They would not consent to rule out the "supernatural" element from history. Under these conditions, is any impartial and critical study of history possible at all? Can Christians continue as Christians in the exercise of their profession? How can they vindicate their endeavor? Can they simply divorce their professional work, as historians, from their religious convictions, and write history as anyone else may do it, as if they were in no way informed by the faith?

The easiest answer to this charge is to declare that all historians have a bias. An unbiased history is simply impossible, and actually does not exist. In fact, "evolutionary" historians are obviously no less committed than those who
believe in the Biblical revelation, only they are committed to another bias. Ernest Renan and Julius Wellhausen were no less committed than Ricciotti or Père Lagrange, and Harnack and Baur no less than Bardy or Lebreton, and Reitzenstein and Frazer much more than Dom Odo Casel and Dom Gregory Dix. They were only committed to different things. One knows only too well that historical evidence can be twisted and distorted in compliance with all sorts of "critical" preconceptions, even more than it has been done sometimes in obedience to "tradition."

This kind of argument, however, is very ambiguous and inconclusive. It would lead, ultimately, to a radical skepticism and would discredit the study of history of any kind. It actually amounts to a total surrender of all claims and hopes for any reliable historical knowledge. It seems, however, that, in the whole discussion, one operates usually with a very questionable conception of the historical study, with a conception derived from another area of inquiry, namely, from the natural sciences. It is assumed in advance that there is a universal "scientific method" which can be applied in any field of inquiry, regardless of the specific character of the subject of study. But this is a gratuitous assumption, a bias, which does not stand critical test and which, in fact, has been vigorously contested, in recent decades, both by historians and by philosophers. In any case, one has, first of all, to define what is the nature and specific character of "the historical" and in what way and manner this specific subject can be reached and apprehended. One has to define the aim and purpose of historical study and then to design methods by which this aim, or these aims, can be properly achieved. Only in this perspective can the very question of "impartiality" and "bias" be intelligently asked and answered.

II

The study of history is an ambiguous endeavor. Its very objective is ambiguous. History is the study of the past. Strictly speaking, we have at once to narrow the scope of the inquiry. History is indeed the study of the human past.
An equation of human history and natural history would be an unwarranted presupposition or option. Much harm has been done to the study of history by such naturalistic presuppositions, which amount, in the last resort, to the denial of any specific character of human existence. Anyhow, "the past" as such cannot be "observed" directly. It has actually passed away and therefore is never given directly in any "possible experience" (to use the phrase of John Stuart Mill). The knowledge of the past is necessarily indirect and inferential. It is always an interpretation. The past can only be "reconstructed." Is it a possible task? And how is it possible? Actually, no historian begins with the past. His starting point is always in the present, to which he belongs himself. He looks back. His starting point is his "sources," the primary sources. Out of them, and on their authority, he proceeds to the "recovery" of the past. His procedure depends upon the nature and character of his information, of his sources.

What are these sources? What makes a certain thing a source for the historian? In a certain sense, almost everything, omnis res scibilis, can serve as a historical source, provided the historian knows how to use it, how to read the evidence. But, on the other hand, no thing at all is a historical source by itself, even a chronicle, or a narrative, or even an autobiography. Historical sources exist, in their capacity as sources, only in the context of a historical inquiry. Things are mute by themselves, even the texts and speeches: they speak only when they are understood; they render answers only when they are examined, as witnesses are examined, when proper questions are asked. And the first rule of the historical craft is precisely to cross-examine the witnesses, to ask proper questions, and to force the relics and the documents to answer them. In his admirable little book, Apologie pour l'Histoire, ou Metier d'Historien, Marc Bloch illustrates this rule with convincing examples.

Before Boucher de Perthes, as in our own days, there were plenty of flint artifacts in the alluvium of Somme. However, there was no one to ask questions, and there was therefore no prehistory. As an old medievalist, I know nothing which is better reading than a cartulary. That is because I know just about what
to ask it. A collection of Roman inscriptions, on the other hand, would tell me little. I know more or less how to read them, but not how to cross-examine them. In other words, every historic research presupposes that the inquiry has a direction at the very first step. In the beginning there must be the guiding spirit. Mere passive observation, even supposing such a thing were possible, has never contributed anything productive to any science. This remark of a conscientious and critical scholar is revealing. What he actually suggests is that all historical inquiry is, by definition, as a true inquiry, "prejudiced" from the very start—prejudiced because directed. Otherwise there would have been no inquiry, and the things would have remained silent. Only in the context of a guided inquiry do the sources speak, or rather only in this context do "things" become "sources," only when they are, as it were, exorcised by the inquisitive mind of the historian. Even in the experimental science, facts never speak by themselves, but only in the process, and in the context, of a directed research, and no scientific experiment can ever be staged, unless an "experiment in mind" has been previously performed by the explorer. Observation itself is impossible without some interpretation, that is, understanding.

The study of history has been sorely handicapped by an uncritical and "naturalistic" conception of historical sources. They have been often mistaken for independent entities, existing before and outside of the process of the historical study. A false task was consequently imposed on the historian: he was supposed to find history in the sources, while handling them precisely as "things." Nothing could come out of any such endeavor but a pseudo history, a history made "with scissors and paste," a "history without the historical problem," as Benedetto Croce aptly has styled it. Certain historians have deliberately sought to reduce themselves to the role of reporters, but even reporters must be interpretative and selective, if they want to be intelligible. In fact, historical sources cannot be handled simply as "relics," "traces," or "imprints" of the past. Their function in the historical research is quite different. They are testimonies rather than traces. And no testimony can be assessed except in the process of interpretation. No collection of factual statements, no com-
pilation of news and dates, is history, even if all facts have been critically established and all dates verified. The best catalogue of an art museum is not a history of art. A catalogue of manuscripts is not a history of literature, not even a history of handwriting. No chronicle is history. In the sharp phrase of Benedetto Croce, a chronicle is but a "corpse of history," *il cadavere*. A chronicle is but "a thing" (*una cosa*), a complex of sounds and other signs. But history is "an act of the spirit," *un atto spirituale.* "Things" become "sources" only in the process of cognition, in relation to the inquiring intellect of the student. Outside of this process historical sources simply do not exist.

The question a historian asks is the question about meaning and significance. And things are then treated as signs and witnesses of the past reality, not simply as relics or imprints. Indeed, only signs can be interpreted, and not "pure facts," since the question about meaning points beyond pure giveness. There are things insignificant and meaningless, and they cannot be understood or interpreted at all, precisely because they are meaningless, just as in a conversation we may fail to understand certain casual remarks, which were not intended to convey any message. Indeed, historical cognition is a kind of conversation, a dialogue with those in the past whose life, thoughts, feelings, and decisions the historian endeavors to rediscover, through the documents by which they are witnessed to or signified. Accordingly, one can infer from certain facts, words or things, as from a sign to the meaning, only if and when these objective things can be lawfully treated as signs, that is, as bearers of meaning, only when and if we can reasonably assume that these things have a dimension of depth, a dimension of meaning. We do not assign meaning to them: we should detect meaning. Now, there is meaning in certain things, in our documents and sources, only in so far as behind them we are entitled to assume the existence of other intelligent beings.

History is accordingly a study of the human past, not of any past as such. Only man has history, in the strict sense of this word. R. G. Collingwood elaborates this point with
great clarity. Close similarity between the work of an archaeologist and that of a paleontologist is obvious: both are diggers. Yet, their aims are quite different. "The archaeologist's use of his stratified relics depends upon his conceiving them as artifacts serving human purposes and thus expressing a particular way in which men have thought about their own life." In the study of nature, on the other hand, there is no such distinction between the "outside" and the "inside" of the data. "To the scientist, nature is always and merely a 'phenomenon,' not in the sense of being defective in reality, but in the sense of being a spectacle presented to his intellectual observation; whereas the events of history are never mere phenomena, never mere spectacles for contemplation, but things which the historian looks, not at, but through, to discern the thought within them." Historical documents can be interpreted as signs because they are charged with meaning, as expressions or reflections, deliberate or spontaneous, of human life and endeavor.

Now, this meaning is available for others only in so far as a sufficient identification can be achieved between the interpreter and those whose thoughts, actions, or habits he is interpreting. If this contact, for any reason, has not been established, or cannot be established at all, no understanding is possible and no meaning can be elicited, even if the documents or relics are charged with meaning, as it is, for instance, in the case of an undecipherable script. Again, "testimonies" can be misunderstood and misinterpreted, just as we often misunderstand each other in an actual conversation or fail to find a "common language"—then no communication is possible; just as we may misinterpret a foreign text, not only because we simply make mistakes in translation, but also when we fail to enter congenially into the inner world of those persons whose testimonies we are deciphering. An Einfühlung into the witnesses is an obvious prerequisite of understanding. We are actually deciphering each other's words even in an ordinary conversation, and sometimes we fail sorely to achieve any satisfactory result. The problem of semantics, that is, of intelligent communication—a communication between intelligent beings—is in-
herent in the whole process of historical interpretation. In the phrase of Ranke, "history only begins when monuments become intelligible." One should add that only "intelligible documents" are, in a full sense, historical documents, historical sources—as H. I. Marrou puts it, "dans la mesure où l'historien peut et sait y comprendre quelque chose." Consequently, the person of the interpreter belongs to the actual process of interpretation no less than the data to be interpreted, just as both partners in a conversation are essential for a successful dialogue. No understanding is possible without some measure of "congeniality," of intellectual or spiritual sympathy, without a real meeting of minds. Collingwood is right in pointing out that historical inquiry reveals to the historian the power of his own mind... Whenever he finds certain historical matters unintelligible, he has discovered a limitation of his own mind, he has discovered that there are certain ways in which he is not, or no longer, or not yet, able to think. Certain historians, sometimes whole generations of historians, find in certain periods of history nothing intelligible, and call them dark ages; but such phrases tell us nothing about those ages themselves, though they tell us a great deal about the persons who use them, namely that they are unable to re-think the thoughts which were fundamental to their life.

It is the first rule of the true exegesis: we have to grasp the mind of the writer, we must discover exactly what he intended to say. The phrase, or the whole narrative, or the whole document, can be misunderstood when we fail to do so, or when we read our own thought into the text. No sentence, and no text, should be dismissed as "meaningless" simply because we fail to detect meaning. We misread the text when we take literally that which has been said metaphorically, and also when we interpret that which was meant to be an actual story just as a parable.

You cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken or written statements, even though he has spoken or written with perfect command of language and perfectly truthful intention. In order to find out his meaning you must also know what the question was (a question in his own mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to which the thing he has said or written was meant as an answer.

It is true of our actual conversations, in the intercourse of
current life. It is true of our study of the historical sources. Historical documents are *documents of life*.

Every historian begins with certain data. Then, by an effort of his searching and inquisitive mind, he apprehends them as "witnesses," or, as it were, "communications" from the past, that is, as meaningful signs. By the power of his intellectual intuition, he grasps the meaning of these signs, and thus recovers, in an act of "inductive imagination," that comprehensive setting in which all his data converge and are integrated into a coherent, that is, intelligible, whole. There is an inevitable element of guess, or rather of "divination," in this process of understanding, as there is, unavoidably, a certain element of guess in every attempt to understand another person. A lack of congenial guess, or imaginative sympathy, may make any conversation impossible, since no real *contact of minds* has been established, as if the participants spoke different languages, so that utterances of one person did not become messages for the other. In a sense, any act of understanding is a "mental experiment," and divination is always an indispensable element therein. Divination is a kind of mental vision, an indivisible act of insight, an act of imagination, inspired and controlled by the whole of one's acquired experience. One may suggest it is an act of "fantasy," but it is fantasy of a very special kind. It is a *cognitive fantasy* and, as Benedetto Croce eloquently explains, without it historical knowledge is simply impossible: senza questa ricostruzione o integrazione fantastica non e dato ne scrivere storia, ne leggerla e intenderla. It is, as he says, a "fantasy in the thought" (la fantasia nel pensiero e per pensiero), a "concreteness of the thought" which implies judgment and is therefore logically disciplined and controlled, and thereby clearly distinguished from any poetical license.¹⁶ "Understanding is Interpretation, whether of a spoken word, or of the meaningful events themselves," as it was stated by F. A. Trendelenburg: *Alles Verstandniss ist Interpretation, sei es des gesprochenen Wörtes oder der sinnvollen Erscheinungen selbst.*¹⁷ The art of hermeneutics is the core of the historical craft. And, as it has been aptly put by a Russian scholar, "one must observe as one reads,
and not read as one observes.\textsuperscript{18} "To read," whether texts or events themselves, means precisely "to understand," to grasp the inherent meaning, and the understanding intellect cannot be ruled out of the process of understanding, as the reader cannot be eliminated out of the process of reading.

Historians must be critical of themselves, probably even more critical of themselves than of their sources as such, since the sources are what they are, that is, "sources," precisely in proportion to the questions which the historian addresses to them. As H. I. Marrou says, "a document is understood precisely in the measure in which it finds a historian capable of appreciating most deeply its nature and its scope," dans la mesure où il se rencontrera un historien capable d'apprécier avec plus de profondeur sa nature et sa portée.\textsuperscript{19} 'Now, the kind of questions a particular historian is actually asking depends ultimately upon his stature, upon his total personality, upon his dispositions and concerns, upon the amplitude of his vision, even upon his likes and dislikes. One should not forget that all acts of understanding are, strictly speaking, personal, and only in this capacity of personal acts can they have any existential relevance and value. One has to check, severely and strictly, one's prejudices and presuppositions, but one should never try to empty one's mind of all presuppositions. Such an attempt would be a suicide of mind and can only issue in total mental sterility. A barren mind is indeed inevitably sterile. Indifference, or neutrality and indecision, are not virtues, but vices, in a historian as well as in a literary critic, as much as one should claim "objectivity." Historical understanding is ultimately an intelligent response to the challenge of the sources, a deciphering of signs. A certain measure of relativity is inherent in all acts of human understanding, as it is inevitable in personal relations. Relativity is simply a concomitant of relations.

The ultimate purpose of a historical inquiry is not in the establishment of certain objective facts, such as dates, places, numbers, names, and the like, as much as all this is an indispensable preliminary, but in the encounter with living beings. No doubt, objective facts must be first carefully established, verified and confirmed, but this is not the final
aim of the historian. History is precisely, to quote H. I. Marrou once more, "an encounter with the other"—"l'histoire est rencontre d'autrui." A narrow mind and an empty mind are real obstacles to this encounter, as they obviously are in all human relations. History, as a subject of study, is history of human beings, in their mutual relationship, in their conflicts and contacts, in their social intercourse, and in their solitude and estrangement, in their high aspirations and in their depravity. Only men live in history—live, and move, and strive, and create, and destroy. Men alone are historic beings, in a full sense of the word. In the historical understanding we establish contact with men, with their thoughts and endeavors, with their inner world and with their outward action. In this sense, Collingwood was undoubtedly right in insisting that "there are no mere 'events' in history."

What is miscalled an "event" is really an action, and expresses some thought (intention, purpose) of its agent; the historian's business is therefore to identify this thought.

In this sense, Collingwood insisted, "history proper is the history of thought." It would be unfair to dismiss this contention as a sheer intellectualism, as an unwelcome ghost of obsolete Hegelianism. Collingwood's emphasis is not so much on the thought as such, but on the intelligent and purposeful character of human life and action. In history, there are not only happenings and occurrences, but actions and endeavors, achievements and frustrations. This only gives meaning to human existence.

In the last resort, history is history of man, in the ambiguity and multiplicity of his existence. This constitutes the specific character of historical cognition and of historical knowledge. Accordingly, methods must be proportionate to the aim. This has been often ignored in the age of militant and doctrinaire positivism, and is still often forgotten in our time. Objective knowledge, more geometrico, is impossible in history. This is not a loss, however, since historical knowledge is not a knowledge of objects, but precisely a knowledge of subjects—of "co-persons," of "co-partners" in the quest of life. In this sense, historical knowledge is, and must be, an
existential knowledge. This constitutes a radical cleavage between the "study of Spirit" and the "study of Nature," between die Geisteswissenschaften and die Naturwissenschaft.²²

III

It has been often contended, especially by the historians of the old school, that historians are led, in the last resort, in their study, by the desire "to know the past as an eyewitness may know it," that is, to become, in some way, just a "witness" of the past events.²³ In fact, this is precisely what the historian cannot do, and never does, and never should attempt to do, if he really wants to be a historian. Moreover, it is by no means certain that an eyewitness of an event does really "know" it, that is, does understand its meaning and significance. An ambition to perform an impossible and contradictory task only obscures the understanding of that which a historian actually does do, if only he does a "historical" work.

The famous phrase of Leopold von Ranke, suggesting that historians "wish to know the actual past"—wie es eigentlich gewesen—has been much abused.²⁴ First of all, it is not fair to make of a casual remark by the great master of history a statement of principle. In any case, in his own work, Ranke never followed this alleged prescription of his, and was always much more than a chronicler. He always was aiming at an interpretation.²⁵ Obviously, historians want to know what actually has happened, but they want to know it in a perspective. And, of course, it is the only thing they can actually achieve. We can never remember even our own immediate past, exactly as we have lived it, because, if we are really remembering, and not just dreaming, we do remember the past occurrences in a perspective, against a changed background of our enriched experience. Collingwood described history as "re-enactment of past experience," and there is some truth in this description, in so far as this "re-enactment" is an integral moment of "understanding identification," which is indispensable in any conversation. But one should not mistake one's own thoughts for the
thoughts of others. Collingwood himself says that the objects of historical thought are "events which have finished happening, and conditions no longer in existence," that is, those events which are "no longer perceptible." Historians look at the past in a perspective, as it were, at a distance. They do not intend to reproduce the past event. Historians want to know the past precisely as the past, and consequently in the context of later happenings. "Un temps retrouvé," that is, recaptured in an act of intellectual imagination, is precisely "un temps perdu," that is, something that really did pass away, something that has been really lost, and only for that reason, and in this capacity of a "lost moment," can it be searched for and rediscovered.

Historical vision is always a retrospective vision. What was a future for the people of the past, is now for historians a past. In this sense, historians know more about the past than people of the past themselves were ever able to know. Historians are aware of the impact of the past, of certain past events, on the present. As historians, we cannot visualize the glorious Pentekontaetia of Pericles, except in the perspective of the subsequent doom and collapse of Athenian democracy. Or, in any case, such an attempt, even if it were possible (which it is not), would in no sense be a historical endeavor. A perspective and a context are constitutive factors of all true historical understanding and presentation. We cannot understand Socrates properly and historically if we ignore the impact of his challenge and thought, as it has been actually manifested in the later development of Greek philosophy. Indeed, we would know much less about the "true," that is, historical, Socrates if we endeavored to see him, as it were, in vacuo, and not against the total historical background, which for us includes also that which for Socrates himself was still an unrealized and unpredictable future.

After all, history is neither spectacle nor panorama, but a process. The perspective of time, of concrete time, filled with events, gives us the sense of direction which was probably lacking in the events themselves, as they actually happened. Of course, one can make an effort to forget, or
to ignore, what one does actually know, that is, the perspective. Whether one can really succeed in doing so is rather doubtful. But even if this were possible, would this be really a historical endeavor? As has been recently said, "to attempt to make oneself a contemporary of the events and people whose history one is writing, means, ultimately, to put oneself in the position which excludes history." No history without a retrospect, that is, without perspective. 28

No doubt, retrospection has its dangers. It may expose us to "optical illusions." In retrospect, we may discover in the past, as it were, "too much," not only if we happen to read anything into the past events, but also because from a certain point of view certain aspects of the past may be seen in a distorted or exaggerated shape. We may be tempted to exaggerate unduly and out of proportion the role and impact of certain historic personalities or institutions, because their images have been disproportionately magnified in our apprehension by the particular perspective in which we are looking at them. And very often the perspective is simply imposed upon us: we cannot change our position. We may be tempted to establish wrong ancestries of trends and ideas, mistaking similarities for actual causal links, as has been done more than once in the history of Early Christianity, and indeed in many other fields. In brief, we may look at the past in a wrong perspective, without knowing it and without any means of correcting our vision. In any case, our perspective is always limited. We can never have a total perspective. Yet, on the other hand, we can never see the past in no perspective at all. The ultimate aim of the historian is indeed to comprehend the whole context, at least in a particular "intelligible, that is self-explanatory field" of research (the phrase is Toynbee's). Obviously, this aim is never achieved, and for that reason all historical interpretations are intrinsically provisional.

The historian is never content with a fragmentary vision. He tends to discover, or to presuppose, more order in the flux of events than probably there ever was. He tends to exaggerate the cohesion of various aspects of the past. As H. I. Marrou describes the historian's procedure, he endeavors,
for the sake of intelligibility, to substitute "an orderly vision," une vision ordonnée, for that "dust of small facts" of which the actual happening seems to consist. No historian can resist doing so, and no historian can avoid doing so. It is at this point, however, that utter caution must be exercised. Historians are always in danger of overrationalizing the flux of history. So often instead of living men, unstable and never fully "made up," historians describe fixed characters, as it were, some typical individuals in characteristic poses. It is, more or less, what the painters of portraits sometimes do, and by that device they may achieve impressiveness and convey a vision. This was the method of ancient historians, from Thucydides to Polybius and Tacitus. This is what Collingwood described as the "substantialism" of ancient historiography, and it was what made that historiography, in his opinion, "unhistorical." But the same method has been persistently used by many modern historians. It suffices to mention Mommsen (in his Roman History), George Grote, Taine, Ferrero. To the same category belong the numerous stories of Christ in modern historiography from Keim and Ernest Renan to Albert Schweitzer. In a sense, it is a legitimate device. A historian tends to overcome, in a synthetic image, the empirical complexity and often confusion of individual bits, and occurrences, to organize them into a coherent whole, and to relate the multiplicity of occurrences to the unity of a character. This is seldom done in a logical way, by a rational reconstruction. Historians act rather as inductive artists, go by intuition. Historians have their own visions. But these are transforming visions. It is by this method that all major generalizations of our historiography have been created: the Hellenic mind; the medieval man; the bourgeois; and the like. It would be unfair to contest the relevance of these categorical generalizations, which must be clearly distinguished from the generic generalizations. And yet, it would be precarious to claim that these generalized "types" do really exist, that is, exist in time and space. They are, as it were, valid visions, like artistic portraits, and, as such, they are indispensable tools of understanding. But "typical men" are different from real
men of flesh and blood. Of similar character are also our sociological generalizations: the city-state of Ancient Greece; the feudal society; capitalism; democracy; and so on. The main danger of all these generalizations is that they overstress the inner "necessity" of a particular course of behavior. A man, as a "type" or a "character," seems to be predestined to behave in his "typical" manner. There seems to be a typical pattern of development for each kind of human society. It is but natural that in our time the mirage of "historical inevitability" had to be exposed and disavowed, as a distorting factor of our historical interpretation. There is indeed an inherent determinism in all these typical and categorical images. But they are no more than a useful shorthand for the "dust of facts." The actual history is fluid and flexible and ultimately unpredictable.

The tendency toward determinism is somehow implied in the method of retrospection itself. In retrospect we seem to perceive the logic of the events, which unfold themselves in a regular order, according to a recognizable pattern, with an alleged inner necessity, so that we get the impression that it really could not have happened otherwise. The ultimate contingency of the process is concealed in the rational schemes, and sometimes it is deliberately eliminated. Thus, events are losing their eventuality, and appear to be rather inevitable stages of development or decay, of rise and fall, according to a fixed ideal pattern. In fact, there is less consistency in actual history than appears in our interpretative schemes. History is not an evolution, and the actual course of events does not follow evolutionary schemes and patterns. Historical events are more than happenings; they are actions, or complexes of actions. History is a field of action, and behind the events stand agents, even when these agents forfeit their freedom and follow a pattern or routine, or are overtaken by blind passions. Man remains a free agent even in bonds. If we may use another biological term, we may describe history rather as epigenesis than as "evolution," since evolution always implies a certain kind of "pre-formation," and "development" is no more than a disclosure of "structure." There is always some danger that we may mistake our con-
ceptual visions for empirical realities and speak of them as if they were themselves factors and agents, whereas, in fact, they are but rational abbreviations for a multiplicity of real personal agents. Thus we venture to describe the evolution of "feudalism" or of "capitalistic society," forgetting that these terms only summarize a complex of diverse phenomena, visualized as a whole for the sake of intelligibility. "Societies," "categories," and "types" are not organisms, which only can "evolve" or "develop," but are complexes of co-ordinated individuals, and this co-ordination is always dynamic, flexible, and unstable.

All historical interpretations are provisional and hypothetical. No definitive interpretation can ever be achieved, even in a limited and particular field of research. Our data are never complete, and new discoveries often compel historians to revise radically their schemes and to surrender sometimes their most cherished convictions, which may have seemed firmly established. It is easy to quote numerous examples of such revision from various areas of historical study, including church history. Moreover, historians must, from time to time, readjust themselves to the changes in the surrounding world. Their vision is always determined by a certain point of view, and thereby limited. But the perspective itself unfolds in the course of actual history. No contemporary historian can commit himself to the identification of the Mediterranean world with the Oicoumene, which was quite legitimate in the ancient time. These limitations do not discredit the endeavor of historians. It may even be suggested that a "definitive" interpretation of events would eliminate the "historicity" of history, its contingency and eventuality, and substitute instead a rational "map of history," which may be lucid and readable, but will be existentially unreal. Again, our interpretations are also facts of history, and in them the depicted events continue their historical existence and participate in the shaping of historical life. One may argue whether the "Socrates of Plato" is a "real" Socrates, but there is little doubt that this Socrates of Plato had its own historical existence, as a powerful factor in the shaping of our modern conception of "philosopher."
It seems that our interpretations disclose, in some enigmatic way, the hidden potentialities of the actual past. It is in this way that traditions are formed and grow, and the greatest of all human traditions is "culture," in which all partial and particular contributions of successive ages are melted together, synthetically transformed in this process of melting, and are finally integrated into a whole. This process of formation of human culture is not yet completed, and probably will never be completed within the limits of history. This is an additional reason why all historical interpretations should be provisional and approximative: a new light may be shed on the past by that future which has not yet arrived.

IV

It has been recently suggested that "if history has meaning, this meaning is not historical, but theological; what is called Philosophy of history is nothing else than a Theology of history, more or less disguised." In fact, the term "meaning" is used in different senses when we speak of the meaning of particular events or of the sets of actions and events, and when we speak of the Meaning of History, taken as an all-inclusive whole, that is, in its entirety and universality. In the latter case, indeed, we are speaking actually of the ultimate meaning of human existence, of its ultimate destiny. And this, obviously, is not a historical question. In this case we are speaking not of that which has happened—and this is the only field in which historians are competent—but rather of that which is to happen, and is to happen precisely because it "must" happen. Now, it can be rightly contended that neither "the ultimate" nor "the future" belongs to the realm of historical study, which is, by definition, limited to the understanding of the human past. Historical predictions, of necessity, are conjectural and precarious. They are, in fact, unwarranted "extrapolations." Histories of men and societies are history, but the History of Man, a truly universal and providential History, is no longer just history.
In fact, all modern "philosophies of history" have been crypto-theological, or probably pseudo-theological: Hegel, Comte, Marx, even Nietzsche. In any case, all of them were based on beliefs. The same is true of the modern substitute for the Philosophy of history, which is commonly known as Sociology, and which is, in fact, a Morphology of history, dealing with the permanent and recurrent patterns or structures of human life. Now, is Man, in the totality of his manifold and personal existence, a possible subject of a purely historical study and understanding? To claim that he is, by itself is a kind of theology, even if it turns out to be no more than an "apotheosis of man." On the other hand—and here lies the major predicament of all historical study—no historian can, even in his limited and particular field, within his own competence, avoid raising ultimate problems of human nature and destiny, unless he reduces himself to the role of a registrar of empirical happenings and forfeits his proper task of "understanding." In order to understand, just historically, for instance, "the Greek mind," the historian must, of necessity, have his own vision, if not necessarily original, of the whole range of those problems with which the "noble spirits" of Antiquity were wrestling, in conflict with each other and in succession. A historian of philosophy must be, to a certain extent, a philosopher himself. Otherwise he will miss the problems around which the quest of philosophers has been centered. A historian of art must be, at least, an amateur—otherwise he will miss the artistic values and problems. In brief, the problem of Man transpires in all problems of men, and accordingly cannot be skipped over in any historical interpretation. Moreover, in a certain sense, historical endeavor, as such, aims in the last resort at something which, of necessity, transcends its boundaries.

The process of historical interpretation is the process in which the Human Mind is built and matures. It is a process of integration, in which particular insights and decisions of various ages are accumulated, confronted, dialectically reconciled, vindicated or discriminated, or even discarded and condemned. If history, as the process of human life through
ages, has any meaning, any "sense," then obviously the study of history, if it is more than a matter of curiosity, must also have a meaning, a certain "sense." And if historical understanding is the historian's "response" to the "challenge" of that human life which he is exploring, it is of utter importance that historians should be prepared, and inwardly equipped, to meet this challenge of human existence in its fullness and in its ultimate depth.

Thus, contrary to the current prejudice, in order to be competent within his proper field of interpretation, a historian must be responsive to the whole amplitude of human concerns. If he has no concerns of his own, concerns of the others will seem nonsensical to him, and he will hardly be able to "understand" them and hardly competent to appraise them. A historian indifferent to the urgency of the philosophical quest may find, with full conviction, that the whole history of philosophy has been just a story of intellectual vagaries or "vain speculations." In the same way, an areligious historian of religion may find, again with naive conviction and with an air of superiority, that the whole history of religions has been but a history of "frauds" and "superstitions," of various aberrations of the human mind. Such "histories of religion" have been manufactured more than once. For similar reasons, certain sections and periods of history have been denounced, and consequently dismissed and ignored, as "barbarian," "dead" or "sterile," as "dark ages," and the like. The point is that even a pretended neutrality, an alleged freedom from bias, is itself a bias, an option, a decision. In fact, again contrary to the current prejudice, commitment is a token of freedom, a prerequisite of responsiveness. Concern and interest imply commitment. Now, obviously, one cannot be committed in general, in abstracto. Commitment is necessarily discriminative and concrete. And consequently, not all commitments would operate in the same manner and not to the same effect. In any case, the openness of mind is not its emptiness, but rather its comprehensiveness, its broad responsiveness, or, one is tempted to say, its "catholicity." Now, there is here more than just a gradation, as it were, in volume or capacity.
"The whole" (to kath’olou) is not just a sum total of various "particularisms" (ta kata merous), even if these particularisms are dialectically arrayed (as they were, for instance, in the Hegelian map of intellect) or discriminated as "stages of the progress" (as was done, for instance, by Auguste Comte). Particularisms must be done away, and catholicity of mind can be achieved only by a new, integrating reorientation, which would necessarily imply a certain radical discrimination. For in the last resort one cannot evade the ultimate discrimination between "yes" and "no"—and the compromise of "more or less" is just "no" in polite disguise.

In any case, historical interpretation involves judgment. The narrative itself will be twisted and distorted if the historian persists in evading judgment. There is little difference, in this case, between discussing the Greco-Persian War and World War II. No true historian would escape taking sides: for "freedom" or against it. And his judgment will tell in his narrative. No historian can be indifferent to the cleavage between "Good" and "Evil," much as the tension between them may be obscured by various speculative sophistications. No historian can be indifferent, or neutral, to the challenge and claim of Truth. These tensions are, in any case, historical facts and existential situations. Even a denial is a kind of assertion, and often a resolute one, charged with obstinate resistance. Agnosticism itself is intrinsically dogmatic. Moral indifference can but distort our understanding of human actions, which are always controlled by certain ethical options. An intellectual indifferentism would have the same effect. Precisely because human actions are existential decisions, their historical interpretation cannot avoid decisions.

Accordingly, a historian, precisely as historian, that is, as interpreter of human life as it has been actually lived in time and space, cannot evade the major and crucial challenge of this actual history: "Who do men say that I am?" (Mark 8:28). For a historian, precisely in his capacity of an interpreter of human existence, it is a crucial question. A refusal to face a challenge is already a commitment. A refusal to answer a certain question is also an answer. Abstention from
judgment is also judgment. An attempt to write history, evading the challenge of Christ, is in no sense a "neutral" endeavor. Not only in writing a "Universal History" (die Weltgeschichte), that is, in interpreting the total destiny of mankind, but also in interpreting any particular sections or "slices" of this history, is the historian confronted with this ultimate challenge because the whole of human existence is confronted with this challenge and claim. A historian's response prejudges the course of his interpretation, his choice of measures and values, his understanding of human nature itself. His response determines his "universe of discourse," that setting and perspective in which he endeavors to comprehend human life, and exhibits the amplitude of his responsiveness. No historian should ever pretend that he has achieved a "definitive interpretation" of that great mystery which is human life, in all its variety and diversity, in all its misery and grandeur, in its ambiguity and contradictions, in its basic "freedom." No Christian historian should lay such claims either. But he is entitled to claim that his approach to that mystery is a comprehensive and "catholic" approach, that his vision of that mystery is proportionate to its actual dimension. Indeed, he has to vindicate his claim in the practice of his craft and vocation.

The rise of Christianity marks a turning point in the interpretation of history. Robert Flint, in his renowned book, History of the Philosophy of History, says:

The rise of ecclesiastical history was more to historiography than was the discovery of America to geography. It added immensely to the contents of history, and radically changed men's conceptions of its nature. It at once caused political history to be seen to be only a part of history, and carried even into the popular mind the conviction of which hardly a trace is to be found in the classical historians—that all history must move towards some general human end, some divine goal.83

Contemporary writers are even more emphatic at this point. For, indeed, the rise of Christianity meant a radical reversal of man's attitude toward the fact of history. It meant actually
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the discovery of the "historic dimension," of the historic time. Strictly speaking, it was a recovery and extension of the Biblical vision. Of course, no elaborate "philosophy of history" can be found in the books of the Old Testament. Yet, there is in the Bible a comprehensive vision of history, a perspective of an unfolding time, running from a "beginning" to an "end," and guided by the will of God, leading His people to His own goal and purpose. In this perspective of dynamic history early Christians have assessed and interpreted their new experience, the Revelation of God in Christ Jesus.

Classical historians held a very different view of human history. The Greeks and the Romans were indeed a history-writing people. But their vision of history was basically unhistorical. They were, of course, desperately interested in the facts of history, in the facts of the past. It might be expected that they would accordingly be well qualified for the historian's task. In fact, by their basic conviction they were rather disqualified for that task. The Greek mind was "in the grip of the past." It was, as it were, charmed by the past. But it was quite indifferent and uncertain with regard to the future. Now, the past itself acquires its historic character and significance only in the perspective of the future. "Time's arrow" was totally missing in the classical vision of human destiny. Great historians of Greece and Rome were not, in any sense, philosophers. At their best, they were fine observers, but rather moralists or artists, orators and politicians, preachers or rhetoricians, than thinkers. Ancient philosophers, again, were not interested in history, as such, as a contingent and accidental flux of events. They endeavored, on the contrary, to eliminate history, to rule it out, as a disturbing phenomenon. Philosophers of ancient Greece were looking for the permanent and changeless, for the timeless and immortal. Ancient historiography was emphatically pessimistic. History was a story of unavoidable doom and decay. Men were confronted with a dilemma. On the one hand, they could simply "resign" and reconcile themselves to the inevitability of "destiny," and even find joy and satisfaction in the contemplation of harmony and
splendor of the cosmic whole, however indifferent and inimical it might be to the aims and concern of individuals and societies. This was the *catharsis* of tragedy, as tragedy was understood in the classical world. Or, on the other hand, men could attempt an escape, a "flight" out of history, out of this dimension of flux and change—the hopeless *wheel of genesis and decay*—into the dimension of the changeless.

The ancient pattern of historical interpretation was "cosmic," or "naturalistic." On the one hand, there was a biological pattern of growth and decay, the common fate of everything living. On the other hand, there was an astronomical pattern of periodical recurrence, of circular motion of heavens and stars, a pattern of "revolutions" and cycles. Indeed, both patterns belonged together, since the cycles of the earth were predetermined and controlled by the circles of the heavens. Ultimately, the course of history was but an aspect of the inclusive cosmic course, controlled by certain inviolable laws. These laws were implied in the structure of the universe. Hence the whole vision was essentially fatalistic. The ultimate principle was *tyche* or *heimarmene*, the cosmic "destiny" or *fatum*. Man's destiny was implied and comprehended in that astronomical "necessity." The Cosmos itself was conceived as an "eternal" and "immortal," but periodical and recurrent, being. There was an infinite and continuous reiteration of the same permanent pattern, a periodical renewal of situations and sequences. Consequently, there was no room for any progress, but only for "re-olutions," re-circulation, *cyclophoria* and *anacyclosis*. Nothing "new" could be added to the closed perfection of this periodical system. Accordingly, there was no reason, and no motive, to look forward, into the future, as the future could but disclose that which was already preformed in the past, or rather in the very nature of things (*physis*). The permanent pattern could be better discerned in the past, which has been "completed" or "perfected" (*perfectum*), than in the uncertainty of the present and future. It was in the past that historians and politicians were looking for "patterns" and "examples."

It was especially in the later philosophical systems of the
The Predicament of the Christian Historian

Hellenistic age that these features of "permanence" and "recurrence" were rigidly emphasized—by the Stoics, the Neopythagoreans, the Platonics, the Epicureans alike. *Eadem sunt omnia semper nec magis est neque erit mox quam fuit ante.* But the same conviction was already dominant in the classical age. Professor Werner Jaeger admirably summarizes the main convictions of Aristotle:

> In this setting of thought there was no room for any conception of "history," whether of the world or of man and human societies. There was a *rhythm* in the cosmic process, and consequently in the destiny of man, but *no direction*. History was not going or moving anywhere. It was only rotating. It had no end, as it had no goal. It had only structure. The whole of ancient philosophy was, in fact, a system of "general morphology" of being. And it was also essentially political or social. Man was conceived as an essentially "social being," *zoon politicon*, and his personal uniqueness was hardly acknowledged at all. Only "typical" situations were regarded as relevant. Nor was the uniqueness of any event acknowledged. Only "patterns" were relevant. There was a great variety of views and shades of opinion within this general and common pattern of the Greek and Hellenistic thought; there were inner tensions and conflicts.
therein, which must be carefully discerned and acknowledged. But the basic vision was the same in all these variations on the same theme: an "eternal Cosmos," the "endless returns," the ominous "wheel of genesis and decay."

Against this kind of background, and in this perspective, Christianity meant an intellectual revolution, a radical reversal of standards, a new vision and orientation. Christianity is an *eschatological religion* and, for that very reason, is *essentially historical*. Recent theological controversy has sorely obscured the meaning of these terms, and some explanation is required to prevent confusion and misunderstanding.

The starting point of the Christian faith is the acknowledgment of certain actual events, in which God has acted, sovereignly and decisively, for man's salvation, precisely "in these last days." *In this sense these facts—Christ's* coming into the world, his Incarnation, his Cross and Resurrection, and the Descent of the Holy Spirit—*are eschatological events*: unique and "ultimate," that is, decisive, "critical" and crucial, wrought once forever, *ephapax*. In a certain sense, they are also *final events*, the accomplishment and fulfillment of the Messianic prophecy and promise. In this sense, they assume their significance in the perspective of a past history which they "conclude" and "fulfill." *They are eschatological because they are historical*, that is, because they are situated in a sequence of the antecedent events, and thereby validate retrospectively the whole series. *In this sense, Christ is "the end of history,"* that is, of a particular "section" of history, though not of history as such. History, as such, is far from being terminated or abrogated by Christ's coming, but is actually going on, and *another eschatological event* is anticipated and expected to terminate history, *the Second Coming*. This entire pattern of interpretation is definitely *linear*, running from the beginning to the end, from Creation to Consummation, *but the line is broken, or rather "bent,"* at a particular "crucial" or "turning point. *This point is the center of history,* of the "history of salvation," *die Heilsgeschichte*. Yet, paradoxically, "beginning," "center," and "end" coincide, not at "events," but in the person of the Redeemer. Christ is both *alpha* and *omega*, "the First" and "the Last,"
as well as the center. **In another sense, Christ is precisely the Beginning.** The new *aion* has been inaugurated in his coming. "The Old" has been completed, but "the New" just began.

Time was in no sense "devaluated" by Christ's coming. On the contrary, time was validated by his coming, by him and through him. It was "consecrated" and given meaning, the new meaning. In the light of Christ's coming history now appears as a "pro-gress," inwardly ordered toward "the end," to which it unfailingly precipitates. The hopeless "cycles" have been exploded, as St. Augustine used to say. It was revealed that there was no rotation in history, but, on the contrary, an unfolding of a singular and universal purpose. In this perspective of a unique and universal history, all particular events are situated in an irreversible order. "Singularity" of the events is acknowledged and secured.

Now, it can be contended that the Biblical vision of history was not, in fact, a "history of man," but rather "the history of God," the story of God's rule in history. Indeed, the main emphasis of the Bible is precisely on God's lordship, both in the world at large and in history in particular. But *precisely because history was apprehended as "God's history," the "history of man" was made possible*. Man's history was then apprehended as a *meaningful story* and no longer as a reiteration of the cosmic pattern, nor as a chaotic flux of happenings. The history of men was understood in the perspective of their salvation, that is, of the accomplishment of their destiny and justification of their existence. Man's action has been thereby justified and stimulated, since he was give na task, and a purpose. God has acted, and His ultimate action in Christ Jesus was a consummation of His continuous actions in the past, "at sundry times and in diverse manners." Yet, His manifold actions were *not simply particular cases* or instances of a certain general law, *but were singular events*. One can never suppress personal names in the Bible. The Bible can never be, as it were, "algebraized." Names can never be replaced by symbols. There was a dealing of the Personal God with human persons. And this dealing culminated in the Person of Jesus Christ, who came "in the fullness of time," to "complete" the Old and to "inaugurate"
the New. Accordingly, there are two basic themes in the Christian understanding of history.

First, there is a retrospective theme: the story of the Messianic preparation. Secondly, there is a prospective theme, opening the vistas of the "end of history." The Christian approach to history, so radically different from that of the ancient world, is by no means just a subjective reorientation of man in time. An existential revaluation of time itself is implied. Not only was the human attitude changed when a new and unique term of reference was inserted into the flux of events, but the character of historical time itself has been changed. What was of decisive importance was that God's revelation in Jesus Christ was of an ultimate character, disclosing a new dimension of human existence. The decisive contribution of the Christian faith to the understanding of history was not in the detection of the radical "historicity" of man's existence, that is, of his finite relativity, but precisely in the discovery of perspective in history, in which man's historical existence acquires relevance and meaning. Therefore, the modern existentialist emphasis on "man's historicity" is, in fact, neither historical nor distinctively Christian. It is, in many instances, rather a relapse into Hellenism. "Man's historicity" means, in certain existentialist interpretations, nothing more than man's essential temporality, his inextricable involvement in the comprehensive context of passing occurrences, which brings him, finally, to extinction, to death. This diagnosis reminds one, however, more of the tragic insight of the Ancients than of the jubilant News of the Gospel. The original Christian kerygma not only intended to expose the misery and "nothingness" of sinful man, and to announce the Divine judgment, but above all it proclaimed the value and dignity of man—God's creature and adoptive child—and offered empirical man, miserable and spiritually destitute, God's "enemy," and yet beloved of God, the way of salvation. It was not only a condemnation of the Old, but an inauguration of the New, of "the acceptable year of the Lord."

Now, it is precisely at this point that a radical disagreement among Christian interpreters arises. Is there anything
else to happen "in history" which may have any ultimate existential relevance for man, after Christ's coming? Or has everything that could be accomplished in history already been achieved? History, as a natural process, is, of course, still continuing—a human history. But does the Divine history continue as well? Has history any constructive value now, after Christ? or any "meaning" at all? It is sometimes contended that, since the ultimate Meaning has been already manifested and the Eschaton has already entered history, history has been, as it were, "closed" and "completed," as a meaningful process, and eschatology has been "realized." This implies a specific interpretation of the "turning-point" of history which was the coming of Christ. It is sometimes assumed that there was, indeed, a sacred history in the past, just up to the coming of Christ Jesus, in which it was "consummated," but that after him there is in history only an empty flux of happenings, in which the nothingness and vanity of man is constantly being exposed and manifested, but nothing truly "eventful" can ever take place, since there is nothing else to be accomplished within history. This assumption has been variously phrased and elaborated in contemporary theological thought. It may take a shape of the "realized Eschatology," and then meaning is shifted from the realm of history to the realm of sacramental experience, in which the Eschaton is present and reenacted. It may take the shape of a "consequent Eschatology," and then history appears to be just a great Interim between the great events in the past and in the future, between the "first" and "second" comings of the Lord, devoid of any constructive value, just a period of hope and expectation. Or else history may be "interiorized," and the realm of meaning would be confined to the experience of individual believers, making "decisions." In all these cases, history as an actual course of events in time and space is denied any "sacred" character, any positive significance. Its course is apprehended as a continuous unfolding of human vanity and impotence.

It has been, in fact, recently suggested that "a Christian history" is simply nonsense. It has been contended that "the message of the New Testament was not an appeal to his-
This radical eschatologism, which simply "dismantles" all human history, is open to serious theological doubt. Indeed, it is a theological, and not a historical, assumption. It is rooted in a one-sided theological vision in which God alone is seen active, and man is just an object of Divine action, in wrath or mercy, and never an agent himself. But it is this "inhuman" conception of man, and not "the message of the New Testament," which makes nonsense of human history. The message of the New Testament, on the contrary, makes sense of history. In Christ, and by him, Time was itself, for the first time, radically and existentially validated. History has become *sacred* in its full dimension since "the Word was made flesh," and the Comforter descended into the world for its cleansing and sanctification. Christ is ever abiding in his Body, which is the Church, and in her the *Heilsgeschichte* is effectively continued. The *Heilsgeschichte* is still going on. It is obviously true that in practice it is utterly difficult to discern the pattern of this ongoing "history of salvation" in the perplexity of historical events, and historians, including Christian historians, must be cautious and modest in their endeavor to decipher the hidden meaning of the particular events. Nevertheless, the historian must be aware of that new "situation" which has been created in history by the Coming of Christ: there is "now" nothing "neutral" in the human sphere itself, since the Cross and Resurrection, since the Pentecost. Accordingly, the whole of history, even "the hopeless history of the world," appears now *in the perspective of an ultimate, eschatological conflict*. It was in this perspective that St. Augustine undertook his survey of historical events in his story of the "Two Cities." It may be difficult to relate the *Heilsgeschichte* to the general history of the world. On the other hand, the Church is *in the world*. Its actual history may be often distorted by worldly accretions. Yet "salvation" has also a historical dimension. The Church is the leaven of history. As Cyril C Richardson has aptly observed recently, the history of the Church bears a *prophetic* character, no less than the sacred
history of the Bible. "It is a part of revelation—the story of the Holy Ghost."\textsuperscript{40}

One may suggest that in the modern "hyper-eschatologism," with its implicit radical devaluation of history, we are facing in fact a revival of the Hellenic anti-historicism, with its failure to ascertain any constructive value in temporal action. Of course, eschatologists of various descriptions protest their allegiance to the Bible and abjure all Hellenism. They would indignantly repudiate any charge of philosophy. However, the close dependence of Rudolf Bultmann upon Martin Heidegger is obvious. In fact, they advocate the same position as the Greek philosophy, so far as the understanding of history is concerned. Obviously there is a profound difference between a subjection to the \textit{fatum}, whether it is conceived as a blind \textit{heimarmene} or as a "fiery Logos," and the proclamation of an impending and imminent judgment of the eternal God. Yet in both cases \textit{human action} is radically depreciated, if for different reasons, and is denied any constructive task. This makes the understanding of history an impossible and even a nonsensical endeavor, except in the form of a general exposure of man's vanity and pride, of his utter impotence even in his ambition and pride. Under the guise of prophecy, history of this kind is in danger of degenerating into \textit{homiletic} exercise. It is true that, in a certain sense, the modern radical eschatologism may be regarded as a logical consequence of the reduced conception of the Church, which was so characteristic of certain trends of the Reformation. The Church was still recognized as the area of an "invisible" action and operation of God, but she was denied precisely her historical significance. The modern recovery of the integral doctrine of the Church, which cuts across the existing denominational borders, may lead to the recovery of a deeper historical insight and may restate history in its true existential dimension.\textsuperscript{41}

Strangely enough, for those who reduce the Church to the role of \textit{an eschatological token} and refuse to regard her as a kind of \textit{proleptic eschatology}, history inevitably becomes again essentially a "political history," as it was in classical times. It is again conceived as a story of states and nations,
and as such it is denounced and condemned. Paradoxically, it ceases to be, in this interpretation, the history of man. It is assumed that man has nothing to do, that is, to create or to achieve. He simply expects judgment, or, in any case, stands under it. But in fact, man is becoming—or, indeed, is failing to become—himself precisely in his historical struggle and endeavor. Eschatologism, on the contrary, condemns man to a dreamy mysticism, that very trap and danger which eschatologists pretend and attempt to evade. He is doomed to detect and contemplate, unredeemably, the abyss of his nothingness, is exposed to dreams and nightmares of his own vanity and spiritual sickness. And a new mythology emerges out of these unhealthy dreams. Whatever kind of "man's historicity" may be claimed as a discovery of such an impoverished Christianity, the actual historicity of man is thereby, implicitly or often quite explicitly, denied and prohibited. Then history, in such an interpretation, actually becomes "hopeless," without a task, without a theme, without any meaning. Now, the true history of man is not a political history, with its Utopian claims and illusions, but a history of the spirit, the story of man's growth to the full stature of perfection, under the Lordship of the historical God-man, even of our Lord, Christ Jesus. It is a tragic story, indeed. And yet the seed matures, not only for judgment, but also for eternity.

The Christian historian does not proceed actually "on Christian principles," as is sometimes suggested. Christianity is not a set of principles. The Christian historian pursues his professional task of interpreting human life in the light of his Christian vision of that life, sorely distorted by sin, yet redeemed by Divine mercy, and healed by Divine grace, and called to the inheritance of an everlasting Kingdom. The Christian historian will, first of all, vindicate "the dignity of man," even of fallen man. He will, then, protest against any radical scission of man into "empirical" and "intelligible" fractions (whether in a Kantian fashion or in any other) of which the former is doomed and only the latter is promised salvation. It is precisely the "empirical man" who needs salvation, and salvation does not consist
merely in a kind of disentanglement of the "intelligible character" out of the empirical mess and bondage. Next, the Christian historian will attempt to reveal the actual course of events in the light of his Christian knowledge of man, but will be slow and cautious in detecting the "providential" structure of actual history, in any detail. Even in the history of the Church "the hand of Providence" is emphatically hidden, though it would be blasphemous to deny that this Hand does exist or that God is truly the Lord of History. Actually, the purpose of a historical understanding is not so much to detect the Divine action in history as to understand the human action, that is, human activities, in the bewildering variety and confusion in which they appear to a human observer. Above all, the Christian historian will regard history at once as a mystery and as a tragedy—a mystery of salvation and a tragedy of sin. He will insist on the comprehensiveness of our conception of man, as a prerequisite of our understanding of his existence, of his exploits, of his destiny, which is actually wrought in his history.48

The task of a Christian historian is by no means an easy task. But it is surely a noble task.
Antinomies of Christian History: Empire and Desert

CHRISTIANITY ENTERED HISTORY as a new social order, or rather a new social dimension. From the very beginning Christianity was not primarily a "doctrine," but exactly a "community." There was not only a "Message" to be proclaimed and delivered, and "Good News" to be declared. There was precisely a New Community, distinct and peculiar, in the process of growth and formation, to which members were called and recruited. Indeed, "fellowship" (koinonia) was the basic category of Christian existence. Primitive Christians felt themselves to be closely knit and bound together in a unity which radically transcended all human boundaries—of race, of culture, of social rank, and indeed the whole dimension of "this world." They were brethren to each other, members of "One Body," even of the "Body of Christ." This glorious phrase of St. Paul admirably summarizes the common experience of the faithful. In spite of the radical novelty of Christian experience, basic categories of interpretation were taken over from the Old Testament, of which the New Covenant was conceived to be the fulfilment and consummation. Christians were indeed "a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a people set apart" (I Peter 2:9). They were the New Israel, the "Little Flock," that is,

that faithful "Remnant" to which it was God's good pleasure to give the Kingdom (Luke 12:32). Scattered sheep had to be brought together into "one fold," and assembled. The Church was exactly this "Assembly," ekklesia tou Theou,—a permanent Assembly of the new "Chosen People" of God, never to be adjourned.

In "this world" Christians could be but pilgrims and strangers. Their true "citizenship," politeuma, was "in heaven" (Phil. 3:20). The Church herself was peregrinating through this world (paroikousa). "The Christian fellowship was a bit of extra-territorial jurisdiction on earth of the world above" (Frank Gavin). The Church was an "outpost of heaven" on the earth, or a "colony of heaven." It may be true that this attitude of radical detachment had originally an "apocalyptic" connotation, and was inspired by the expectation of an imminent parousia. Yet, even as an enduring historical society, the Church was bound to be detached from the world. An ethos of "spiritual segregation" was inherent in the very fabric of the Christian faith, as it was inherent in the faith of Ancient Israel. The Church herself was "a city," a polis, a new and peculiar "polity." In their baptismal profession Christians had "to renounce" this world, with all its vanity, and pride, and pomp,—but also with all its natural ties, even family ties, and to take a solemn oath of allegiance to Christ the King, the only true King on earth and in heaven, to Whom all "authority" has been given. By this baptismal commitment Christians were radically separated from "this world." In this world they had no "permanent city." They were "citizens" of the "City to come," of which God Himself was builder and maker (Hebr. 13:14; cf. 11:10).

The Early Christians were often suspected and accused of civic indifference, and even of morbid "misanthropy," odium generis humani,—which should be probably contrasted with the alleged "philanthropy" of the Roman Empire. The charge was not without substance. In his famous reply to Celsus, Origen was ready to admit the charge. Yet, what else could Christians have done, he asked. In every city, he explained, "we have another system of allegiance," allo
Along with the civil community there was in every city another community, the local Church. And she was for Christians their true home, or their "fatherland," and not their actual "native city." The anonymous writer of the admirable "Letter to Diognetus," written probably in the early years of the second century, elaborated this point with an elegant precision. Christians do not dwell in the cities of their own, nor do they differ from the rest of men in speech and customs. "Yet, while they dwell in the cities of Greeks and Barbarians, as the lot of each is cast, the structure of their own polity is peculiar and paradoxical.... Every foreign land is a fatherland to them, and every fatherland is a foreign land. Their conversation is on the earth, but their citizenship is in heaven." There was no passion in this attitude, no hostility, and no actual retirement from daily life. But there was a strong note of spiritual estrangement: "and every fatherland is a foreign land." It was coupled, however, with an acute sense of responsibility. Christians were confined in the world, "kept" there as in a prison; but they also "kept the world together," just as the soul holds the body together. Moreover, this was precisely the task allotted to Christians by God, "which it is unlawful to decline" (Ad Diognetum, 5, 6). Christians might stay in their native cities, and faithfully perform their daily duties. But they were unable to give their full allegiance to any polity of this world, because their true commitment was elsewhere. They were socially committed and engaged in the Church, and not in the world. "For us nothing is more alien than public affairs," declared Tertullian: neculla magis res aliena quam publica (Apologeticum, 38.3). "I have withdrawn myself from the society," he said on another occasion: secessi de populo (De Pallio, 5). Christians were in this sense "outside society," voluntary outcasts and outlaws,—outside of the social order of this world.

It would be utterly misleading to interpret the tension between Christians and the Roman Empire as a conflict or clash between the Church and the State. Indeed, the Christian Church was more than "a church," just as ancient Israel was
at once a "church" and a "nation." Christians also were a nation, a "peculiar people," the People of God, tertium genus, neither Jew nor Greek. The Church was not just a "gathered community," or a voluntary association, for "religious" purposes alone. She was, and claimed to be, a distinct and autonomous "society," a distinct polity." On the other hand, the Roman Empire was, and claimed to be, much more than just "a state." Since the Augustan reconstruction, in any case, Rome claimed to be just the City, a permanent and "eternal" City, Urbs aeterna, and an ultimate City also. In a sense, it claimed for itself an "eschatological dimension." It posed as an ultimate solution of the human problem. It was a Universal Commonwealth, "a single Cosmopolis of the inhabited earth," the Oikoumene. Rome was offering "Peace," the Pax Romana, and "Justice" to all men and all nations under its rule and sway. It claimed to be the final embodiment of "Humanity," of all human values and achievements. "The Empire was, in effect, a politico-ecclesiastical institution. It was a 'church' as well as a 'state'; if it had not been both, it would have been alien from the ideas of the Ancient World" (Sir Ernest Barker). In the ancient society—in the ancient polis, in Hellenistic monarchies, in the Roman republic—"religious" convictions were regarded as an integral part of the political creed. "Religion" was an integral part of the "political" structure. No division of competence and "authority" could ever be admitted, and accordingly no division of loyalty or allegiance. The State was omnipotent, and accordingly the allegiance had to be complete and unconditional. Loyalty to the State was itself a kind of religious devotion, in whatever particular form it might have been prescribed or imposed. In the Roman Empire it was the Cult of Caesars. The whole structure of the Empire was indivisibly "political" and "religious." The main purpose of the Imperial rule was usually defined as "Philanthropy," and often even as "Salvation." Accordingly, the Emperors were described as "Saviours."

In retrospect all these claims may seem to be but Utopian delusions and wishful dreams, vain and futile, which they were indeed. Yet, these dreams were dreamt by the best people
of that time—it is enough to mention Vergil. And the Utopian dream of the "Eternal Rome" survived the collapse of the actual Empire and dominated the political thinking of Europe for centuries. Paradoxically, this dream was often cherished even by those, who, by the logic of their faith, should have been better protected against its deceiving charm and thrill. In fact, the vision of an abiding or "Eternal Rome" dominated also the Christian thought in the Middle Ages, both in the East, and in the West.

There was nothing anarchical in the attitude of Early Christians toward the Roman Empire. The "divine" origin of the State and of its authority was formally acknowledged already by St. Paul, and he himself had no difficulty in appealing to the protection of Roman magistrates and of Roman law. The positive value and function of the State were commonly admitted in the Christian circles. Even the violent invective in the book of Revelation was no exception. What was denounced there was iniquity and injustice of the actual Rome, but not the principle of political order. Christians could, in full sincerity and in good faith, protest their political innocence in the Roman courts and plead their loyalty to the Empire. In fact, Early Christians were devotedly praying for the State, for peace and order, and even for Caesars themselves. One finds a high appraisal of the Roman Empire even in those Christian writers of that time, who were notorious for their resistance, as Origen and Tertullian. The theological "justification" of the Empire originated already in the period of persecutions. Yet, Christian loyalty was, of necessity, a restricted loyalty. Of course, Christianity was in no sense a seditious plot, and Christians never intended to overthrow the existing order, although they did believe that it had ultimately to wither away. From the Roman point of view, however, Christians could not fail to appear seditious, not because they were in any sense mixed in politics, but precisely because they were not. Their political "indifference" was irritating to the Romans. They kept themselves away from the concerns of the Commonwealth, at a critical time of its struggle for existence. Not only did they claim "religious freedom" for themselves. They also claimed supreme authority
for the Church. Although the Kingdom of God was emphatically "not of this world," it seemed to be a threat to the omnicompetent Kingdom of Man. The Church was, in a sense, a kind of "Resistance Movement" in the Empire. And Christians were "conscientious objectors." They were bound to resist any attempt at their "integration" into the fabric of the Empire. As Christopher Dawson has aptly said, "Christianity was the only remaining power in the world which could not be absorbed in the gigantic mechanism of the new servile state." Christians were not a political faction. Yet, their religious allegiance had an immediate "political" connotation. It has been well observed that monotheism itself was a "political problem" in the ancient world (Eric Peterson). Christians were bound to claim "autonomy" for themselves and for the Church. And this was precisely what the Empire could neither concede, nor even understand. Thus, the clash was inevitable, although it could be delayed.

The Church was a challenge to the Empire, and the Empire was a stumbling block for the Christians.

II

The Age of Constantine is commonly regarded as a turning point of Christian history. After a protracted struggle with the Church, the Roman Empire at last capitulated. The Caesar himself was converted, and humbly applied for admission into the Church. Religious freedom was formally promulgated, and was emphatically extended to Christians. The confiscated property was restored to Christian communities. Those Christians who suffered disability and deportation in the years of persecution were now ordered back, and were received with honors. In fact, Constantine was offering to the Church not only peace and freedom, but also protection and close cooperation. Indeed, he was urging the Church and her leaders to join with him in the "Renovation" of the Empire. This new turn of Imperial policy and tactics was received by Christians with appreciation, but not without some embarrassment and surprise. Christian response to the new situation was by no means
unanimous. There were many among Christian leaders who were quite prepared to welcome unreservedly the conversion of Emperor and the prospective conversion of the Empire. But there were not a few who were apprehensive of the Imperial move. To be sure, one could but rejoice in the cessation of hostilities and in that freedom of public worship which now has been legally secured. But the major problem has not yet been solved, and it was a problem of extreme complexity. Indeed, it was a highly paradoxical problem.

Already Tertullian was asking certain awkward questions, although in his own time they were no more than rhetorical questions. Could Caesars accept Christ, and believe in Him? Now, Caesars obviously belonged to "the world." They were an integral part of the "secular" fabric, necessarii saeculo. Could then a Christian be Caesar, that is, belong at once to two conflicting orders, the Church and the World? (Apologeticum, 21.24). In the time of Constantine this concept of the "Christian Caesar" was still a riddle and a puzzle, despite the eloquent effort of Eusebius of Caesarea to elaborate the idea of the "Christian Empire." For many Christians there was an inner contradiction in the concept itself. Caesars were necessarily committed to the cause of "this world." But the Church was not of this world. The office of Caesars was intrinsically "secular." Was there really any room for Emperors, as Emperors, in the structure of Christian Community? It has been recently suggested that probably Constantine himself was rather uneasy and uncertain precisely at this very point. It seems that one of the reasons for which he was delaying his own baptism, till his very last days, was precisely his dim feeling that it was inconvenient to be "Christian" and "Caesar" at the same time. Constantine's personal conversion constituted no problem. But as Emperor he was committed. He had to carry the burden of his exalted position in the Empire. He was still a "Divine Caesar." As Emperor, he was heavily involved in the traditions of the Empire, as much as he actually endeavored to disentangle himself. The transfer of the Imperial residence to a new City, away from the memories of the old pagan Rome, was a spectacular symbol of this noble effort. Yet, the Empire
itself was still much the same as before, with its autocratic ethos and habits, with all its pagan practices, including the adoration and apotheosis of Caesars. We have good reasons to trust Constantine's personal sincerity. No doubt, he was deeply convinced that Christianity was the only power which could quicken the sick body of the Empire and supply a new principle of cohesion in the time of social disintegration. But obviously he was unable to abdicate his sovereign authority, or to renounce the world. Indeed, Constantine was firmly convinced that, by Divine Providence, he was entrusted with a high and holy mission, that he was chosen to reëstablish the Empire, and to reëstablish it on a Christian foundation. This conviction, more than any particular political theory, was the decisive factor in his policy, and in his actual mode of ruling.

The situation was intensely ambiguous. Had the Church to accept the Imperial offer and to assume the new task? Was it a welcome opportunity, or rather a dangerous compromise? In fact, the experience of close cooperation with the Empire has not been altogether happy and encouraging for Christians, even in the days of Constantine himself. The Empire did not appear to be an easy or comfortable ally and partner for the Church. Under Constantine's successors all inconveniences of "coöperation" became quite evident, even if we ignore the abortive attempt of Julian to reinstate Paganism. The leaders of the Church were compelled, time and again, to challenge the persistent attempts of Caesars to exercise their supreme authority also in religious matters. The rise of monasticism in the fourth century was no accident. It was rather an attempt to escape the Imperial problem, and to build an "autonomous" Christian Society outside of the boundaries of the Empire, "outside the camp." On the other hand, the Church could not evade her responsibility for the world, or surrender her missionary task. Indeed, the Church was concerned not only with individuals, but also with society, even with the whole of mankind. Even kingdoms of this world had to be brought ultimately into obedience to Christ. Nor was the Empire prepared to leave the Church alone, or to dispense with her help and service. The Church
was already a strong institution, strong by her faith and discipline, and spread everywhere, even to the remote corners of the inhabited earth. Thus, the Church was forced finally into alliance with the Empire, by the double pressure of her own missionary vocation and of the traditional logic of Empire.

By the end of the fourth century Christianity was ultimately established as the official religion of the Roman Empire. Under Theodosius the Great, the Roman Empire formally committed itself to the Christian cause. Paganism was legally disavowed and proscribed. "Heresy" was also outlawed. The State formally engaged in the maintenance of the Orthodox Faith. The basic presupposition of the new arrangement was the Unity of the Christian Commonwealth. There was but One and comprehensive Christian Society, which was at once a Church and a State. In this one society there were different orders or "powers," clearly distinguished but closely correlated,—"spiritual" and "temporal," "ecclesiastical" and "political." But the "Society" itself was intrinsically One. This idea was by no means a new one. Ancient Israel was at once a Kingdom and a Church. The Roman Empire has always been a "politico-ecclesiastical institution," and it also retained this double character after it had been "christened." In the Christian Commonwealth "Churchmanship" and "Citizenship" were not only "co-extensive," but simply identical. Only Christians could be citizens. And all citizens were obliged to be Orthodox in belief and behavior. The Christian Commonwealth was conceived as a single "theocratic" structure. Moreover, the Roman Empire always regarded itself as a "Universal Kingdom," as the only legitimate Kingdom, the only "Empire." As there was but One Church, the Church Universal, so there could be but One Kingdom, the Ecumenical Empire. The Church and the Kingdom were in effect but One Society, indivisible and undivided, One Civitas—Respublica Christiana. "The One Commonwealth of all mankind, conceived partly as an Empire—the surviving image of ancient Rome, but mainly and generally as a Church, is the essential society of that long period of human history which we call by the name of the Middle
Ages. It was a fact, and not merely an idea; and yet it was also an idea, and not altogether a fact" (Sir Ernest Barker).

It was a momentous and magnificent achievement, a glorious vision, an ambitious claim. But it was also an ominous and ambiguous achievement. In fact, the two orders, "spiritual" and "temporal," could never be truly integrated into one system. Old tensions continued inside of the "One Society," and the balance of "powers" in the Christian Commonwealth has been always unstable and insecure. It would be an anachronism to describe this internal tension between "powers" in the Medieval Commonwealth as a conflict or competition between the Church and the State, conceived as two distinct societies, with appropriate spheres of competence and jurisdiction. In the Middle Ages, Church and State, as two distinct societies, simply did not exist. The conflict was between the two "powers" in the same society, and precisely for that very reason it was so vigorous and acute. In this respect there was no basic difference between the Christian East and the Christian West, as different as the actual course of events has been in these two areas of the Christian Commonwealth. The major problem was the same, in the East and in the West—the problem of a "Christian Society," of a "Holy Empire." It was but natural that this problem should assume special urgency and dimension precisely in the East. In the East "the Holy Empire" was a formidable reality, "a tangible fact in an actual world," in the phrase of James Bryce, while in the West it was rather an idea, or just a claim. Since Constantine the heart of the Empire was at Constantinople, and no longer in the old City of Rome. The story of Byzantium was an immediate continuation of Roman history. In the West, Roman order disintegrated at an early date. In the East, it survived for centuries. Even in Oriental garb, Byzantium continued to be "the Kingdom of the Romans," up to its very end. The main problem of Byzantium was precisely the problem of "the Eternal Rome." The whole weight of the Empire was felt there much more than ever in the West. It is highly significant, however, that all "Byzantine problems" reappear in the West, with the same urgency and the same ambiguity, as
soon as "Empire" had been reconstituted there, under Charlemagne and his successors. Indeed, Charlemagne regarded himself as a lawful successor to Constantine and Justinian. His claims and policy in religious matters were almost identical with those of the Byzantine Caesars.

It has been often contended that in Byzantium the Church had surrendered her "freedom" into the hands of Caesars. The Byzantine system has been derogatorily labelled as a "Caesaropapism," with the assumption that Emperor was the actual ruler of the Church, even if he was never formally acknowledged to be her head. It has been said not once that in Byzantium the Church simply ceased to exist, that is, to exist as an "independent institution," and was practically reduced to the status of a "liturgical department of the Empire." The evidence quoted in support of these charges, at first glance, may seem to be abundant and overwhelming. But it does not stand a closer examination. The charge of "Caesaropapism" is still maintained in certain quarters. It has been emphatically rejected by many competent students of Byzantium as a sheer misunderstanding, as a biased anachronism. Emperors were indeed rulers in the Christian Society, also in religious matters, but never rulers over the Church.

The story of Byzantium was an adventure in Christian politics. It was an unsuccessful and probably an unfortunate experiment. Yet it should be judged on its own terms.

III

Justinian has clearly stated that basic principle of the Byzantine political system in the preface to his Sixth Novel, dated March 16, 535:

There are two major gifts which God has given unto men of His supernal clemency, the priesthood and the imperial authority—hierosyne and basileia; sacerdotium and imperium. Of these, the former is concerned with things divine; the latter presides over the human affairs and takes care of them. Proceeding from the same source, both adorn human life. Nothing is of greater concern for the emperors as the dignity of the priesthood, so that priests may in their turn pray to God for them. Now, if one is in every respect blameless and filled with confidence toward God, and
the other does rightly and properly maintain in order the commonwealth entrusted to it, there will be a certain fair harmony established, which will furnish whatsoever may be needful for mankind. We therefore are highly concerned for the true doctrines inspired by God and for the dignity of priests. We are convinced that, if they maintain their dignity, great benefits will be bestowed by God on us, and we shall firmly hold whatever we now possess, and in addition shall acquire those things which we have not yet secured. A happy ending always crowns those things which were undertaken in a proper manner, acceptable to God. This is the case, when sacred canons are carefully observed, which the glorious Apostles, the venerable eye-witnesses and ministers of the Divine World, have handed down to us, and the holy Fathers have kept and explained.

This was at once a summary, and a program. Justinian did not speak of State, or of Church. He spoke of two ministries, or of two agencies, which were established in the Christian Commonwealth. They were appointed by the same Divine authority and for the same ultimate purpose. As a "Divine gift," the Imperial power, imperium, was "independent" from the Priesthood, sacerdotium. Yet it was "dependent" upon, and "subordinate" to, that purpose for which it had been Divinely established. This purpose was the faithful maintenance and promotion of the Christian truth. Thus, if "the Empire" as such was not subordinate to the Hierarchy, it was nevertheless subordinate to the Church, which was a Divinely appointed custodian of the Christian truth. In other words, the Imperial power was "legitimate" only within the Church. In any case, it was essentially subordinate to the Christian Faith, was bound by the precepts of the Apostles and Fathers, and in this respect "limited" by them. The legal status of the Emperor in the Commonwealth depended upon his good standing in the Church, under her doctrinal and canonical discipline. Imperium was at once an authority, and a service. And the terms of this service were set in rules and regulations of the Church. In his coronation oath, the Emperor had to profess the Orthodox faith and to take a vow of obedience to the decrees of the ecclesiastical Councils. This was no mere formality. "Orthodoxy was, as it were, the super-nationality of Byzantium, the basic element of the life of the State and people" (I. I. Sokolov).
The place of Emperor in the Byzantine system was high and exalted. He was surrounded with a halo of theocratical splendor. The court ceremonial was rich and elaborate, and it was distinctively a religious ceremonial, a ritual, almost a kind of "Imperial liturgy." Yet, Emperor was no more than a layman. He had a certain position in the Church, and a very prominent and high position. But it was a lay position. There was, as it were, a special office in the Church reserved for a layman. Emperors did not belong to the regular hierarchy of the Church. They were in no sense "ministers of Word and sacraments." Some special "priestly" character might be conceded to them, and indeed has been often claimed and asserted. In any case, it was a very specific "Royal priesthood," clearly distinguishable from the "Ministerial priesthood" of the clergy. Certainly, the Emperor was a high dignitary in the Church, but in a very special sense, which it is not easy to define exactly. Whatever the original meaning of the rite of Imperial Coronation might have been—and it seems that originally it was definitely a strictly "secular" ceremony, in which even the Patriarch acted as a civil servant—gradually it developed into a sacred rite, a sacrament, if not a regular "sacrament," especially since it was combined with the rite of "anointment," a distinctively ecclesiastical rite, conferred by the Church. The rites of Imperial Coronation convey a thoroughly "consecrational" conception of the "temporal power." Probably, this "theocratical" emphasis was even stronger in the West than in Byzantium. It is specifically significant that the rite included a solemn oath to obey faithfully all rules of the Church, and above all to keep inviolate the Orthodox faith, in conformity with the Holy Scripture and the ordinances of the Councils.

The crux of the problem is in the claim of the "temporal" rulers, and in their endeavor, "to be Christian" and to perform accordingly certain Christian duties in their own right, as their own assignment. This claim implied a conviction that basically "the secular" itself was, in a certain sense, "sacred." In a Christian society nothing can be simply "secular." It may be argued that this claim was often
insincere, no more than a disguise for worldly motives and concerns. Yet it is obvious that in many instances—and one should emphasize, in all major and crucial instances—this claim was utterly sincere. Both Justinian and Charlemagne—to quote but the most spectacular cases—were deeply sincere in their endeavor to be "Christian rulers" and to promote the cause of Christ, as much as their actual policies were open to criticism. It was commonly conceded that the Emperor's duty was "to defend" the Faith and the Church, by all available means at his disposal, including even "the sword," but probably first of all by appropriate legislation. A tension would arise every time when Emperors displayed their concern for matters religious, as many Byzantine Emperors, and most of all Justinian, actually did on many occasions. In principle, this was not beyond their lawful competence. Neither "the purity of the Faith," nor "the strictness of the Canons," is a purely "clerical concern." Emperors should care for the "light belief" of the people. Nor could they be prohibited to hold theological convictions. If the right of formal decision in the matters of faith and discipline belonged to the Priesthood—and this right was never contested or abrogated—the right of being concerned about doctrinal issues could never be denied even to laymen, nor the right to voice their religious convictions, especially in the periods of doctrinal strife or confusion. Obviously, Emperors could raise their voice more powerfully and impressively than anybody else, and use their "power" (potestas) in order to enforce those convictions which they might, in full honesty, believe to be Orthodox. Yet even in this case Emperors would have to act through appropriate channels. They would have to impose their will, or their mind, upon the hierarchy of the Church, which they actually attempted to do not once, using sometimes violence, threat, and other objectionable methods. The legal or canonical form had to be observed in any case. To act in religious matters without the consent and concurrence of the Priesthood was obviously ultra vires of the Imperial power, beyond its lawful competence. Flagrant abuses by Byzantine Caesars should not be ignored. On the other hand, it is obvious that in no case
were Emperors successful when they attempted to go against the Faith of the Church. The Church in Byzantium was strong enough to resist the Imperial pressure. Emperors failed to impose upon the Church a compromise with Arians, a premature reconciliation with the Monophysites, Iconoclasm, and, at a later date, an ambiguous "reunion" with Rome:

Nothing could be more false than the charge of Caesaropapism which is generally brought against the Byzantine Church—the accusation that the Church rendered servile obedience to the orders of the Emperor even in the religious sphere. It is true that the Emperor always concerned himself with ecclesiastical affairs; he endeavored to maintain or to impose unity in dogma, but his claims were by no means always submissively recognized. Indeed, the Byzantines became accustomed to the idea that organized opposition to the Imperial will in religious matters was normal and legitimate. ... Without any suspicion of paradox the religious history of Byzantium could be represented as a conflict between the Church and the State, a conflict from which the Church emerged unquestionably the victor. (Henry Grégoire).

It can be argued that, in the course of time, the actual influence and the prestige of the Church in Byzantium were steadily growing. In this connection, the Epanagoge, a constitutional document of the late ninth century, is especially significant and instructive. It was apparently no more than a draft, which has never been officially promulgated. The draft was prepared probably by Photius, the famous Patriarch. Certain portions of the document were incorporated in the later legal compilations and received wide circulation. In any case, the document reflected the current conception of the normal relationship between the Emperor and the hierarchy, prevailing at that time. The main principle was still the same as in Justinian. But now it was elaborated with greater emphasis and precision.

The Commonwealth, politeia, is composed of several parts and members. Of these the most important, and the most necessary, are the Emperor and the Patriarch. There is an obvious parallelism between the two powers. The peace and prosperity of the people depend upon the accord and unanimity between the Imperial power and the Priesthood. The Emperor is the supreme ruler. Yet, the purpose of the Imperial rule is Beneficence, euergesia. It is an old idea,
insincere, no more than a disguise for worldly motives and concerns. Yet it is obvious that in many instances—and one should emphasize, in all major and crucial instances—this claim was utterly sincere. Both Justinian and Charlemagne—to quote but the most spectacular cases—were deeply sincere in their endeavor to be "Christian rulers" and to promote the cause of Christ, as much as their actual policies were open to criticism. It was commonly conceded that the Emperor's duty was "to defend" the Faith and the Church, by all available means at his disposal, including even "the sword," but probably first of all by appropriate legislation. A tension would arise every time when Emperors displayed their concern for matters religious, as many Byzantine Emperors, and most of all Justinian, actually did on many occasions. In principle, this was not beyond their lawful competence. Neither "the purity of the Faith," nor "the strictness of the Canons," is a purely "clerical concern." Emperors should care for the "right belief" of the people. Nor could they be prohibited to hold theological convictions. If the right of formal decision in the matters of faith and discipline belonged to the Priesthood—and this right was never contested or abrogated—the right of being concerned about doctrinal issues could never be denied even to laymen, nor the right to voice their religious convictions, especially in the periods of doctrinal strife or confusion. Obviously, Emperors could raise their voice more powerfully and impressively than anybody else, and use their "power" (potestas) in order to enforce those convictions which they might, in full honesty, believe to be Orthodox. Yet even in this case Emperors would have to act through appropriate channels. They would have to impose their will, or their mind, upon the hierarchy of the Church, which they actually attempted to do not once, using sometimes violence, threat, and other objectionable methods. The legal or canonical form had to be observed in any case. To act in religious matters without the consent and concurrence of the Priesthood was obviously ultra vires of the Imperial power, beyond its lawful competence. Flagrant abuses by Byzantine Caesars should not be ignored. On the other hand, it is obvious that in no case
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Yet, we do not find many traces of this apocalyptic dread in the writings of the Desert Fathers. Their motives for desertion were quite different. In the East, where the Monastic Movement originated, the Christian Empire was in the process of growth. In spite of all its ambiguities and shortcomings, it was still an impressive sight. After so many decades of suffering and persecution, "this World" seemed to have been opened for the Christian conquest. The prospect of success was rather bright. Those who fled into the wilderness did not share these expectations. They had no trust in the "christened Empire." They rather distrusted the whole scheme altogether. They were leaving the earthly Kingdom, as much as it might have been actually "christened," in order to build the true Kingdom of Christ in the new land of promise, "outside the gates," in the Desert. They fled not so much from the world's disasters, as from the "worldly cares," from the involvement with the world, even under the banner of Christ, from the prosperity and wrong security of the world.

Nor was the Monastic endeavor a search for "extraordinary" or "superrogatory" deeds and exploits. The main ascetical emphasis, at least at the early stage of development, was not on taking "special" or "exceptional" vows, but rather on accomplishing those common and essential vows, which every Christian had to take at his baptism. Monasticism meant first of all a "renunciation," a total renunciation of "this world," with all its lust and pomp. And all Christians were bound to renounce "the world" and to pledge an undivided loyalty to the only Lord, Christ Jesus. Indeed, every Christian was actually taking this oath of undivided allegiance at his Christian initiation. It is highly significant that the rite of Monastic profession, when it was finally established, was made precisely on the pattern of the baptismal rite, and the Monastic profession came to be regarded as a kind of "second baptism." If there was a search for "perfection" in the Monastic endeavor, "perfection" itself was not regarded as something "peculiar" and optional, but rather as a normal and obligatory way of life. If it was a "rigorism," this rigorism could claim for itself the authority of the Gospel.
It is also significant that, from the very beginning, the main emphasis in the Monastic oath was placed precisely on "social" renunciation. The novice had to disown the world, to become a stranger and pilgrim, a foreigner in the world, in all earthly cities, just as the Church herself was but a "stranger" in the earthly City, paroikousa on earth. Obviously, this was but a confirmation of the common baptismal vows. Indeed, all Christians were supposed to disown the world, and to dwell in this world as strangers. This did not necessarily imply a contempt for the world. The precept could also be construed as a call to its reform and salvation. St. Basil the Great, the first legislator of Eastern Monasticism, was desperately concerned with the problem of social reconstruction. He watched with grave apprehension the process of social disintegration, which was so conspicuously advanced in his time. His call to the formation of monastic communities was, in effect, an attempt to rekindle the spirit of mutuality in a world which seemed to have lost any force of cohesion and any sense of social responsibility. Now, Christians had to set a model of the new society, in order to counterbalance the disruptive tendencies of the age. St. Basil was strong in his conviction that man was essentially a social or "political" being, not a solitary one—zoon koinonikon. He could have learned this both from the Scripture and from Aristotle. But the present society was built on a wrong foundation. Consequently, one had first of all to retire or withdraw from it. According to St. Basil, a monk had to be "home-less" in the world, aoikos, his only home being the Church. He had to go out, or to be taken out, of all existing social structures—family, city, Empire. He had to disown all orders of the world, to sever all social ties and commitments. He had to start afresh. The later custom or rite to change the name in taking the habit was a spectacular symbol of this radical break with the previous life. But monks leave the society of this world in order to join another society, or rather to actualize in full their membership in another community, which is the Church. The prevailing form of Monasticism was "coenobitical," the life in common. The solitary life might be praised as an
exception for a few peculiar persons, but it was firmly discouraged as a common rule. The main emphasis was on obedience, on the submission of will. "Community" was always regarded as a normal and more adequate manner of ascetical life. A monastery was a corporation, "a body," a small Church. Even hermits did dwell usually together, in special colonies, under the direction of a common spiritual leader or guide. This communal character of Monasticism was strongly re-emphasized by St. Theodore of Studium, the great reformer of Byzantine Monasticism (759-826). St. Theodore insisted that there was no commandment of solitary life in the Gospel. Our Lord Himself lived in a "community" with His disciples. Christians are not independent individuals, but brethren, members of the Body of Christ. Moreover, only in community could Christian virtues of charity and obedience be properly developed and exercised.

Thus, monks were leaving the world in order to build, on the virginal soil of the Desert, a New Society, to organize there, on the Evangelical pattern, the true Christian Community. Early Monasticism was not an ecclesiastical institution. It was precisely a spontaneous movement, a drive. And it was distinctively a lay movement. The taking of Holy Orders was definitely discouraged, except by order of the superiors, and even abbots were often laymen. In early times, secular priests from the vicinity were invited to conduct services for the community, or else the neighboring Church was attended on Sundays. The monastic state was clearly distinguished from the clerical. "Priesthood" was a dignity and an authority, and as such was regarded as hardly compatible with the life of obedience and penitence, which was the core and the heart of monastic existence. Certain concessions were made, however, time and again, but rather reluctantly. On the whole, in the East Monasticism has preserved its lay character till the present day. In the communities of Mount Athos, this last remnant of the old monastic regime, only a few are in the Holy Orders, and most do not seek them, as a rule. This is highly significant. Monasticism cut across the basic distinction between clergy
and laity in the Church. It was a peculiar order in its own right.

Monasteries were at once worshipping communities and working teams. Monasticism created a special "theology of labor," even of manual labor in particular. Labor was by no means a secondary or subsidiary element of monastic life. It belonged to its very essence. "Idleness" was regarded as a primary and grievous vice, spiritually destructive. Man was created for work. But work should not be selfish. One had to work for common purpose and benefit, and especially to be able to help the needy. As St. Basil stated it, "in labor the purpose set before everyone, is the support of the needy, not one's own necessity" (Regulae fusius tractatae, 42). Labor was to be, as it were, an expression of social solidarity, as well as a basis of social service and charity. From St. Basil this principle was taken over by St. Benedict. But already St. Pachomius, the first promoter of coenobitical Monasticism in Egypt, was preaching "the Gospel of continued work" (to use the able phrase of the late Bishop Kenneth Kirk). His coenobium at Tabennisi was at once a settlement, a college, and a working camp. On the other hand, this working community was, in principle, a "non-acquisitive society." One of the main monastic vows was the complete denial of all possessions, not only a promise of poverty. There was no room whatsoever for any kind of "private property" in the life of a coenobitical monk. And this rule was sometimes enforced with rigidity. Monks should not have even private desires. The spirit of "ownership" was strongly repudiated as an ultimate seed of corruption in human life. St. John Chrysostom regarded "private property" as the root of all social ills. The cold distinction between "mine" and "thine" was, in his opinion, quite incompatible with the pattern of loving brotherhood, set forth in the Gospel. He could have added at this point also the authority of Cicero: nulla autem privata natura. Indeed, for St. John, "property" was man's wicked invention, not of God's design. He was prepared to force upon the whole world the rigid monastic discipline of "non-possession" and obedience, for the sake of the world's relief. In his opinion, separate monasteries should
exist now, in order that one day the whole world might become like a monastery.

As it has been well said recently, "Monasticism was an instinctive reaction of the Christian spirit against that fallacious reconciliation with the present age which the conversion of the Empire might seem to have justified" (Père Louis Bouyer). It was a vigorous reminder of the radical "otherworldliness" of the Christian Church. It was also a mighty challenge to the Christian Empire, then in the process of construction. This challenge could not go without a rejoinder. The Emperors, and especially Justinian, made a desperate effort to integrate the Monastic Movement into the general structure of their Christian Empire. Considerable concessions had to be made. Monasteries, as a rule, were exempt from taxation and granted various immunities. In practice, these privileges only led ultimately to an acute secularization of Monasticism. But originally they meant a recognition, quite unwillingly granted, of a certain Monastic "extra-territoriality." On the other hand, many monasteries were canonically exempt from the jurisdiction of the local bishops. During the Iconoclastic controversy, the independence of Monasticism was conspicuously manifested in Byzantium. Up to the end of Byzantium, Monasticism continued as a peculiar social order, in perpetual tension and competition with the Empire.

Obviously, actual Monasticism was never up to its own principles and claims. But its historical significance lies precisely in its principles. As in the pagan Empire the Church herself was a kind of "Resistance Movement," Monasticism was a permanent "Resistance Movement" in the Christian Society.

In the New Testament the world "Church," ekklesia, has been used in two different senses. On the one hand, it denoted the One Church, the Church Catholic and Universal, the one great Community of all believers, united "in Christ." It was a theological and dogmatic use of the
term. On the other hand, the term, used in the plural, denoted local Christian communities, or Christian congregations in particular places. It was a descriptive use of the word. Each local community, or Church, was in a sense self-sufficient and independent. It was the basic unit or element of the whole ecclesiastical structure. It was precisely the Church in a particular locality, the Church "peregrinating," paroikousa, in this or that particular city. It had, within itself, the fullness of the sacramental life. It had its own ministry. It can be asserted with great assurance that in the early second century, at least, each local community was headed by its own Bishop, episcopos. He was the main, and probably exclusive, minister of all sacraments in his Church, for his flock. His rights in his own community were commonly recognized, and the equality of all local Bishops was acknowledged. This is still the basic principle of Catholic canon law. The unity of all local communities was also commonly acknowledged, as an article of faith. All local Churches, as scattered and dispersed as they actually were in the world, like islands in a stormy sea, were essentially One Church Catholic, mia ekklesia catholike. It was, first of all, the "unity of faith" and the "unity of sacraments," testified by mutual acknowledgement and recognition, in the bond of love. Local communities were in a standing intercourse, according to the circumstances. The Oneness of the Church was strongly felt in this primitive period, and was formally professed in manifold ways: "One Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all" (Ephes. 4:5, 6). But external organization was loose. In the early years of the Church, contacts were maintained by travels and supervision of the Apostles. In the subapostolic age they were maintained by occasional visits of the Bishops, by correspondence, and in other similar ways. By the end of the second century, under the pressure of common concerns, the custom of having "Synods," that is, the gatherings of Bishops, developed. But "Synods," that is, councils, were still but occasional meetings, except probably for North Africa, for special purpose, and in a restricted area. They did not yet develop into a permanent institution. Only in
the third century did the process of consolidation advance, and led to the formation of "ecclesiastical provinces," in which several local Churches in a particular area were co-ordinated, under the presidency of the Bishop in the capital of the province. The emerging organizations seem to have followed the administrative divisions of the Empire, which was practically the only natural procedure. The local "autonomy" was still firmly preserved and safeguarded. The chief Bishop of the province, the Metropolitan, was no more than a president of the episcopal body of the province and chairman of the synods, and had some executive authority and a right of supervision only on behalf of all Bishops. He was not authorized to interfere with the regular administration of particular local episcopal districts, which came to be known as "dioceses." Although in principle the equality of all Bishops has been strongly maintained, certain particular sees came to prominence: Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, Ephesus, to mention but the most important.

The new situation obtained in the fourth century. On the one hand, it was a century of Synods. Most of these Synods, or Councils, were extraordinary meetings, convened for particular purposes, to discuss some urgent matters of common concern. Most of these Councils dealt with the matters of faith and doctrine. The aim was to achieve unanimity and agreement on principal points, and to enforce a certain measure of uniformity in order and administration. On the other hand, the Church had now to face a new problem. The tacit assumption of the basic identity between the Church and the Empire demanded a further development of administrative pattern. The provincial system, already in existence, was formally accepted and enforced. And a further centralization was envisaged. As the Commonwealth was one and indivisible, a certain parallelism had to be established between the organization of the Empire and the administrative structure of the Church. Gradually, a theory of five Patriarchates, a pentarchy, was promoted. Five principal episcopal sees were suggested, as centers of administrative centralization: Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. An independent status was conceded to the Church
of Cyprus, in consideration of its Apostolic origin and ancient glory. What was more important, the Synod system was formally enforced. The Council of Nicea ruled that Provincial Synods should be regularly held twice in the course of the year (Canon 5). According to the established custom, their competence included, first, all matters of faith and of common concern, and, secondly, those controversial matters which might emerge in the province, and also appeals from the local congregations. It does not seem that the system did work well or smoothly. The Council of Chalcedon observed that Synods were not regularly held, which led to the neglect of important business and disorder, and reconfirmed the earlier rule (Canon 19). And still the system did not work. Justinian had to concede that Synods might meet but once each year (Novel 137.4). The Council in Trullo (691-692), which codified all earlier canonical legislation, also ruled that meetings should be held yearly, and the absentees should be brotherly admonished (Canon 8). And finally, the Second Council of Nicea confirmed that all Bishops of the province should meet yearly, to discuss "canonical and evangelical matters" and to deal with "questions" of canonical character. The aim of the system was obvious. It was an attempt to create a "higher" instance in administration, above the episcopal office, in order to achieve more uniformity and cohesion. Yet, the principle of episcopal authority in local communities was still firmly upheld. Only, by that time, a Bishop was no longer the head of a single local community, but "a diocesan," that is, a head of a certain district, composed of several communities which were committed to the immediate charge of priests, or presbyters. Only acting Bishops, that is, those who were actually in office, had jurisdiction, and the authority to function as Bishops, although the retired Bishops were keeping their rank and honor. Nobody could be consecrated as a Bishop, or ordained as a priest, except to a definite "title," that is, for a particular flock. There was no ministry "at large."

The logic of the single Christian Commonwealth seemed to imply one further step. The Imperial power was centered
in one Emperor. "Was it not logical that the Priesthood, the Hierarchy, should also have one Head? This has been actually claimed, if for completely different reasons, by the Popes of Rome. The actual basis of the "Roman claims" was in the Primacy of St. Peter and in the Apostolic privileges of his See. But, in the context of the Commonwealth-idea, these claims were inevitably understood as claims for the Primacy in the Empire. The "primacy of honor" was readily conceded to the Bishop of Rome, with the emphasis on the fact that Rome was the ancient capital of the Empire. But now, with the transfer of the capital to the New City of Constantine, which has become a "New Rome," the privileges of the Bishop of Constantinople also had to be safeguarded. Accordingly, the Second Ecumenical Council (Constantinople 381) accorded to the Bishop of Constantinople "the privilege of honor," ta presbeia tes times, after the Bishop of Rome, with an open reference to the fact that "Constantinople was the New Rome" (Canon 3). This put the Bishop of Constantinople above that of Alexandria in the list of ecclesiastical precedence, to the great anger and offence of the latter. In this connection it was strongly urged that this exaltation of the Constantinopolitan See violated the prerogatives of the "Apostolic Sees," that is, those founded by the Apostles, of which Alexandria was one of the most renowned, as the See of St. Mark. Nevertheless, the Council of Chalcedon reconfirmed the decision of 381. Privileges of Rome were grounded in that it was the Capital City. For the same reason it seemed to be fair that the See of the New Rome, the residence of the Emperor and of the Senate, should have similar privileges (Canon 28). This decision provoked violent indignation in Rome, and the 28th Canon of Chalcedon was repudiated by the Roman Church. It was inevitable, however, that the prestige and influence of the Constantinopolitan Bishop should grow. In the Christian Commonwealth it was but natural for the Bishop of the Imperial City to be in the center of the ecclesiastical administration. By the time of the Council of Chalcedon, there was in Constantinople, along with the Bishop, a consultative body of resident Bishops, synodos endemousa, acting as a kind of
permanent "Council." It was also logical that, in the course of time, the Bishop of Constantinople should assume the title of an "Ecumenical Patriarch," whatever exact meaning might have been originally connected with the name. The first Bishop who actually assumed the title was John the Faster (582-593), and this again could not fail to provoke the protest from Rome. St. Gregory the Great, the Pope, accused the Patriarch of pride and arrogance. There was no personal arrogance,—the Patriarch was a severe and humble ascetic, "the Faster"—there was but the logic of the Christian Empire. Political catastrophes in the East, that is, the Persian invasion and Arab conquest, together with the secession of Monophysites and Nestorians in Syria and Egypt, reduced the rôle of the ancient great Sees in those areas, and this accelerated the rise of the Constantinopolitan See. At least de facto, the Patriarch has become the chief Bishop of the Church in the Eastern Empire. It is significant that the Epanagoge spoke plainly of the Patriarch, meaning of course the Patriarch of Constantinople. He was the opposite number to the Emperor. By that time the political unity of the Christian Commonwealth had been already broken. Byzantium had actually become precisely an Eastern Empire. And another, and rival, Empire has been founded in the West, under Charlemagne. After a period of indecision, the See of Rome finally took the side of Charlemagne. On the other hand, the missionary expansion among the Slavs in the ninth and tenth centuries greatly enlarged the area of the Constantinopolitan jurisdiction.

It is commonly admitted that "Roman Unity," the Pax Romana, facilitated the missionary expansion of the Church, which only in rare cases went beyond the boundaries of the Empire, the limes Romanus. It is also obvious that the empirical unity of the Church had been so speedily realized precisely because the Empire was one, at least in principle and in theory. Those countries which were outside of the Empire were also but loosely fit in the institutional unity of the Church. The factual identity of the main ecclesiastical organization with the Empire created considerable difficulty for those Churches which were beyond the Imperial border.
The most conspicuous example is the Church in Persia, which was compelled to withdraw from the unity with the West already in 410 and constitute itself into an independent unit, precisely because the Church in the West was too closely connected with the Roman Empire, an enemy of Persia. The split was caused by non-theological factors, and was limited to the level of administration. Thus, "Roman Unity" was at once a great advantage and a handicap for the Church's mission.

Now, it can be reasonably contended that in the period before Constantine the Church did not evolve any organization which could have enabled her to act authoritatively on a really "ecumenical" scale. The first truly "ecumenical" action was the Council in Nicea, in 325, the First Ecumenical Council. Councils were already in the tradition of the Church. But Nicea was the first Council of the whole Church, and it became the pattern on which all subsequent Ecumenical Councils were held. For the first time the voice of the whole Church was heard. The membership of the Council, however, was hardly ecumenical, in the sense of actual representation. There were but four Bishops from the West, and the Roman Bishop was represented by two presbyters. Few missionary Bishops from the East were present. The majority of Bishops present came from Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor. The same is true of all subsequent Ecumenical Councils, recognized in the Eastern Orthodox Church, up to the Second Council of Nicea, 787. Strangely enough, we do not find in our primary sources any regulations concerning the organization of the Ecumenical Councils. It does not seem that there were any fixed rules or patterns. In the canonical sources there is no single mention of the Ecumenical Council, as a permanent institution, which should be periodically convened, according to some authoritative scheme. The Ecumenical Councils were not an integral part of the Church's constitution, nor of her basic administrative structure. In this respect they differed substantially from those provincial and local Councils which were supposed to meet yearly, to transact current matters and to exercise the function of unifying supervision. The authority of the Ecumenical Councils was high, ultimate, and binding.
But Councils themselves were rather occasional and extraordinary gatherings. This explains why no Ecumenical Councils were held since 787. In the East there was a widely spread conviction that no further Councils should be held, beyond the sacred number "Seven." There was no theory of the Ecumenical Councils in Eastern theology, or in the canon law of the East. Seven Councils were, as it were, the seven gifts of God, as there were seven gifts of the Spirit, or seven Sacraments. The ecumenical authority of those Seven Councils was of a "super-canonical" character. The Eastern Church, at least, did not know any "conciliar theory" of administration, except on a local level. Such a theory was elaborated in the West, in the late Middle Ages, during the so called "Conciliar Movement" in the Western Church, in the struggle with the growing Papal centralization. It has no connection with the organization of the Ancient Church, especially in the East.

It is well known that Emperors were taking an active part in the Ecumenical Councils, and sometimes participated in the conciliar deliberations, as, for example, Constantine at Nicea. Councils were usually convened by Imperial decrees, and their decisions were confirmed by the Imperial approval, by which they were given the legally binding authority in the Empire. In certain cases, the initiative was taken by the Emperor, as it was with the Fifth Ecumenical Council, at Constantinople, 553, at which the pressure and violence of the Emperor, the great Justinian himself, was so conspicuous and distressing. These are the facts which are usually quoted as proof of the Byzantine Caesaropapism. Whatever influence the Emperors might have had on the Councils, and however real their pressure might have been, the Councils were definitely gatherings of Bishops, and only they had the authority to vote. The Imperial pressure was a fact, and not a right. The active rôle of the Emperors in the convocation of the Council, and their great concern in the matter, are completely understandable in the context of an indivisible Christian Commonwealth. It is obviously true that Ecumenical Councils were in a certain sense "Imperial Councils," die Reichskonzilien, the Councils of the Empire. But we
should not forget that the Empire itself was an *Oikoumene*. If "ecumenical" meant just "Imperial," "Imperial" meant no less than "Universal." The Empire, by conviction, always acted in behalf of the whole of mankind, as gratuitous as this assumption might have been. Attempts were made, by modern scholars, to construe the Ecumenical Councils as an Imperial institution, and, in particular, to draw a parallel between them and the Senate. This suggestion is hardly tenable. First of all, if the Senate was an institution, the Councils were just occasional events. Secondly, the Emperor's position at the Council was radically different from his position in the Senate. The vote belonged solely to the Bishops. Decisions were "acclaimed" in their name. The Emperor was an obedient son of the Church and was bound by the voice and will of the hierarchy. The number of Bishops present was, in a sense, irrelevant. They were expected to reveal the *common mind* of the Church, to testify to her "tradition." Moreover, decisions had to be unanimous: no majority vote was permissible in matters of eternal truth. If no unanimity could be achieved, the Council would be disrupted, and this disruption would reveal the existence of a schism in the Church. In any case, Bishops in the Council did not act as officials of the Empire, but precisely as "Angels of the Churches," by the authority of the Church, and by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Above all, as Edward Schwartz, the greatest modern authority on the history of the Councils, has aptly said, "the Emperor was a mortal, the Church was not."

VI

The Church is not of this world, as her Lord, Christ, was also not of the world. But He was in this world, having "humbled" Himself to the condition of that world which He came to save and to redeem. The Church also had to pass through a process of the historical *kenosis*, in the exercise of her redemptive mission in the world. Her purpose was not only to redeem men out of this world, but also to redeem the world itself. In particular, since man was essentially
"social being," the Church had to wrestle with the task of the "redemption of society." She was herself a society, a new pattern of social relationship, in the unity of faith and in the bond of peace. The task proved to be exceedingly arduous and ambiguous. It would be idle to pretend that it has been ever completed.

The "Holy Empire" of the Middle Ages was an obvious failure, both in its Western and its Eastern forms. It was at once an utopia and a compromise. The "old world" was still continuing under the Christian guise. Yet it did not continue unchanged. The impact of the Christian faith was conspicuous and profound in all walks of life. The faith of the Middle Ages was a courageous faith, and the hope was impatient. People really did believe that "this world" could be "christened" and converted, not only that it was "forgiven." There was a firm belief in the possibility of an ultimate renewal of the entire historical existence. In this conviction all historical tasks have been undertaken. There was always a double danger involved in the endeavor: to mistake partial achievements for ultimate ones, or to be satisfied with relative achievements, since the ultimate goal was not attainable. It is here that the spirit of compromise is rooted. On the whole, the only ultimate authority which has been commonly accepted at this time was that of the Christian truth, in whatever manner this truth might have been expounded and specified. The myth of "the dark Middle Ages" has been dispelled by an impartial study of the past. There was even a shift in the opposite direction. Already Romantics started preaching a "return to the Middle Ages, precisely as an "Age of faith." They were impressed by the spiritual unity of the Medieval world, in striking contrast with the "anarchy" and "confusion" of Modern times. Obviously, the Medieval world was also a "world of tensions." Yet, tensions seemed to be overarched by certain crucial convictions, or coordinated in the common obedience to the supreme authority of God. The sore shortcomings of the Medieval settlement should not be ignored or concealed. But the nobility of the task also should not be overlooked. The aim of Medieval man was to build a truly Christian Society. The urgency of
this aim has been recently rediscovered and recognized. Whatever may be said about the failures and abuses of the Medieval period, its guiding principle has been vindicated. The idea of a Christian Commonwealth is now again taken quite seriously, as much as it is still enveloped in fog and doubt, and in whatever particular manner it may be phrased in our own days. In this perspective, the Byzantine politico-ecclesiastical experiment also appears in a new light. It was an earnest attempt to solve a real problem. The experiment probably should not be reënacted, nor, indeed, can it be actually repeated in the changed situation. But lessons of the past should not be forgotten or unlearned. The Byzantine experiment was not just a "provincial," an "Eastern" experiment. It had an "ecumenical" significance. And much in the Western legacy is actually "Byzantine," both good and bad.

For obvious reasons, Monasticism could never become a common way of life. It could be, of necessity, but a way for the few, for the elect, for those who might have chosen it. An emphasis on the free decision was implied. One can be born into a Christian Society, one can be but re-born into Monasticism, by an act of choice. The impact of Monasticism was much wider than its own ranks, nor did the monks always abstain from a direct historical action, at least by the way of criticism and admonition. Monasticism was an attempt to fulfil the Christian obligation, to organize human life exclusively on a Christian basis, in opposition to "the world." The failures of historical Monasticism must be admitted and duly acknowledged. They were constantly exposed and denounced by the Monastic leaders themselves, and drastic reforms have been periodically undertaken. Monastic "de-generation" has been a favorite theme of many modern historians. And again, in recent times "the call of the Desert" has assumed a new urgency and thrill, not only attracting those who are tired of the world and are dreaming of "escape" or "refuge," but also awakening those who are zealous to enforce a "renewal" upon a world, confused by fear and despair. Monasticism attracts now not only as a school of contemplation, but also as a school of obedience, as a social experiment, as an experiment in common life.
Here lies the modern thrill of the cloister. In the context of this new experience, the legacy of Eastern and Byzantine Monasticism is being readily and gratefully received and reassessed by an increasing number of fervent Christians in the West and elsewhere.

The Church, which establishes herself in the world, is always exposed to the temptation of an excessive adjustment to the environment, to what is usually described as "worldliness." The Church which separates herself from the world, in feeling her own radical "otherworldliness," is exposed to an opposite danger, to the danger of excessive detachment. But there is also a third danger, which was probably the major danger of Christian history. It is the danger of double standards. This danger has been precipitated by the rise of Monasticism. Monasticism was not meant originally to be just a way for the few. It was conceived rather as a consequent application of common and general Christian vows. It served as a powerful challenge and reminder in the midst of all historical compromises. Yet a worse compromise has been invented, when Monasticism had been reinterpreted as an exceptional way. Not only was the Christian Society sorely rent asunder and split into the groups of "religious" and "secular," but the Christian ideal itself was split in twain and, as it were, "polarized," by a subtle distinction between "essential" and "secondary," between "binding" and "optional," between "precept" and "advice." In fact, all Christian "precepts" are but calls and advices, to be embraced in free obedience, and all "advices" are binding. The spirit of compromise creeps into Christian action when the "second best" is formally permitted and even encouraged. This "compromise" may be practically unavoidable, but it should be frankly acknowledged as a compromise. A multiplicity of the manners of Christian living, of course, should be admitted. What should not be admitted is their grading in the scale of "perfection." Indeed, "perfection" is not an advice, but a precept, which can never be dispensed with. One of the greatest merits of Byzantium was that it could never admit in principle the duality of standards in Christian life.

Byzantium had failed, grievously failed, to establish an
unambiguous and adequate relationship between the Church and the larger Commonwealth. It did not succeed in unlocking the gate of the Paradise Lost. Yet nobody else has succeeded, either. The gate is still locked. The Byzantine key was not a right one. So were all other keys, too. And probably there is no earthly or historical key for that ultimate lock. There is but an eschatological key, the true "Key of David." Yet Byzantium was for centuries wrestling, with fervent commitment and dedication, with a real problem. And in our own days, when we are wrestling with the same problem, we may get some more light for ourselves through an impartial study of the Eastern experiment, both in its hope and in its failure.
CHAPTER IV

The Iconoclastic Controversy

The ICONOCLASTIC CONTROVERSY was undoubtedly one of the major conflicts in the history of the Christian Church. It was not just a Byzantine conflict; the West was also involved in the dispute. It is true, however, that the West never followed the East in the theological argument, nor did it suffer all the implications and consequences of the Byzantine theology of the Icons. In the history of the Christian East it was, on the contrary, a turning point. All levels of life were affected by the conflict, all strata of society were involved in the struggle. The fight was violent, bitter, and desperate. The cost of victory was enormous, and tensions in the Church were not solved by it. The Church in Byzantium has never recovered again her inner unity, which had been distorted or lost in the Iconoclastic strife.

Strangely enough, we seem to have lost the key to this momentous crisis of history. The origin, the meaning, and the nature of the Iconoclastic conflict are rather uncertain and obscure. Modern historians do not agree on the main points of the interpretation. It has been fashionable for several decades, since Paparrigopoulos and Vasiljevsky, to interpret the Iconoclastic crisis primarily in political and social categories and to regard its religious aspect as a side issue. It has been variously suggested that originally the conflict had nothing to do with doctrine, and theological

arguments or charges were invented, as it were, post factum, as efficient weapons in the straggle. Some historians went so far as to suggest that the religious problem was simply a kind of a "smoke screen," manufactured and employed by the rival parties as a disguise to conceal the true issue, which was economic. Even quite recently, a prominent Byzantine scholar contended that theology "counted for nothing" in the dispute and that the whole controversy was "concerned with anything but philosophical speculation." Byzantium was supposed to have been spiritually dead and exhausted long before the Iconoclastic controversy arose, and the conflict itself was merely a symptom of sterility of the Byzantine Church. A kind of deadlock had been reached in her development. "Intellectual curiosity was practically dead. On the Orthodox side there is scarcely a sign of it." On the other hand, Iconoclasm "was in itself of little importance intellectually." The Iconoclastic struggle, therefore, should not be interpreted in the perspective of the great doctrinal conflicts of the preceding centuries; the old Christological heresies had been condemned and were dead issues by that time. Their ghosts were invoked in the Iconoclastic dispute just for the sake of polemical efficiency. And finally, it is contended that we should not dig out these corpses again.

In the light of the recent research, these arbitrary statements are hopelessly old-fashioned and out of date. The theological setting of the whole dispute has been rediscovered and reestablished by impartial scholars beyond any reasonable doubt. It is enough to quote the studies of George Ostrogorsky, Gerhart B. Ladner and, especially, Lucas Koch, O.S.B. Most modern scholars now recognize that the true problem under discussion was specifically religious, and that both parties were wrestling with real theological problems. The Iconoclastic debate was not simply ecclesiastical or ritualistic; it was a doctrinal controversy. Some ultimate issues of faith and belief were at stake. It was a real struggle for "Orthodoxy." St. John of Damascus, Patriarch Nicephorus and St. Theodore of Studium were indeed true theologians, and not just controversialists or ecclesiastical schemers. It is very instructive that a close study of the
works of Nicephorus (a large part of which is still un-
published) has compelled J. D. Andreev to revise and
reverse his earlier interpretation of the Iconoclastic con-
troversy. He began his studies in the mood of Paparrigopoulo,
but ended with a firm conviction that Iconoclasm was an
integral phase of the great Christological dispute, that
Patriarch Nicephorus was a "mighty exponent of the Greek
genius." Unfortunately, Andreev's book was never published
and his manuscript, which was ready for the printer, seems
to have been lost."

This new conclusion should not deny or minimize the
political and social aspects of the conflict. But these aspects
are to be viewed in proper perspective. All doctrinal move-
ments in the Early Church (and possibly, all doctrinal and
philosophical movements) were, in some sense, "politically
involved" and had political and social implications, and
even Monotheism itself was "a political problem." Yet, by
no means were they just an ideological superstructure over
a political or economic foundation. In the Iconoclastic con-
flict the political strife itself had a very definite theological
connotation and the "Caesaro-papalism" of the Iconoclastic
emperors was itself a kind of theological doctrine. Iconoclasm
was, no doubt, a complex phenomenon. Various groups were
associated with the movement, and their purposes and con-
cerns, their motives and aims, were by no means identical.
Probably, there was no real agreement inside the Iconoclastic
party itself, if there was a party at all or, at least, one
particular party. As a matter of fact, we know there was
considerable disagreement. And therefore, the recovery of a
theological setting or perspective does not settle all problems
at once. It brings, rather, some new problems to the fore.
We have to admit frankly that our knowledge of the epoch
is still very inadequate and incomplete. There is here still
much to be done before we could attempt an inclusive
historical synthesis. Even the major theological documents
of the epoch have not yet been properly studied. We have
no reliable book on the theology of St. Theodore of Studium,
and no monograph at all on St. Patriarch Nicephorus. And
much of the available information has been overlooked or
misinterpreted, owing to certain prejudices and presuppositions, which were never seriously scrutinized.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that, on the whole, we know and understand the position of the Iconodules much better than the theology of the Iconoclasts. The theological contentions and aspirations of the defenders of the Holy Icons are, more or less, clear and comprehensible. They were plainly stated and summarized by the prominent writers of the time. We know what they stood for and what they opposed, and what their reasons were. The theological position of the Iconoclasts, on the contrary, is still rather obscure. Of course, this is due primarily to the scarcity of information. Our documentation is fragmentary and scanty. The original writings of the Iconoclasts were almost completely destroyed by their antagonists and are to be reconstructed only upon the evidence of their enemies. To some extent this has been done. Still we do not know, exactly, what was the starting point of the Iconoclastic argument nor the real perspective of that argument. This missing perspective usually has been supplied by the conjecture of historians, as it were, by analogy. Judaic or Moslem hatred and repudiation of sacred images, on one hand, and the later Puritanical condemnation of the sacred art, on the other, seemed to provide a relevant analogy, especially because there were parallel movements of a similar type in other contexts, almost contemporaneous with the Iconoclastic outburst in Byzantium. The main problem for a historian, however, is still: what was the main inspiration of those Church groups, which committed themselves to the Iconoclastic cause? It would be a precarious endeavour to use analogy, before this first question is settled. It is a gratuitous assumption, and a too easy solution, if we simply suggest (as it had been so often done) that they were led mainly by the desire to please the Emperor. This assumption does not do full justice to the obvious facts. Bishops, as we know, did not go as far as some politicians, and yet they seemed to be quite sincerely against the Iconodulia. Even Kopronymos had to justify his policy and convictions by theological arguments, obviously, not so much to impress his opponents, as
to make a convincing appeal to his prospective supporters, and he had to speak their idiom, even if it was not his own, i.e. even if his main reason was not ultimately a theological one. And we know that the pseudo-council of 754 did not follow the Emperor's lead completely.\textsuperscript{18}

It is not the purpose of this paper to make an attempt at synthesis. Its scope and purpose is very modest and limited. I am going to bring to the fore some neglected evidence and suggest some fresh lines of research. It is to be a programme of study, not a report on achievements. We shall begin with a concrete question: What was the main authority of the Iconoclasts? It was an appeal to antiquity, and this was possibly the strongest point both of their attack and of their self-defense. It was a double appeal to Scripture and Tradition. It is usual, in modern interpretation, to give priority to their scriptural proof. Their patristic references were rather neglected. They seemed to be less instructive and convincing. But in the eighth and ninth centuries the patristic proofs would carry full weight. It seems to me, we should have given much more attention to these references, not to pass a judgment on the fight, but to ascertain the reasons and aims of the contending parties.

First of all, some few comments on the scriptural proofs will not be out of place. The Old Testament prohibition of images comes first, and the defenders of the Icons themselves gave much attention to this point. They re-interpreted in many ways this Old Testament witness. Yet, can we be sure, that it was the real focus of the debate, and was it not rather a borrowing from other literary sources? What I mean is simply this: there was a controversy between Jews and Christians, on that very point, immediately before the out-break of the Iconoclastic movement in the Byzantine Church. Obviously, in this controversy the Old Testament witness had to have an indisputable priority. We have every reason to admit that in this debate the Christian apologists developed some standard arguments and compiled some patristic \textit{testimonia} to vindicate the Christian position.\textsuperscript{18} We have no direct evidence to prove that the internecine strife within the Church was an organic continuation of the earlier Judaeo-
Christian controversy. Yet, of course, it was quite natural for both sides to use or apply the readily available arguments and "proofs." But was this really the point of the Byzantine controversy? Usually, the whole Iconoclastic argument is reconstructed as a "Semitic" objection against the "Hellenistic" re-paganization of the Church. Iconoclasm then appears to be merely Oriental resistance to a more or less acute Hellenization of Christianity. We have to concede that, in some respects, it is a very plausible hypothesis. Iconoclasm was born in the Orient, and its first promoters were Phrygian bishops (Constantine of Nacoleia and Thomas of Claudio-polis). Yet, let us not overlook the strange fact that their names completely disappear in later documents—probably because they would not appeal too much to the new strata which were sustaining the Iconoclastic cause in its later phase. Again, the Iconoclastic movement in Byzantium was preceded by a persecution of a similar character in the Caliphate. Still, no direct link with the Moslem opposition has been detected—there was no more than a parallelism and "analogy." Even the defenders of an Oriental inspiration concede that the role of the Orientals in the later development of the struggle was nul. On the other hand, the first theologian of Icons emerged in the East, in a Moslem environment, and St. John of Damascus was by no means an exceptional figure. We should not forget also that, at least in the later period of the struggle, the Iconoclastic cause was popular in the Hellenized quarters, in the court circles, and in the army, whereas in the lower classes it never had flourished, even if there are recorded some cases of violence among the masses. This observation was made by Schwartz-lose. Even if the initial impetus came from the Orient and from the masses, the movement grew rapidly on Greek soil and was supported mostly by the learned. This was the main reason Paparrigopolou construed Iconoclasm into an early system of Enlightenment. In any case, we have to warn ourselves against easy generalizations. The situation seems to have been more complicated than an Oriental hypothesis can explain. It remains to determine precisely why and how Iconoclasm could appeal to the higher clergy and other
intellectuals in Byzantium. They were the opponents with whom Nicephorus and Theodore had to debate the issue. The subservience and opportunism of these men is not an explanation. It simply explains away an unwelcome question. It has been customary to look for the "sources" of the Iconoclasm in the most remote quarters: Judaism, Islam, Paulicianists and other Oriental heresies. But Hellenistic precedents or "sources" have been overlooked or ignored.

Let us turn now to the patristic references of the Iconoclastic party. Most of them are colorless and irrelevant—detached phrases taken out of their original context. There are only two references which are of importance and can substantiate a theological thesis. First, a letter of Eusebius of Caesarea to Constantia Augusta. Secondly, quotations from Epiphanius or "Epiphanides" or Pseudo-Epiphanius, if we have to agree with Ostrogorsky on the point of the authorship. The witness of Epiphanius was discussed extensively by Holl and Ostrogorsky, and we can leave it aside in the present study. We have, however, to remember that, for Holl, the witness of Epiphanius (which he regarded as authentic) was a proof of a dogmatic connotation of the whole problem of Images, as early as the fourth century. The evidence of Eusebius, strangely enough, was never given much attention. It has often been quoted, but never properly analyzed. There is no reason whatsoever to question its authenticity." It seems to be the key-argument in the whole system of Iconoclastic reasoning. It was hardly an accident that St. Nicephorus felt compelled to write a special "Antirrheticus" against Eusebius. The name of Eusebius demands attention for another reason: the whole Iconoclastic conception of the Imperial power and authority in the Church goes back to Eusebius. There was an obvious trend of archaism in Iconoclastic policy.

The letter of Eusebius is not preserved in full. Some parts of it were quoted and discussed at the Council of Nicea and again by Nicephorus, and all excerpts available were put together by Boivin and published for the first time in the notes to his edition of Nicephorus Gregoras' History (1702). The text has been reproduced several times since, and a
critical edition is badly wanted. This time, however, we are not concerned with the exact reading.

The letter cannot be accurately dated. It was a reply to Constantia Augusta, a sister of Constantine. She had asked Eusebius to send her an "image of Christ." He was astonished. What kind of an image did she mean? Nor could he understand why she should want one. Was it a true and unchangeable image, which would have in itself Christ's character? Or was it the image he had assumed when he took upon himself, for our sake, the form of a servant? The first, Eusebius remarks, is obviously inaccessible to man; only the Father knows the Son. The form of a servant, which he took upon himself at the Incarnation, has been amalgamated with his Divinity. After his ascension into heaven he had changed that form of a servant into the splendor which, by an anticipation, he had revealed to his disciples (at the Transfiguration) and which was higher than a human nature. Obviously, this splendor cannot be depicted by lifeless colors and shades. The Apostles could not look at him. If even in his flesh there was such a power, what is to be said of him now, when he had transformed the form of a servant into the glory of the Lord and God? Now he rests in the unfathomable bosom of the Father. His previous form has been transfigured and transformed into that splendor ineffable that passes the measure of any eye or ear. No image of this new "form" is conceivable, if "this deified and intelligible substance" can still be called a "form." We cannot follow the example of the pagan artists who would depict things that cannot be depicted, and whose pictures are therefore without any genuine likeness. Thus, the only available image would be just an image in the state of humiliation. Yet, all such images are formally prohibited in the Law, nor are any such known in the churches. To have such images would have meant to follow the way of the idolatrous pagans. We, Christians, acknowledge Christ as the Lord and God, and we are preparing ourselves to contemplate him as God, in the purity of our hearts. If we want to anticipate this glorious image, before we meet him face to face, there is but one Good Painter, the Word of God himself. The main point of this
Eusebian argument is clear and obvious. Christians do not need any artificial image of Christ. They are not permitted to go back; they must look forward. Christ's "historical" image, the "form" of his humiliation, has been already superseded by his Divine splendor, in which he now abides. This splendor cannot be seen or delineated, but, in due time, true Christians will be admitted into that glory of the age to come. It would be superfluous for our present purpose to collate the parallels from the other writings of Eusebius."

This testimony of Eusebius was disavowed by the Orthodox and rejected as heretical, as betraying his impious errors. It was emphasized that Eusebius was an Arian. We would phrase this charge somewhat differently. Eusebius was an Origenist, and his letter to Constantia was composed in an Origenistic idiom. Now, we have to ask this question: was the letter of Eusebius just an accidental reference discovered (by the Iconoclasts), post factum, and brought forward, along with many others, to vindicate a thesis that had been formulated quite independently? Or, do we have here one of the original sources of the Iconoclastic inspiration, at least in its later theological form? Should we not explain the obvious popularity of the Iconoclastic bias among the learned bishops and clergy (whom it would be ridiculous to associate with either the Moslems, Paulicianists, or other obvious heretics) on the basis of their Origenistic leaning? To do this, of course, one would have to go through the list of all the bishops and clergy concerned and ascertain to what extent this suggestion could be substantiated in each particular case. We are speaking now especially of the prelates present at the Iconoclastic pseudo-councils of 754 and 815. This inquiry cannot, however, be undertaken in the present preliminary study. In any case, Origenism was by no means a dead issue by that time. Origen's spiritual ideal, through Evagrius and St. Maximus the Confessor, was integrated into the current Orthodox synthesis. For St. Maximus himself, Origenism was still a living theology and he had to wrestle with its problems and shortcomings quite in earnest. It is not yet quite certain whether he had actually overcome all of them."

This was but a century before the outbreak of Iconoclasm. The Orient
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especially was infected by Origenistic ideas of all sorts. It is true, the name of Origen was never mentioned in the Iconoclastic debate, and Nicephorus treated Eusebius simply as an Arian and does not mention Origen. We are not concerned at this point, however, with what Nicephorus had to say against Eusebius. The Origenistic character of the letter in question is beyond doubt. Obviously, the Iconoclasts would have condemned themselves, if they had dared to claim for themselves the authority of Origen. Yet, the whole tenor and ethos of Origenism was undoubtedly favorable to that course of theological reasoning which was actually adopted by the Iconoclasts. Therefore, the defense of Holy Icons was, in some sense, an indirect refutation of Origenism, a new act in the story of the "Origenistic controversies."

First of all, Origen's Christology was utterly inadequate and ambiguous. The whole set of his metaphysical presuppositions made it very difficult for him to integrate the Incarnation, as an unique historical event, into the general scheme of Revelation. Everything historical was for him but transitory and accidental. Therefore the historical Incarnation had to be regarded only as a moment in the continuous story of permanent Theophany of the Divine Logos—a central moment, in a sense, but still no more than a central symbol. In the perspective of a continuous Divino-cosmic process there was no room for a true historical uniqueness, for an ultimate decision, accomplished in time, by one major event. No event could, in this perspective, have an ultimate meaning or value by itself as an event. All events were to be interpreted as symbols or projections of some higher, super-temporal and super-historical, reality. The historical was, as it were, dissolved into the symbolic. Now, a symbol is no more than a sign, pointing to a beyond, be it eternity or "the age to come," or both at once. The whole system of symbols was something provisional, to be ultimately done away. One had to penetrate behind the screen of symbols. This was the major exegetical principle or postulate of Origen. The exegetical method of Origen, by whatever name we may label it, was meant precisely for that ultimate purpose—to transcend history, to go beyond the veil of events, beyond the "letter" which would inevitably
kill even under the New Dispensation of Grace, no less than _sub umbraculo legis_. The reality or historicity of the events was not denied, but they were to be interpreted as hints and symbols. It would be an obvious injustice, if we imputed to Origen a neglect of history, of the "historic Jesus ' and him Crucified. As Bigg has aptly remarked: "the Cross in all its wonder, its beauty, its power, was always before the eyes of Origen." This symbolism of Origen had nothing docetical about it. Yet, the "historic Cross" of Jesus was for Origen just a symbol of something higher. Only the _simpliciores_, "who are still children," could be satisfied, in Origen's opinion, with the "somatic" sense of Scripture, which is but "a shadow of the mysteries of Christ," just as the Law of old had been a shadow of good things to come. The more advanced are concerned with the truth itself, i.e. with the "Eternal Gospel" (or a "Spiritual" Gospel), of which the historic Gospel or Evangel is but an enigma and shadow. Origen emphatically distinguishes and contrasts an "external" and a "hidden" Christianity. He admits, it is true, that one has to be at once "somatic" and "pneumatic," but only for educational reasons and purposes. One has to tell the "fleshly" Christians that he does not know anything but Christ Jesus and Him Crucified. "But should we find those who are perfected in the spirit, and bear fruit in it, and are enamoured of the heavenly wisdom, these must be made to partake of that Word which, after it was made flesh, rose again to what it was in the beginning, with God." Ultimately, we have to "transform" the "sensual" Evangelium into the "spiritual", that is to say that the New Testament is to be interpreted in the same manner as the _Old—as an anticipation_. This basic orientation towards the future, towards that which is to come, implies a definite devaluation of the past, of that which had already happened. It implies also an ultimate levelling of the whole temporal process, which is but natural since everything temporal is but a symbol of the eternal, and at any point one can break into the eternal. The whole "allegorical" or rather symbolical method of interpretation implies a certain equality of the two historical dispensations: they are both, in an ultimate sense, but pro-
visional, and should be interpreted as such. Both are but "shadows," if in a different sense. And Origen concludes, therefore, that in the Old Testament the whole truth was already available for the advanced. The prophets and the sages of the Old Dispensation have actually seen and known more and better than "somatics" in the Church, "and could see better than we can the realities of which (the happenings of their times) were the shadows." They have seen the glory of Christ, the image of the invisible God, "advanced from the introduction they had in types to the vision of truth." He dwells at length on this topic and concludes: "those who were made perfect in earlier generations knew not less than the Apostles did of what Christ revealed to them, since the same teacher was with them as He who revealed to the Apostles the unspeakable mysteries of godliness." The only advantage of the Apostles was that "in addition to knowing these mysteries, they saw the power at work in the accomplished fact." The allegorical method was first invented in order to interpret the promise. It could not suit the new purpose: a Christian exegete had to interpret an achievement. In other words, a Christian allegorist was approaching the Gospel as if it were still nothing more than the Law; he approached the New Testament as if it were still the Old; he approached the achievement as if it were but a promise. There was indeed a further promise in the achievement, yet the fact of the accomplishment should not have been disregarded. And it was at that point that the "allegorical" method was bound to fail. We may describe the allegorical method as "Judaic," i.e. as an approach to the Gospel in the spirit of Prophecy. Of course, this "Judaism" was in no sense "Semitic"; it was a typical Hellenistic approach. "For the mere letter and narrative of the events which happened to Jesus do not present the whole view of the truth. For each one of them can be shown, to those who have an intelligent apprehension of Scripture, to be a symbol of something else." We have to ascend from the narratives themselves to the things which they symbolized. The story or narrative is but a starting point. One begins with Jesus of the Gospel, with Him the Crucified, but his aim should
be to arrive at the vision of the Divine glory. The humanity of Jesus is but the first and lowest step of our spiritual understanding, which is to be transcended.30

In fact, we have to deal here not only with the steps and degrees of interpretation. Jesus himself has transcended the state of his humiliation, which had been superseded and, as it were, abrogated by the state of his glorification. His humanity has not been laid aside, yet it was exalted to a higher perfection, in an intimate blending with his divinity.31

This is strong language indeed. "And truly, after his resurrection, he existed in a body intermediate, as it were, between the grossness of the one he had before his sufferings, and the appearance of a soul uncovered by such a body." And therefore, after his resurrection, Jesus simply could not appear to the people "in the same manner as before that event." Even in the days of his flesh he "was more things than one," i.e. he had no standing appearance, "nor was he seen in the same way by all who beheld him." His external outlook depended upon the measure of ability to receive him. His glorious transfiguration on the Mount was but one instance of the adaptability of his body. "He did not appear the same person to the sick, and to those who needed his healing aid, and to those who were able by reason of their strength to go up the mountain along with him."31

These varying appearances of Jesus are to be referred to the nature of the Word, who does not show himself in the same way, or indifferently, to all, but to the unprepared would appear as one "who has neither form nor beauty" (to the "sons of men") and to those who can ascend with him in a "surpassing loveliness."33

As strange and forbidding as this interpretation may seem to be, it has been preserved in the tradition up to the later ages. We find it, for example, in St. Maximus. He speaks of the mystical experience, but his phrasing is almost a literal quotation from Origen. The Lord does not appear to all in his present glory, but to those who are still under way he comes in the form of a servant, and to those who are capable of following him up to the mountain of his trans-
figuration he would appear in the form of God, in which he existed before the world began. After the resurrection it was assumed into his divinity, and could no more be distinguished from it. "Ideo omnia quod est in Christo jam nunc Filius Dei est." If he was truly man, he is now man no more, and therefore we also are no more men when we follow his words, for he, as the prototokos of all men, has transformed us into God. "51 autem Deus est qui quondam homo fuit, et oportet te illi similem fieri, 'quando similes ejus fuerimus, et viderimus eum sicut est' (I Jo. 3:2), te quoque necesse erit Deum fieri, in Christo Jesu." For our immediate purpose, there is no need to go into any further detail. The main contention of Origen is clear. And we could not fail to observe the close and intimate resemblance between Origen's ideas and those in the letter of Eusebius to Constantia. Origen's Christology was the background and presupposition of Eusebius. He drew legitimate conclusions from the principles laid down by Origen. If one walks in the steps of Origen, would he, really, be interested in any "historical" image or "ikon" of the Lord? What could be depicted was already overcome and superseded, and the true and glorious reality of the Risen Lord escapes any depiction or description. Moreover, from the Origenist point of view, the true face of the Lord could hardly be depicted even in the days of his flesh, but only his image accommodated to the capacity of a "somatic" and "fleshy" man, which "appearance" was in no sense his true and adequate image. Of course, Origen himself was not concerned with the pictorial images. Yet, what he had to say against pagan images could be very easily used against icons. Again, there was an obvious parallelism between the two problems: the problem of Scripture and the problem of pictorial representation. It was the same problem of "description." We know that this was a major topic of the whole Iconoclastic controversy. St. John of Damascus had clearly seen the connection of the two topics and problems: Scripture itself is "an image." If we apply the exegetical method of Origen to the problem
of the artistic and pictorial "description," we shall have at least to hesitate. Possibly, we would have no difficulty in accepting "symbolic" representations, just as the Bible is to be taken as a book of symbols, which, by their very nature, compel us to go beyond. But, surely, we shall be most seriously embarrassed by a "historical" image. This was exactly what had happened at the Iconoclastic pseudo-councils in 754 and 815. The very point of their argument was this: they felt very strongly the utter disproportion between all historical ("sensual") images and the "state of glory" in which both Christ and his saints were already abiding. One instance will suffice: was it permissible, so asked the Iconoclastic bishops in 754, to depict the saints, who already shine in the glory ineffable, and to recall them thereby again to earth?*

Iconoclasm was not just an indiscriminate rejection of any art. There was a wide variety of opinion among the opponents of the icons. Yet, in the main, it was rather a resistance to one special kind of religious art, namely the icon-painting, an "icon" being a representation of a true historical person, be it our Lord or a saint. This type of Christian art was growing at that time. Its birth-place was probably in Syria, and its distinctive mark was, as Louis Bréhier put it recently, "la recherche naive de la vérité historique"—a special emphasis on the historic truth." One of the favorite subjects was the Crucified Christ. It was not necessarily a "naturalism," but it was bound to be some sort of a historic realism. This was the main contention of the new trend. A true "icon" claimed to be something essentially different from a "symbol." It had to be a "representation" of something real, and a true and accurate representation. A true icon had to be, in the last resort, a historic picture. This accounts for the stability of the iconographic types in the East: there is no room for an artistic "invention." The iconographic types belong to tradition, and are stabilized by the authority of the Church. Only the execution belongs to the artist. Thus was it formulated at Nicaenum II.* The final appeal is not to an artistic imagination or to an individual vision, but to history,—to things seen and testified. In this connection, canon 82 of the Council in Trullo (691-692)
is illustrative. It deals directly only with one particular case (the immediate circumstances of the decision are uncertain), but, at least by implication, it establishes a general principle too. The Council forbids a symbolic representation of Christ as a Lamb. Apparently, the Council was objecting to a semi-historical scene: St. John the Baptist pointing to the coming Christ, and Christ represented symbolically. The reasons for prohibition are highly instructive. The lamb is a "typos," or an "image" or figure of the coming Grace, which signifies the very Lamb, Christ. Now, the old "types" and "shadows," i.e. symbols and signs, must be respected. Yet, priority belongs to "grace" and "truth," which is the fulness of the Law. The Council prescribes that Christ should be represented or depicted as man, instead of the "ancient lamb," in remembrance of His incarnation, passion and redeeming death, and of the universal redemption, thereby accomplished. It is much more than an ordinary canonical regulation, it is a doctrinal statement and pronouncement. It is a doctrinal programme, a true preamble to all subsequent literature on the Holy Icons. Strangely enough, this canon was completely overlooked by the historians of Iconoclasm. The case, to which the Council refers, seems to be very special. But the canon lays down a principle. There must have been some reason for that. What is remarkable is that the painting of icons is emphatically linked with the relation between the "types" and the (historic) "truth," or possibly between the two Testaments. We touch again upon an exegetical problem. All ancient "types" are already over, the Truth had come, Christ, the Incarnate and Crucified. It was a solemn approbation and encouragement of the new "historical" art. The phrasing seems to be deliberate. An emphasis on the "human form" of Christ was quite natural at the time when the last Christological controversy had been in the process of being settled. It directs the painter's attention to the historical achievement.

It is commonly agreed that theological defense of Holy Icons, especially by St. Theodore, but earlier by St. John of Damascus, had been based on Neo-platonic presuppositions. The whole conception of the "prototype" and the "image"
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(reflection on a lower level) was platonic. On the whole, this statement is obviously fair. Yet, it needs a qualification. In any case, the argument includes an open reference to the (historic) Incarnation. The Iconodules were not speaking simply of "images" of some "eternal" or "heavenly" realities. They were speaking precisely of the "images" of some "earthly" realities, as it were, of historic personalities, who lived in time on earth. And this makes a difference.

At this moment, we are not concerned with the doctrine of the Iconodules. Let us admit that they were platonic or rather pro-platonic. Unfortunately, it has been overlooked that there was, in Neo-platonism, an obvious Iconoclastic tendency as well. Porphyrius, in his Life of Plotinus, tells us that Plotinus, it seemed, "was ashamed to be in the flesh," and it is precisely with that statement that Porphyrius begins his biography. "And in such a frame of mind he refuses to speak either of his ancestors or parents, or of his fatherland. He would not sit for a sculptor or painter." Should one make a permanent image of this perishable frame? It was enough that one is compelled to bear it. Plotinus would gladly forget that he had an earthly biography, parents or fatherland. The philosophical aspiration of Plotinus must be carefully distinguished from an "Oriental" asceticism, Gnostic or Manichean. Plotinus was not a dualist. Yet, his practical conclusion was still that we should "retreat" from this corporeal world and escape the body. Plotinus himself suggested the following analogy. Two men live in the same house. One of them blames the builder and his handiwork, because it is made of inanimate wood and stone. The other praises the wisdom of the architect, because the building is so skillfully erected. For Plotinus this world is not evil, it is the "image" or reflection of the world above, and perhaps the best of all images. Still, one has to aspire beyond all images, from the image to the prototype, from the lower to the higher world, and Plotinus praises not the copy, but the pattern or exemplar. 

"He knows that when the time comes, he will go out and will no longer have need of any house." This was why he was unwilling to sit for a painter. The picture of this "perishable frame" could never be his
true "image," an image of his immortal self. No picture can ever be taken of the very self of man. And therefore, all pictures are deceiving. They would imprison man's imagination in a "perishable frame." Now, is not this admirable passage of Plotinus a good introduction to the Iconoclastic mind? A Christian would, of course, put the whole problem a bit differently. Possibly, instead of a "world above" he would speak of the "age to come." Yet, to the same effect. Origen, at least, was not so far from Plotinus at this point. It is interesting to notice that among the ancient testimonia, collected by the Iconoclasts, there was one of an obvious "platonic" inspiration and of an undoubtedly heretical origin. It was a quotation from the Acts of St. John. It was an exact parallel to the story told of Plotinus by Porphyry. A picture was taken of St. John, without his knowledge. He did not approve of it, nor could he recognize at once that it was really his picture, as he had never seen his face in the mirror. After all, it was but a "picture of his body." But man had to be the painter of his soul and to adorn it with faith and other virtues. "This, however, which thou hast made, is childish and imperfect; thou hast painted a dead picture of a dead thing."\(^4\)

It has been usual to interpret the Iconoclastic movement as an Oriental or Semitic reaction and resistance to an excessive Hellenization of Christian art and devotion, to the Hellenistic involvement of the Byzantine Church. But, we find nothing specifically "Semitic" in Iconoclastic theology; both the arguments and the proofs seem to be rather Hellenistic. The Iconodules were Platonic to be sure. But was not the Iconoclastic attitude also rather Platonic? And are we not to interpret the whole conflict rather as an inner split within Hellenistic Christianity? Iconoclasm was, of course, a very complex movement and its various components are to be carefully analyzed. But the main inspiration of Iconoclastic thought was Hellenistic. We must reverse the current interpretation. It was Iconoclasm that was a return to the pre-Christian Hellenism. The whole conflict can be interpreted as a new phase of an age-long process. Sometimes it has been styled as an Hellenization of Christianity. It should
be described rather as a Christianization of Hellenism. The main feature of the process was obviously the split in Hellenism or its polarization. In the Iconoclastic controversy,—at least, on its theological level—the two Hellenisms, as several times before, met again in a heated fight. The main issue was between symbolism and history. The Iconoclasts represented in the conflict an un-reformed and uncompromising Hellenic position, of an Origenistic and Platonic trend. It was not an immediate continuation of the Monophysite tradition. Yet, Monophysitism itself, as far as its theology was concerned, was a kind of Hellenism, and its roots go back to the early Alexandrian tradition, and therefore it could be easily amalgamated with Neoplatonism. The Iconodules, on the contrary, stood definitely for the "Historic Christianity." A particular topic was under discussion, but the major issues were at stake. This accounts for the bitterness and violence of the whole struggle. Not only the destiny of Christian Art was at stake, but "Orthodoxy" itself. In any case, the struggle can be understood only in the perspective of an age-long Auseinandersetzung between Christianity and Hellenism. Both parties were "Hellenistically-minded." Yet there was a conflict between a Christian Hellenism and an Hellenized Christianity, or possibly between Orthodoxy and Syncretism."

The only contention of this brief essay is to raise the question. More study will be required before an ultimate answer can be given."
CHAPTER V

Christianity and Civilization

A NEW EPOCH commences in the life of the Church with the beginning of the IVth century. The Empire accepts christening in the person of the “isapostolic” Caesar. The Church emerges from its forced seclusion and receives the seeking world under its sacred vaults. But the World brings with it its fears, its doubts and its temptations. There were both pride and despair paradoxically intermingled. The Church was called on to quench the despair and to humble the pride. The IVth century was in many respects more of an epilogue than of a dawn. It was rather a finale of an outworn history than a true beginning. Yet, a new civilization emerges often out of the ashes.

During the Nicene age for the majority the time was out of joint, and a peculiar cultural disharmony prevailed. Two worlds had come into collision and stood opposed to one another: Hellenism and Christianity. Modern historians are tempted to underestimate the pain of tension and the depth of conflict. The Church did not deny the culture in principle. Christian culture was already in the process of formation. And in a sense Christianity had already made its contribution to the treasury of the Hellenistic civilization. The school of Alexandria had a considerable impact on the contemporary experiments in the field of philosophy. But Hellenism was not prepared to concede anything to the

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Church. The attitudes of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, on one side, and of Celsus and Porphyrius, on the other, were typical and instructive. The external struggle was not the most important feature of the conflict. The inner struggle was much more difficult and tragic: every follower of the Hellenic tradition was called at that time to live through and overcome an inner discord.

Givilization meant precisely Hellenism, with all its pagan memories, mental habits, and esthetical charms. The "dead gods" of Hellenism were still worshipped in numerous temples, and pagan traditions were still cherished by a significant number of intellectuals. To go to a school meant at that time precisely to go to a pagan school and to study pagan writers and poets. Julian the Apostate was not just an out-of-date dreamer, who attempted an impossible restoration of the dead ideals, but a representative of a cultural resistance which was not yet broken from inside. The ancient world was reborn and transfigured in a desperate struggle. The whole of the inner life of the Hellenistic men had to undergo a drastic revaluation. The process was slow and dramatic, and finally resolved in the birth of a new civilization, which we may describe as Byzantine. One has to realize that there was but one Christian civilization for centuries, the same for the East and the West, and this civilization was born and made in the East. A specifically Western civilization came much later.

Rome itself was quite Byzantine even in the VIIIth century. The Byzantine epoch starts if not with Constantine himself, in any case with Theodosius, and reaches its climax under Justinian. His was the time when a Christian culture was conscientiously and deliberately being built and completed as a system. The new culture was a great synthesis in which all the creative traditions and moves of the past were merged and integrated. It was a "New Hellenism," but a Hellenism drastically christened and, as it were, "churchified." It is still usual to suspect the Christian quality of this new synthesis. Was it not just an "acute Hellenization" of the "Biblical Christianity," in which the whole novelty of the Revelation had been diluted and dissolved? Was not this...
new synthesis simply a disguised Paganism? This was precisely the considered opinion of Adolf Harnack. Now, in the light of an unbiased historical study, we can protest most strongly against this simplification. Was not that which the XIXth century historians used to describe as an "Hellenization of Christianity" rather a Conversion of Hellenism? And why should Hellenism not have been converted? The Christian reception of Hellenism was not just a servile absorption of an undigested heathen heritage. It was rather a conversion of the Hellenic mind and heart.

What really had happened was this. Hellenism was mightily dissected with the sword of Christian Revelation, and was utterly polarized thereby. The closed horizon has been exploded. One should describe Origen and Augustine as "Hellenists." But obviously it was another type of Hellenism than that of Plotinus or Julian. Among the decrees of Julian, Christians most loathed the one which prohibited Christians to teach arts and science. This was in fact a belated attempt to expel Christians from the making of civilization, to protect the ancient culture from Christian influence and impact. For the Cappadocian Fathers this was the main issue. And St. Gregory of Nazianzus in his sermons against Julian dwelt at length on this topic. St. Basil felt himself compelled to write an address "To young men, on how they might derive benefit from Hellenic literature." Two centuries later, Justinian debarred non-Christians from all teaching and educational activities, and closed down the pagan schools. There was, in this measure, no hostility to "Hellenism." This was no break in tradition. Traditions are kept and even cherished, but they are drawn into the process of Christian re-interpretation. This comprises the essence of Byzantine culture. It was an acceptance of the postulates of culture and their transvaluation. The magnificent Temple of Holy Wisdom, of the Eternal Word, the great church of Sophia in Constantinople, will ever stand as a living symbol of this cultural achievement.

The history of Christian culture was by no means an idyll. It was enacted in struggle and dialectical conflict. Already the IVth century was a time of tragic contradictions.
The Empire became Christian. The chance of transfiguring the whole of human creativity was given. And yet, it was precisely from this Christened Empire that the flight commences, the flight into the desert. It is true that individuals used to leave cities even before, in the time of the persecutions, to dwell or wander in deserts and holes of the earth. The ascetical ideal has been for a long time in the process of formation, and Origen, for one, was a great master of spiritual life. Yet, a movement begins only after Constantine. It would be utterly unfair to suspect that people were leaving "the world" simply because it became difficult and exacting to bear its burden, in search for an "easy life." It is difficult to see in what sense the life in the desert could be "easy." It is true also that in the West at that time the Empire was falling to pieces and sorely endangered by Barbarian invasion, and apocalyptic fears and anticipations might have been alive there, an expectation of a speedy end of history.

In the East at that time the Christian Empire was in the process of construction. In spite of all the perplexities and dangers of life, here one might have been tempted rather with a historical optimism, with a dream of a realized City of God on earth. And many, in fact, succumbed to this allurement. If nevertheless, there were so many in the East who did prefer to "emigrate" into the Desert, we have all reasons to believe that they fled not so much from worldly troubles, as from the "worldly cares," implied even in a Christian civilization. St. John Chrysostom was very emphatic in his warnings against the dangers of "prosperity." For him "security was the greatest of all persecutions," much worse than the bloodiest persecutions from outside. For him the real danger for true piety began precisely with the external victory of the Church, when it became possible for a Christian to "settle down" in this world, with a considerable measure of security and even comfort, and to forget that he had no abiding City in this world and had to be a stranger and pilgrim on earth. The meaning of monasticism did not consist primarily in taking severe vows. Monastic vows were but a re-emphasis of the Baptismal vows. There was no special "monastic" ideal at that early age. The early monks
wanted simply to realize in full the common Christian ideal which was, in principle, set before every single believer. It was assumed that this realization was almost impossible within the existing fabric of society and life, even if it is disguised as a Christian Empire. Monastic flight in the IVth century was first of all a withdrawal from the Empire. Ascetic renunciation implies first of all a complete disowning of the world, i.e. of the order of this world, of all social ties. A monk should be "homeless," aoikos, in the phrase of St. Basil. Asceticism, as a rule, does not require detachment from the Cosmos. And the God-created beauty of nature is much more vividly apprehended in the desert than on the market-place of a busy city.

Monasteries were in picturesque environments and the cosmic beauty can be strongly felt in hagiographical literature. The seat of evil is not in nature but in man's heart, or the world of evil spirits. The Christian fight is not against flesh and blood, but "against spiritual wickedness in high places" (Ephes. 6:12). It is only in the wilderness that one can realize in full one's allegiance to the only Heavenly King, the Christ, loyalty to Whom may be seriously compromised by claims laid on a citizen by his man-made city.

Monasticism was never anti-social. It was an attempt to build up another City. A monastery is, in a sense, an "extraterritorial colony" in this world of vanity. Even hermits did dwell usually in groups and colonies, and were united under the common direction of a spiritual father. But it was the "coenobia" that was regarded as the most adequate embodiment of the ascetical ideal. Monastic community is itself a social organization, a "body," a small Church. A monk left the world in order to build a new society, a new communal life. This was, in any case, the intention of St. Basil. St. Theodore of Studium, one of the most influential leaders of later Byzantine monasticism, was even more rigid and emphatic in this respect. The Empire, already since Justinian, was very anxious to domesticate monasticism, to reintegrate it into the general political and social order. Success was but partial, and led to a decay. In any case,
monasteries always remain, in a sense, heterogeneous inclu-
sions and are never fully integrated into the imperial
order of life. One may suggest that Monasticism, historically
speaking, was an attempt to escape the building up of the
Christian Empire. Origen contended in his time that Christians
could not participate in the general civic life, because they
had a "polis" of their own, because in every city they had
their own "order of life," to *allo systema patridos* (C. Cels.
VIII. 75). They lived "contrary to the order" of the worldly
city (*antipoliteuomenoi*).

In a "Christianized" city this antithesis was not removed. Also monasticism is something "other," a kind of "anti-city,"
*anti-polis*, for it is basically "another" city. Essentially it
always remains outside of the worldly system, and often
asserts its "extraterritoriality" even with regard to the general
ecclesiastical system, claiming some kind of independence
upon the local or territorial jurisdiction. Monasticism is, in
principle, an exodus from the world, an exit from the
natural social order, a renunciation of family, social status,
and even citizenship. But it is not just an exit *out*, but also
a transition to another social plane and dimension. In this
social *“otherworldliness”* consists the main peculiarity of
monasticism as a movement, as well as its historical signifi-
cance. Ascetical virtues can be practised by *hymen* also, and
by those who stay in the world. What is peculiar of monas-
ticism is its social structure. The Christian world was
polarized. Christian history unfolds in an antithesis between
the Empire and the Desert. This tension culminates in a
violent explosion in the Iconoclastic controversy.

The fact that monasticism evades and denies the con-
ception of the Christian Empire does not imply that it
opposes culture. The case is very complex. And first of all,
monasticism succeeded, much more than the Empire ever
did, to preserve the true ideal of culture *in* its purity and
freedom. In any case, spiritual creativity was richly nourished
from the depths of the spiritual *life*. "Christian holiness
synthesizes within itself all the fundamental and ultimate
aspirations of the entire ancient Philosophy," aptly remarked
one Russian scholar. "Starting in Ionia and Magna *Graecia,*
the main stream of great Hellenic speculation flows through Athens to Alexandria and from thence to the Thebaide. Cliffs, deserts, and caves become new centers of the theurgic wisdom." Monastic contribution to the general learning was very large in the Middle Ages, both in the East and in the West.

Monasteries were great centers of learning. We should not overlook another aspect of the matter. Monasticism in itself was a remarkable phenomenon of culture. It is not by chance that ascetic endeavour has been persistently described as "Philosophy," the "love of wisdom," in the writings of the Patristic age. It was not by accident that the great traditions of Alexandrinian theology were revived and blossomed especially in the monastic quarters. It was not by chance likewise that in the Cappadocians of the IVth century ascetic and cultural endeavours were so organically intertwined. Later on, too, St. Maximus the Confessor built his magnificent theological synthesis precisely on the basis of his ascetical experience. Finally, it was by no accident that in the Iconoclastic period monks occurred to be the defenders of art, safeguarding the freedom of religious art from the oppression of the State, from "enlightened" oppression and utilitarian simplification.

All this is closely linked with the very essence of asceticism. Ascesis does not bind creativity, it liberates it, because it asserts it as an aim in itself. Above all—creativity of one's self. Creativity is ultimately saved from all sorts of utilitarianism only through an ascetical re-interpretation. Ascesis does not consist of prohibitions. It is activity, a "working out" of one's very self. It is dynamic. It contains the urge of infinity, an eternal appeal, an unquenchable move forward. The reason for this restlessness is double. The task is infinite because the pattern of perfection is infinite, God's perfection. No achievement can ever be adequate to the goal. The task is creative because something essentially new is to be brought in existence. Man makes up his own self in his absolute dedication to God. He becomes himself only in this creative process. There is an inherent antinomy in true ascesis. It begins with humility, renunciation, obedience. Creative free-
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dom is impossible without this initial self-renunciation. It is the law of spiritual life: the seed is not quickened unless it dies. Renunciation implies an overcoming of one's limitations and partiality, an absolute surrender to the Truth. It does not mean: first renunciation, and then freedom. Humility itself is freedom. Ascetic renunciation unfetters the spirit, releases the soul. Without freedom all mortifications will be in vain. On the other hand, through the ascetic trial the very vision of the world is changed and renewed.

True vision is available only to those who have no selfish concerns. True asceticism is inspired not by contempt, but by the urge of transformation. The world must be re-instated to its original beauty, from which it fell into sin. It is because of this that asceticism leads to action. The work of Redemption is done by God indeed, but man is called to co-operate in this redemptive endeavour. For Redemption consists precisely in the Redemption of Freedom. Sin is slavery, and "Jerusalem which is above is free." This interpretation of the ascetical endeavour will appear unexpected and strange. It is certainly incomplete. The world of ascesis is complicated, because it is a realm of freedom. There are many roads, some of which may end in blind alleys. Historically, of course, asceticism does not always lead to creativity. One ought, however, to distinguish clearly between an indifference to creative tasks, and their non-acceptance. New and various problems of culture are disclosed through the ascetic training, a new hierarchy of values and aims is revealed. Hence the apparent indifference of asceticism to many historic tasks. This brings us back to the conflict between the Empire and the Desert. We may well say: between History and the Apocalypse. It is the basic question of the significance and value of the whole historical endeavour, Christian goal, in any case, transcends history, as it transcends culture. But Man was created to inherit eternity.

One may describe asceticism as an "eschatology of transfiguration." Ascetic "maximalism" is primarily inspired by an awareness of the end of history. It would be more accurate to say: conviction, not an actual expectation. The calculation of times and dates is irrelevant, as it is dangerous
and misleading indeed. What is important is a consistent use of "eschatological measures" in the estimation of all things and events. It is unfair to suppose that nothing on earth can stand this "eschatological" testing. Not everything should fade away. No doubt, there is no room for politics or economics in the ultimate Kingdom of Heaven. But, obviously, there are many values in this life which will not be abrogated in "the age to come." First comes Love. It is not accidental that monasticism takes persistently the form of a community. It is an organization of mutual care and help. Any work of mercy, or even a burning of the heart for somebody else's suffering or need, cannot be regarded as insignificant in the eschatological dimension. Is it too much to suggest that all creative charity is eternal? Are not some abiding values disclosed also in the field of knowledge? Nothing can be said with an ultimate certainty. And yet it seems we have some criterion of discrimination. Human personality, in any case, transcends history.

Personality bears history within itself. I would cease to be Myself if my concrete, i.e. historical, experience is simply subtracted. History therefore will not fade away completely even in the "age to come," if the concreteness of human life is to be preserved. Of course, we never can draw the definite line between those earthly things which may have an "eschatological extension" and those which have to die out on the eschatological threshold—in actual life they are inextricably interwoven. Distinction depends on spiritual discernment, on a sort of spiritual clairvoyance. On one hand, obviously, but "one thing is needful." On the other hand, the "World to come" is undoubtedly a world of Eternal Memory, and not of eternal oblivion. There is the "good part" which "shall not be taken away." And Martha shares it also, not only Mary. All that is susceptible to transfiguration will be transfigured. Now, this "transfiguration," in a sense, begins already on this side of the eschatological cleavage. "Eschatological treasures" are to be collected even in this life. Otherwise this life is frustrated. Some real anticipation of the Ultimate is already available. Otherwise the victory of Christ has been in vain. "New Creation" is already initiated.
Christian History is more than a prophetic symbol, sign or hint. We always have some dim feeling about things which have not, and cannot have, any "eternal dimension," and we style them therefore as "vain" and "futile." Our diagnosis is very fallible indeed. Yet, some diagnosis is unavoidable. Christianity is essentially historical. History is a sacred process. On the other hand, Christianity pronounces a judgement on history, and is in itself a move into what is "beyond history." For that reason, Christian attitude to history and culture is bound to be antinomical. Christians should not be absorbed in history. But they have no escape into a sort of "natural state." They have to transcend history for the sake of that "which cannot be contained by earthly shores." Yet, *Eschatology* itself is always a *Consummation*.

Vladimir *Soloviev* pointed out the tragic inconsistency of Byzantine culture. "Byzantium was devout in its faith and impious in its life." Of course, this is a vivid image, and not an accurate description. We may admit, however, that some valid truth is emphasized by this phrase. The idea of a "*churchified*" Empire was a failure. The Empire fell to pieces in bloody conflicts, degenerated in fraud, ambiguity and violence. But the Desert was more successful. It will remain for ever to witness to the creative effort of the Early Church, with its Byzantine theology, devotion and art. Perhaps it will become the most vital and sacred page in the mysterious book of human destiny, which is continuously being written. The epilogue of Byzantium is likewise emphatic, and there is the same polarity: the fall of the Empire after an ambiguous political Union with Rome (at Florence), which was, however, never accepted by the people. And, on the very eve of the fall of "corrupt Byzantium," the glorious flowering of mystical contemplation on Mount Athos and the Renaissance in art in Philosophy which was to nourish the Western Renaissance too. The fall of the Empire and the Fulfillment of the *Desert*...
CHAPTER VI

The Social Problem in the Eastern Orthodox Church

CHRISTIANITY is essentially a social religion. There is an old Latin saying: unus Christianas nullus Christianus. Nobody can be truly Christian as a solitary and isolated being. Christianity is not primarily a doctrine or a discipline that individuals might adopt for their personal use and guidance. Christianity is exactly a community, i.e., the church. In this respect there is an obvious continuity between the Old and the New dispensations. Christians are "the New Israel." The whole phraseology of Scripture is highly instructive: the Covenant, the Kingdom, the Church, "a holy Nation, a peculiar People." The abstract term "Christianity" is obviously of a late date. From the very beginning Christianity was socially minded. The whole fabric of Christian existence is social and corporate. All Christian sacraments are intrinsically "social sacraments," i.e., sacraments of incorporation. Christian worship is also a corporate worship, "publica et communis oratio." in the phrase of St. Cyprian. To build up the Church of Christ means, therefore, to build up a new society and, by implication, to re-build human society on a new basis. There was always a strong

emphasis on unanimity and life in common. One of the earliest names for Christians was simply "Brethren." The church was and was to be a creaturely image of the divine pattern. Three Persons, yet One God. Accordingly, in the church, many are to be integrated into one Body.

All this is, of course, the common heritage of the whole church. Yet, probably, this corporate emphasis has been particularly strong in the Eastern tradition and does still constitute the distinctive ethos of the Eastern Orthodox church. It is not to suggest that all social aspirations of Christianity had been really actualized in the empirical life of the Christian East. Ideals are never fully realized; the church is still in via, and we have to admit the sore failure of the East to become and to stay truly Christian. Yet, ideals must not be overlooked. They are both the guiding principle and the driving power of human life. There was always a clear vision of the corporate nature of Christianity in the East. There is still, as it has been for centuries, a strong social instinct in the Eastern church in spite of all historical involvements and drawbacks. And possibly this is the main contribution which the Eastern church can make to the contemporary conversation on social issues.

II

The early church was not just a voluntary association for "religious" purposes. It was rather the New Society, even the New Humanity, a polis or politeuma, the true City of God, in the process of construction. And each local community was fully aware of its membership in an inclusive and universal whole. The church was conceived as an independent and self-supporting social order, as a new social dimension, a peculiar systema patridos, as Origen put it. Early Christians felt themselves, in the last resort, quite outside of the existing social order, simply because for them the church itself was an "order," an extra-territorial "colony of Heaven" on earth (Phil. 3:20, Moffatt's translation). Nor was this attitude fully abandoned even later when the empire, as it were, came to terms with the church.
The early Christian attitude was continued in the monastic movement, which grew rapidly precisely in the period of an alleged reconciliation with the world. Of course, monasticism was a complex phenomenon, but its main stream was always socially minded. It was not so much a flight from the world as it was an endeavor to build up a new world on a new basis. A monastery was a community, a "little church"—not only a worshipping community, but a working community as well. Great stress was laid on work, and idleness was regarded as the grievous vice. But it had to be a work for common purpose and benefit. It was true already of the early Pachomian communities in Egypt. St. Pachomius was preaching "the gospel of continued work," It is well said of him: "The general appearance and life of a Pachomian monastery cannot have been very different from that of a well-regulated college, city, or camp" (Bp. Kirk, The Vision of God). The great legislator of Eastern monasticism, St. Basil of Caesarea in Cappadocia (c.330-379), was deeply concerned with the problem of social reconstruction. He watched with a grave apprehension the process of social disintegration, which was so spectacular in his day. Thus his call to formation of monastic communities was an attempt to rekindle the spirit of mutuality in a world which seemed to have lost any sense of social responsibility and cohesion. In his conception, man was essentially a "gregarious animal" (koinônikon zōon), "neither savage nor a lover of solitude." He cannot accomplish his purpose in life, he cannot be truly human, unless he dwells in a community. Monasticism, therefore, was not a higher level of perfection, for the few, but an earnest attempt to give a proper human dimension to man's life. Christians had to set a model of a new society in order to counterbalance those disintegrating forces which were operative in the decaying world. A true cohesion in society can be achieved only by an identity of purpose, by a subordination of all individual concerns to the common cause and interest. In a sense, it was a Socialist experiment of a peculiar kind, on a voluntary basis. Obedience itself had to be founded on love and mutual affection, on a free realization of brotherly love. The whole emphasis was on the corporate
nature of man. Individualism is therefore self-destructive.

As startling as it may appear, the same "coenobitical" pattern was at that time regarded as obligatory for all Christians, "even though they be married." Could the whole Christian society be built up as a kind of a "monastery"? St. John Chrysostom, the great bishop of the imperial city of Constantinople (c.350-407), did not hesitate to answer this question in the affirmative. It did not mean that all should go into the wilderness. On the contrary, Christians had to rebuild the existing society on a "coenobitical" pattern. Chrysostom was quite certain that all social evils were rooted in the acquisitive appetite of man, in his selfish desire to possess goods for his exclusive benefit. Now, there was but one lawful owner of all goods and possessions in the world, namely, the Lord Almighty. Men are but his ministers and servants, and they have to use God's gifts solely for God's purposes, i.e., ultimately for common needs. Chrysostom's conception of property was strictly functional: possession is justified only by its proper use. To be sure, Chrysostom was not a social or economic reformer, and his practical suggestions may seem rather inconclusive and even naïve. But he was one of the greatest Christian prophets of social equality and justice. There was nothing sentimental in his appeal to charity. Christian charity, in fact, is not just a caritative emotion. Christians should be not just moved by the other people's suffering, need, and misery. They have to understand that social misery is the continued agony of Christ, suffering still in the person of his members. Chrysostom's ethical zeal and pathos were rooted in his clear vision of the Body of Christ.

One may contend that in practice very little came out of this vigorous social preaching. But one has to understand that the greatest limitation imposed upon the Christian preaching of social virtue was rooted in the conviction that the church could act only by persuasion, and never by violence and compulsion. Of course, no church could ever stand the temptation to call in the assistance of some worldly power, be it the state or public opinion, or any other form of social pressure. But in no case did the results justify the original
break of freedom. The proof is that even now we have not moved very far in the realization of Christian standards. The church is ultimately concerned with the change of human hearts and minds, and not primarily with the change of an external order, as important as all social improvements may be. The early church made an attempt to realize a higher social standard within its own ranks. The success was but relative; the standards themselves had to be lowered. Yet, it was not a reconciliation with the existing injustice; it was rather an acknowledgment of an inherent antinomy. Could the church use, in the human struggle for survival, any other weapon than the word of truth and mercy? In any case, some basic principles were established, and boldly formulated, which are relevant to any historical situation.

It was, first of all, the recognition of an ultimate equality of all men. This egalitarian spirit is deeply implanted in the Eastern Orthodox soul. There is no room for any social or racial discrimination within the body of the Eastern church, in spite of its elaborate hierarchical structure. One can easily detect at the bottom of this feeling precisely the early Christian conception of the church as of an "order" by itself.

Second, it is assumed that the church has to deal primarily with the needy and underprivileged, with all those who are destitute and heavy laden, with the repentant sinners, precisely with the repentant publicans and not with self-righteous Pharisees. The Christ of the Eastern tradition is precisely the humiliated Christ, yet glorified exactly by his humiliation, by condescendence of his compassionate love. This emphasis on an existential compassion in the Eastern tradition sometimes seems exaggerated to Western observers—almost morbid. But it is just an implication of the basic feeling that the church is in the world rather as a hospital for the sick than as a hostel for the perfect. This feeling had always a very immediate impact on the whole social thinking in the East. The main emphasis was on a direct service to the poor and the needy, and not on elaborate schemes for an ideal society. Immediate human relationship is more important than any perfect scheme. The social problem
was treated always as an ethical problem; but ethics was founded in dogma, in the dogma of Incarnation and Redemption through the Cross. One finds all these motives strongly stressed both in the popular preaching and, in the traditional devotional texts, read and repeated in all Orthodox churches again and again. On the whole, the church is always with the humble and meek, and not with the mighty and proud. All this might be often neglected but it was never denied, even by those who were practically betraying the tradition.

And third, there is that inherited social instinct which makes of the church rather a spiritual home, than an authoritarian institution. One has to begin with a remote historical background if one wants to grasp the intimate spirit of the Eastern church. One of the most distinctive marks of this church is its "traditionalism." The term can be easily misunderstood and misinterpreted. In fact, tradition means continuity, and not stagnation. It is not a static principle. The ethos of the Eastern church is still the same as in the early centuries. But is not the existential situation of a Christian ever the same in spite of all radical and drastic changes in his historical situation?

III

There was no important movement of social Christianity in modern Russia. Yet, the impact of Christian principles on the whole life was not negligible: it was the same traditional emphasis on mercy and compassion and on human dignity which is never destroyed, even by sin or crime. But the greatest contribution to the social problem was made in the field of religious thought. "Social Christianity" was the basic and favorite theme of the whole religious thinking in Russia in the course of the last century, and the same thought colored also the whole literature of the same period. Various writers would insist that the true vocation of Russia was in the field of religion, and precisely in the field of social Christianity. Dostoevsky would go so far as to suggest that the Orthodox church was precisely "our Russian socialism." He wanted to say that it was the church that could inspire and enforce an ultimate realization of social
justice in the spirit of brotherly love and mutuality. For him, Christianity could be fully realized only in the field of social action. All elements were given in the traditional piety: the feeling of common responsibility, the spirit of mutuality, humility, and compassion. "The church as a social ideal"; this was Dostoevsky's basic idea, as Vladimir Solovyev put it in his admirable addresses on Dostoevsky. The same was Solovyev's leading vision. The key words were in both cases the same: freedom and brotherhood.

It was the Slavophile school that brought the social aspect of Christianity to the fore in the nineteenth century. The name is misleading. The "slavic idea" was by no means the starting point or the strongest point of this influential movement of ideas. The main point was, however, this: did not the West overemphasize the importance of the individual? and did not the East, and particularly the Slavic East, pay more attention to the social and corporate aspect of human life? There was much of Utopian exaggeration in this historiosophy, and yet this social emphasis was completely justified. And the best spokesmen of the school knew quite well that this Eastern feeling for social and communal values was due, not to the Slavic national character, but precisely to the tradition of the early church. It was one of the greatest leaders of the movement, A. S. Khomyakov (1804-1860), who elaborated a theological basis of social Christianity in his brief but inspiring pamphlet: The Church Is One (it has been recently re-published in English translation, London, S.P.C.K., 1948). His main emphasis was again on the spirit of love and freedom that make the church one fellowship knit together by faith and charity. Spiritual fellowship in the church must be inevitably extended to the whole field of social relations. Society itself should be rebuilt as a fellowship. "Our law is not a law of bondage or of hireling service, laboring for wages, but a law of the adoption of sons, and of love which is free. We know that when any one of us falls he falls alone; but no one is saved alone." It is precisely what St. Basil suggested: nobody can achieve his purpose in solitude and isolation. No true faith is available in isolation, either, since the crucial fact a Christian should believe is
precisely the all-embracing love of God in Christ, who is the head of the Body.

The essence of Christianity, therefore, is the free unanimity of many, which integrates them into unity. This short essay of Khomyakov, in fact, meant a radical reorientation of the whole theological and religious thought in Russia. On the one hand, it was a return to the early tradition; on the other, it was a call to practice. Khomyakov's ideas were the starting point of Solovyev, although later on Solovyev moved in another direction and was seduced by a Romanizing conception of "Christian politics" without, however, abandoning the crucial conception of the church as the social ideal. All his life Solovyev firmly believed in the social mission of Christianity and of the church. Later on, Nicolas Berdyaev wrote a book on Khomyakov in which he stressed the social implications of Khomyakov's conception of the church. It is interesting to observe that all the three writers just quoted were laymen, yet all of them were loyal, in the main, to Tradition, even if on some particular points they would diverge from it. Their influence, in any case, was not confined to the laity. The whole complex of social problems was brought to the fore by the catastrophe of the Russian Revolution. Historical failures of Christians in the social field must be admitted and recognized. And still the basic conviction remains unshaken: the faith of the church provides a solid ground for social action, and only in the Christian spirit can one expect to build afresh a new order in which both human personality and social order would be secured.

At this point an urgent question imposes: why then was there so little social action in the East and the whole richness of social ideas left without an adequate embodiment? There is no easy answer to this question. One point, however, should be made in advance. The church is never a unique worker in the social field. It may be allowed a free hand in the field of social philanthropy, almost under any regime, except of course totalitarian tyranny. And, in fact, the church was usually the pioneer, even in the organization of medical service. In Russia, in any case, the first hospitals and orphanages were organized by the church, as early as the
fifteenth century, if not earlier; and, what is also instructive, precisely in connection with the "coenobitical" monasteries, just as it was in the times of St. Basil and St. Chrysostom. The work was taken over by the state only in the second half of the eighteenth century, but a memory of the past survived in the name of the "God-pleasing institutions," which was in common use even a century ago. The whole situation changes, however, when we come to the foundations of the social order. Christian and secular criteria do not necessarily coincide, and many conflicts do not admit of an easy solution. The **strictures** of the early and mediaeval church on usury can be, surely, completely justified from an integral ethical point of view. Yet, economically, they were a serious handicap to progress. The early church was unusually severe on trade in general, and not without reason. There were nevertheless some pertinent reasons on the other side as well. The same is true of the whole industrial (and "capitalistic") development. On many issues a conflict between the Christian and the "national" approaches seems to be unavoidable. What chance has the church to enforce its point of view, except by preaching and admonishing? The state is never very favorable to the criticism coming from the church unless the state itself is avowedly Christian. The same is true of the economic society. The Eastern church, as a rule, was reluctant to interfere in a political manner. **Nor** should we forget that for several centuries the major churches in the Near East were under Moslem rule and therefore no room was left for any independent social action, except by the way of charity. And when the liberation came in the course of the nineteenth century, the new states were built on a Western, bourgeois pattern and were not ready to follow a Christian lead.

In Russia the field of a prospective influence of the church was similarly narrowed since the state assumed, under a Western influence also, **all** characteristics of a "Polizei-Staat" and started claiming the supremacy over the church itself. The church was comparatively free only within its own ranks. There was there little room for constructive action, and yet the spirit was alive and the vision of social
problems was never obscured. But there was still another major problem: should the church commit itself to any particular social or economic program? Should the church take part in a political struggle? The Eastern answer would be rather in the negative, but by no means will it mean an attitude of indifference.

IV

There is no room for any social action of the churches "behind the Iron Curtain." Of course, this curtain is made not of iron or any other material stuff, but rather of principles. And the main principle of the new totalitarian regime is precisely the complete separation of the church from the whole field of political, social, and economic activities. The church is compelled to retire into "its own sphere," which is, in addition, very strictly circumscribed. The only activity permitted is worship. All educational and missionary activities are prohibited, although the actual policy may vary from country to country and from year to year. On the whole, an absolute sovereignty of the state is taken for granted. In these countries there is but one authority, that of the state or of the party.

Now, in principle, the church can find its way under all circumstances and in every concrete situation. The major danger is, however, elsewhere, namely, in a wrong interpretation of the "other-worldly" character of the church. It is very instructive to compare two recent documents emanating from the Orthodox churches, and both more or less of an informal character. The first is a book, recently published on behalf of the "Christian Union of Professional Men of Greece," *Towards a Christian Civilization* (Athens, 1950). It is an outspoken and courageous call to Christian action on all fields of civilization. It is an admirable sketch of an active and "guiding" Christianity, and of a "contemporanized" Christianity. Christians have to pass a judgment on all areas of life, and first of all on their own failure to grapple efficiently with a hopeless situation. There is a free and creative spirit breathing through the pages of this book. It is a true call to Christian action. Christians are called;
not only authorities or clergy. It is assumed that Christianity has an *authority* in the social sphere. This manifesto has an informal and private character. It is the voice of Christians, of the body of the church.

The other document comes from the Soviet Union. It is a report on the whole Ecumenical problem, prepared by Fr. Razoumovsky, a priest in Moscow, for the conference of several Orthodox churches in Moscow, which took place in July, 1948. It is included in the minutes of the conference, now published in Russian (Vol. II, Moscow, 1949). We are concerned now with the concluding section of this report. The main point made in the report is an utter separation of the field of the church and the state: "the soul" and "the body." A phrase of the Oxford report of 1937 is quoted: "For a Christian there is *no* higher authority than God" and a characteristic qualification is added: "yes, but only in the realm of the soul and spirit, but not in the material sphere, there is a complete sovereignty of the state, responsible before God" (p. 177). It is a strange remark indeed when we recall that the state in question is a Godless state. But the thought is quite clear: Christian principles have no application "in the material sphere." Moreover, we are informed on the next pages that principles of justice, equality, freedom are not Christian. They belong to an independent secular sphere exempt even from a moral judgment of the church. The church simply has nothing to do with the whole area of social and kindred problems. One particular point is stressed: it is admitted that Christ had sent his apostles "to teach," but they have to teach "nations" only, not the "rulers" (p. 177). Further, Christ suggested that his followers should avoid an immediate contact with evil. "If social injustice is *evil*—because the world lies in the *evil*—it is already a sign that it does not belong to our sphere" (p. 191). This enigmatic phrase has to mean apparently that Christians should not fight evil, but only do good. It is also suggested that social improvements and economic security are of a dubious value from a moral point of view: "would there be any room for the sacrificial love, which is commanded by Christ." Hence no need to overcome greed or envy (p. 189). The main
tenor of the document is obvious: the church retires from the world, in which she has nothing to do; she has no social mission at all and has to avoid any "contact" with the world, because it is "in the evil." Have we to forget its misery and suffering? No, but all this belongs solely to the competence of the state, and the church resigns its responsibility for "the material sphere."

Possibly it is just that amount of "religious freedom" which is conceded to churches by an atheistic state and possibly it is in full accordance with the Godless principles. But can the church accept a "reconciliation" or "toleration" at this cost without betraying the gospel of righteousness and its own age-long tradition? Such "otherworldliness" of the church has for it no warrant in the historical experience of the Eastern church. Of course it is not in the tradition of St. Basil and St. Chrysostom. There is no need to add that in fact there is no real separation between the spheres of competence simply because the church in the Soviet Union indulges, time and again, in pronouncements of an openly political or social nature, when, of course, it is invited to do so by the state.

The church is indeed "not of this world," but it has nevertheless an obvious and important mission "in this world" precisely because it lies "in the evil." In any case, one cannot avoid at least a diagnosis. It was commonly believed for centuries that the main Christian vocation was precisely an administration of charity and justice. The church was, both in the East and in the West, a supreme teacher of all ethical values. All ethical values of our present civilization can be traced back to Christian sources, and above all back to the gospel of Christ. Again, the church is a society which claims the whole man for God's service and offers cure and healing to the whole man, and not only to his "soul." If the church, as an institution, cannot adopt the way of an open social action, Christians cannot dispense with their civic duties for theirs is an enormous contribution to make "in the material sphere," exactly as Christians.
CHAPTER VII

Patriarch Jeremiah II and the Lutheran Divines

The letters between the Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah II and a group of Lutheran theologians at Tubingen, in the last quarter of the XViTh century, are ecumenical documents of great importance and interest. It was the first systematical exchange of theological views between the Orthodox East and the new Protestant West. It was private and informal. It was none the less significant for that. Eminent people took part in the correspondence. The Patriarch himself was a man of strong convictions and great experience, a staunch churchman and a statesman. He wrote "individually, not synodically," but he had the advice and cooperation of the best Greek scholars available, including John and Theodosius Zygomas and, probably, Gabriel Severus, the titular Metropolitan of Philadelphia. His replies were carefully prepared and drafted. On the Lutheran side, there was an illustrious company of University professors: Jacob Andreae, Lucas Osiander, John Brenz, Jacob Heerebrand and others, and especially Martin Crusius, who seems to have been the real promoter of the cause. We have every reason to assume that a much larger circle of Lutheran divines was taking interest in the negotiation. The immediate outcome of this epistolary contact, however, was

definitely negative. No agreement was reached, and little hope of reconciliation was left. The tension between the two communions was rather increased. There was an obvious disillusionment and disappointment on both sides, and even some bitterness and resentment. It is most doubtful whether the whole negotiation would have ever been disclosed, had not a third and uninvited partner joined in. Roman Catholics watched with keen concern and anxiety these unusual deliberations of the Ecumenical See with German dissenters. They utterly detested what was, in their opinion, an unlawful "appeal" from the West to the East. A copy of the first Patriarchal reply, by inadvertance or indiscretion, came into the hands of a Polish priest, Stanislaus Socolovius, and he published it, with his comments, under an offensive title: Censura Orientalis Ecclesiae: de praecipuis nostri saeculi haereticorum dogmatibus etc. (Dillingae 1582; cf. the Annotationes by the same writer, Krakow 1582). The book had a wide circulation, as the edition was reprinted shortly at Köln and Paris (1584) and a German translation made (Ingolstadt 1585). Some other Roman polemists intervened (as, for instance, W. Lindanus, Bishop of Roeremond: Concordia discors Protestantium etc., Köln 1583). The Pope himself (Gregory XIII), through a special messenger, congratulated the Patriarch upon his noble rejoinder to the schismatics: the Patriarch could reassure the Holy Father that he was not prepared to make any concessions in the matter of faith. This unexpected and unwelcome publicity compelled the Lutherans to vindicate their cause and to publish all the documents, the Greek replies in full and their own letters. The book appeared in Wittenberg, in 1584, in two languages, Greek and Latin, with an explanatory and defensive preface by Crusius: Acta et scripta theologorum Wirtembergensiummet Patriarche Constantinopolitani D. Hiererniae, quae utrique ab anno MDLXXVIusque ad annum MDLXXXIde Augustana Confessione inter se miserunt. It was immediately commented upon by the Catholics (by the same Socolovius and some others). An irenical approach proved to be a call to battle. And yet, in spite of all this unfortunate entanglement, there was an obvious gain: an
important step had been taken, silence had been broken.

The initiative in the correspondence was taken by the Protestants. Stephen Gerlach, a young Lutheran theologian from Tübingen, was going in 1573 to Constantinople for a prolonged stay, as a chaplain to the new Imperial ambassador in Turkey, Baron David Ungnad von Sonnegk. He was carrying with him two private letters for the Patriarch, from Martin Crusius and Jacob Andreae, chancellor of Tübingen University. It might seem that Crusius had originally no ecclesiastical concerns: he was interested rather in getting some information on the present state of the Greek Church and nation, under the Turkish rule. But that was rather a diplomatic disguise. Probably from the very beginning Gerlach had some other commission as well. In any case, even in the first letters the unity and fellowship of faith had already been mentioned. In any case, only a few months later, a new letter was dispatched from Tübingen, under the joint signature of Crusius and Andreae, to which a copy of the Augsburg Confession in Greek had been appended. Gerlach was directed to submit it to the Patriarch for his consideration and comment. A hope was expressed that the Patriarch might see that there was a basic agreement in doctrine, in spite of a certain divergence in some rites, since the Protestants were not making any innovations, but kept loyally the sacred legacy of the Primitive Church, as it had been formulated, on the scriptural basis, by the Seven ecumenical Councils. At Constantinople Gerlach established personal contacts with various dignitaries of the Church and had several interviews with the Patriarch himself. Finally he succeeded in obtaining not only a polite acknowledgement, but a proper theological reply. It was very friendly, but rather disappointing. The Patriarch suggested that the Lutherans should join the Orthodox Church and unconditionally accept her traditional teaching. The Lutherans persisted in their convictions. The correspondence went on for some years and then broke off. In his last reply to Tübingen the Patriarch simply declined any further discussion of doctrine. Nevertheless he was prepared to correspond in friendship. And in fact he kept in touch with Tübingen for
some time after the formal termination of theological deliberations.

What was the main reason for and purpose of the Lutheran approach to the Orthodox East? The matter was complex. Two main points should be stressed. First of all, the early Reformers had no intention of "innovating" in doctrine. On the contrary, they struggled to purify the Church from all those "innovations" and accretions which, in their opinion, had been accumulated in the course of ages, particularly in the West. They had therefore to appeal to Tradition, i.e. to the witness of the Early Church. The argument from Christian Antiquity has been constantly used in the controversy with Rome from the very beginning, from the famous Leipzig Disputation of Luther himself, in 1519. It was more than a reference to the Past. It was also a timely reminder that Christendom was larger than the Romanized West. Luther might have been occasionally very irreverent to and critical of the Fathers, but he would not disregard their witness altogether, and the argument from tradition had a considerable place in his writings. It was quite natural that, at a later stage, a consensus quinquesaeccularis should be suggested as a criterion and basis of doctrinal settlement, along with the Scriptures. No wonder that in the Formula Concordiae references to Tradition were numerous and conspicuous. Ecclesiastical History, as a distinct theological discipline, was introduced in the University curriculum just at that time of controversy, first by the Protestants and precisely for polemical purposes. Now, the Church of the East was notoriously the Church of Tradition. It was but natural to ask, could not the Christian East be an ally or a companion in the struggle against the Roman innovations? The age-long resistance of the East to the Papal claims seemed to justify these expectations. Eastern "traditionalism," in this concrete situation, could be interpreted rather as a token of promise, than as an impediment. It was in this mood that the Lutherans of Tubingen presented the Augsburg Confession to the Patriarch. The witness of the East could have enormous weight in the Western dispute. For the same reason, the Romans would insist on the perfect
agreement ("perpetua consensio") of the East and the West on all basic doctrines and rites and quote for that purpose the Council of Florence. On the contrary, the Protestants, for several generations, used to emphasize the ultimate irreconcilability of the East with Rome. The witness of the Eastern Church, both ancient and modern, has been extensively exploited for polemical purposes both by Catholics and Protestants. There was a special reason for the intervention of a Polish theologian in an Orthodox-Lutheran discussion. One has to remember the ecclesiastical situation in Poland at that particular time. The expansion of the Reformation in the Slavic East was one of the vital concerns for German Reformers,—Melanchthon himself was deeply interested in the matter. Yet, by that time, the Reformation in Poland, after a short-lived success, was just about to collapse. There was indeed still a strong Protestant minority in the country, and Protestant leaders were in friendly contact with the Orthodox. They had a common danger to face: Roman propaganda. A plan for an Orthodox-Protestant "confederation" of defense was under way. On the other hand, just at the same time, a Union with Rome was negotiated by the Orthodox bishops in Poland. It was ultimately consummated in 1595, but with partial and precarious success, since the rank and file of the Orthodox clergy and laity vigorously resisted that submission to Rome. In these circumstances, the voice of the Ecumenical Patriarch was of the utmost importance, especially because the Church in Poland was at that time under his direct authority and jurisdiction. This brings us to our second point. We cannot ignore the "non-theological factors" of the ecumenical problem. Reformation from the beginning had some obvious political and international implications. The Unity of Christian Europe was seriously threatened. Europe was about to be split into two hostile camps, precisely on the religious issue. The political situation itself, to a great extent, was created by religious dissent. Political alliances and confessional unions were intimately interlinked. The problem was at once political and religious, both international and "ecumenical." It would not be an exaggeration to say that in the XVIth century
the main problem of the European international politics was exactly "the Eastern Question." And it had an obvious religious aspect. Protestant and Catholic powers were struggling at that time for supremacy in the Near East. It was an urgent problem: was the Christian East to be on the Protestant, or on the Roman, side? The Ecumenical Patriarch was not only the head of the Church, but also the leader of the Greek nation. European diplomats at Constantinople were seriously concerned with his attitude. As a matter of fact, all European contacts with the Patriarchate in the XVIth century were intermingled with political intrigues. The Greeks were still seeking help from the West, against the Moslem invaders. It could come from either side: from Rome or from the Protestant federation. Again, there was an imminent "Turkish peril." A divided Christian West could easily become the prey of Oriental aggressors. Political security itself lay in Christian Reunion.

It was exactly in this political context that the first attempt to get in touch with the Patriarch was made by Melanchton in 1559. He was deeply impressed by the suffering of Christians under the Turkish rule. It was an eschatological sign for him. He could but hope that in the last days Christ himself would reunite the whole Church. He wrote in this sense to the Patriarch Joasaph and urged him to believe that Lutherans were loyal to the teaching of the Scriptures and of the Fathers. This letter was never acknowledged or replied to. Probably it was delivered after great delay, already after Melanchton's death. What is especially interesting is that, along with the personal message, Melanchton sent the Patriarch a copy of the Augsburg Confession in Greek, obviously as a proof of the doctrinal orthodoxy of the Lutheran communion. This translation was published in Basel, 1559, under the name of Paul Dolsdus (reprinted again in Wittemberg, 1587). Prof. E. Benz has recently proved that this translation was not an accurate rendering of the final and official text of the Augustana, but a document of a very peculiar character. First of all, the text used for translation was a special version of the Variata 1531, and not the later revision. Strange as it may appear
this fact was completely overlooked both by contemporaries and by later scholars (only Lebedev noticed that it was the earlier version, somewhat amplified). Secondly, it was a free "interpretation" rather than a literal rendering. It was a skilful transposition, as it were, of the Augsburg Confession into the traditional theological idiom of the East. It betrays the interpreter's intimate acquaintance with Greek patristic and liturgical phraseology. It is highly improbable that Dolscius could have done it. There can be little doubt that Melanchton himself was responsible for that piece of work. But even such an expert Greek scholar as he could not have done it so effectively and consistently without the help of somebody to whom this Eastern idiom came naturally. Demetrios, a deacon of the Greek Church, was staying with Melanchton precisely at the time when the translation was being made, and we have every reason to believe that his share in the whole work was considerable. Demetrios was an enigmatic person. He seems to have been sent to Germany by the Patriarch on some business. But he was obviously in deep sympathy with the Reformation and was active in the expansion of Protestantism in Hungary and Moldavia. He was commissioned by Melanchton to deliver his letter and a copy of the Greek version to the Patriarch. Obviously, the Greek Augustana was intended primarily for the Greeks. It was not intended for domestic circulation and Melanchton was much annoyed by its publication, as he alleged, without his consent and advice ("sine meo consilio"). On, the whole, this version itself was already an important ecumenical achievement. In fact, it was an attempt to present the main doctrines of the Lutheran communion in the language of the Greek Fathers and Liturgy. Was this just a diplomatic disguise, or an adaptation to the Greek usage? Or rather, was the whole venture inspired by a deep conviction that, basically and essentially, the Augsburg Confession was really in agreement with the Patristic tradition? Melanchton was a good Patristic scholar and his respect for the Early Fathers was genuine. He could sincerely believe that the Augustana might be acceptable to the Patriarch. As a matter of fact, even in this special Greek draft, it proved to be unacceptable.
The question remains, however, whether this version was an adequate and authentic presentation of the official Lutheran teaching. In any case, the Tübingen divines did not hesitate to send this document to the Patriarch, and Crusius was prepared to reprint it, as even at that time it was already difficult to obtain copies. This Greek version was never disavowed on the Lutheran side. It is possible, however, that it was simply forgotten. It must be borne in mind, on the other hand, that no commonly accepted "Lutheran" doctrine existed at this early date—it was still a period of transition and controversy, there was still ample room for free interpretation. Let us remember that Formula Concordiae, with its attempt to reconcile various and divergent opinions, belonged precisely to that same time when the negotiations between Tubingen and Constantinople were in progress. The main tendency of the Greek version of the Augustana was to avoid the use of scholastic phraseology, which was alien to the East, and to tone down the Western emphasis on the forensic aspect of the doctrine of Salvation. Emphasis was shifted from Justification and Forgiveness to Life Eternal, New Birth or Regeneration, and Resurrection. It was a substitution as it were of the Johannine idiom for the Pauline. Again, the dogma itself was treated rather from the point of view of worship, than simply as a piece of scholastic doctrine.

The first Patriarchal reply was signed on 15 May, 1576, and immediately dispatched to Tübingen. It was, undoubtedly, a corporate work, and Theodosius Zygomalas was apparently the main contributor. But the final draft was carefully revised by the Patriarch himself. The document was by no means an original composition, nor did it claim any originality. On the contrary, all novelty was strictly avoided. It was a deliberate compilation from traditional sources. It was not so much an analysis of the Augustana itself, as a parallel exposition of the Orthodox doctrine. It has been suggested that the main value of the document lies precisely in its unoriginality. It was the last doctrinal statement in the East, in which no influence of Western tradition can be detected, even in terminology. It was, in a sense, an
epilogue to Byzantine theology. The sources of this document were carefully checked by modern scholars (by Philipp Meyer first of all and his observations are commonly accepted). The main authorities were: Nicolas Cabasilas, Symeon of Thessalonica, Joseph Bryennios, and of the early Fathers especially St. Basil and St. John Chrysostom. The same authorities were used in the later replies of the Patriarch. He laid the greatest emphasis on loyalty to Tradition. This constituted probably the greatest difficulty for the Lutherans, with their emphasis on the Sola Scriptura. On the whole, the Patriarch was most conciliatory and balanced in his comments or criticisms. In his covering letter he expressed his hope that "both Churches" could be reunited. This unity, however, could be established only on the basis of a complete doctrinal agreement, i.e. of an integral acceptance of the Holy Tradition.

There were some special points on which the Patriarch could not agree with the Lutheran teaching. Of course, he had to object to the Filioque clause. Yet, obviously, there was nothing specially Lutheran about it. He could agree, in general, with the Lutheran conception of Original Sin, but he would still stress human freedom (he quotes St. Chrysostom extensively at this point). Nothing can be done without Divine initiative. Yet the Grace of God is freely received, there is no coercion in its action. And therefore, Faith and "good works" cannot be separated, nor should they be opposed to each other or contrasted. In any case, an actual forgiveness depends upon penitence. Again, in the chapter on Sacraments the Patriarch presents the Orthodox teaching: there are seven sacraments, and he dwells at some length on each of them. In this particular chapter we have to admit some Western influence: not only because the number "seven" had been fixed in the West (at a comparatively late date—Peter Lombardus) and only gradually accepted in the East (in some documents of the XIVth and even XVth centuries we have still some other lists of the Sacraments), but also because, probably for the first time in the East, a scholastic distinction between "form" and "matter" is mentioned (we have, perhaps, to attribute this
terminological turn to Gabriel Severus, who made an extensive use of this scholastic phraseology in his treatise "On the Sacraments," published in 1600. The Patriarch could not accept the doctrine of the Holy Eucharist, as expounded in the Augsburg Confession. Without going into a detailed criticism, he makes a plain statement on Orthodox teaching. A "conversion" of the elements into the very Body and Blood of Christ is effected by the consecration (μεταβάλλεσαι). He does not use the term "Transubstantiation," which was adopted by some Orthodox theologians at a later date. The Eucharist is not only a sacrament, but a sacrifice. The Patriarch stresses the importance of the sacrament of Penance, both from a sacramental and a moral point of view. He disavows all abuses which have crept into penitential practice, but strongly insists on penitential exercises, as a helpful remedy for sinners. Strangely enough, he was satisfied with the Augustana's statement on Holy Orders, i.e. that nobody could administer Sacraments and preach the Word of God publicly, nisi sit rite vocatus et ordinatus ad hanc functionem. It was a vague and ambiguous statement and could be variously interpreted. Obviously, the Orthodox interpretation was not the same as the Lutheran. Very little is said of the Church. Nothing special is said de novissimis. But the Patriarch dwells at length on some controversial points of practice: the Invocation of Saints and monastic vows.

The document was obviously irenical. And possibly for that very reason it was not convincing, A modern reader is tempted to style it as evasive and non-committal. In fact, one may feel that the most important points of divergence were touched upon rather slightly: the doctrine of the Church and Ministry, and even the doctrine of Justification. Yet the Patriarch himself was of another opinion. His purpose was not to criticize, but to expound a sound doctrine. He concludes his message to the Lutherans with a concrete proposal: if they can wholeheartedly adhere to this traditional doctrine, he will gladly receive them in communion, and so the "two churches" will be made one. He was really not going to make any concessions. We have to bear in mind that in Constantinople very little was known of the
Reformation. As far as we can judge by the Diaries of Gerlach and his successor Salomon Schweigger, the Orthodox were scantily informed, and much of this information was coming through occasional and often tendencious channels, namely from the Roman Catholics. There was, however, some reason to sympathize with the Reformed movement, simply because it was a movement *Los von Rom*. But knowledge of the Reformed doctrine was very inadequate at this early date. Jeremiah himself had some idea of the movement, as we can judge by the questions he put to Gerlach, in their personal conversations. We do not know exactly how extensive was his information. Again, the Augsburg Confession can be properly understood only in a wider historical setting. Possibly, the Patriarch was interested in one thing: to what extent it was possible to expect the Western dissenters to join the Orthodox Church. For him it was the only natural approach to the problem of unity, and possibly it was the only approach available in the XVIth century. The East was for centuries separated and estranged from the West, and the chief reason for that lay precisely in the "Roman claims." Now there was a new anti-Roman movement in the West. Was it not to be a return to that Tradition for which the East so persistently stood? We cannot expect any comprehensive evaluation of the Lutheran doctrine from Jeremiah. He was concerned only with the question of whether the Protestants were prepared to embrace the sound doctrine, of which the Orthodox Church had been a faithful steward through the ages. On the other hand, the Lutherans in Tubingen were interested in exactly the same thing, from an opposite point of view: was the Orthodox East prepared to accept their own "sound doctrine," as stated in the Augsburg Confession.

The Patriarchal comment on the Augustana was a sad disappointment for them. They felt compelled to offer some explanations. This new message to the Patriarch was signed by Crusius and Lucas Osiander. It was, in the main, an *apologia*. They were offended by the Patriarch's hint that they were following human devices. On the contrary, they were sure that they stood on safer ground than he,—
it was the Word of God. There was, in fact, a conflict between the two doctrinal principles; the principle of Tradition, on the Orthodox side, and the Scriptural principle, on the side of Reformation. The Lutherans were, by that time, fully aware of this ultimate clash of principles. Yet, it seemed to them that the measure of agreement was still quite considerable. The points of disagreement were as follows. What was the authority in the matters of doctrine? Of course, Filioque. Again, the whole doctrine of Freedom and Justification by Faith only. There were but two Sacraments. It was not lawful to pray for the departed. The Eucharist was not to be regarded as a sacrifice. Finally, both the Invocation of Saints and Monasticism were unacceptable. The Patriarch had very little to add to his previous statement.

The Lutherans sent him this time some fresh material on their teaching, namely Compendium theologiae by Jacob Heerebrand; it was translated into Greek by Crusius (published in Wittenberg, 1582). In the preparation of the second Patriarchal reply some new experts took part: Metropolitan of Berrhoea, Methodius, Metropolitan of Melonike, Hieromonk Matthaeus, and, as before, Theodosisus Zygomalas. There was nothing new in that second message, except the stronger insistence on a total acceptance of the whole of the Orthodox teaching. Still, it was not yet an end. The Lutherans wrote once more to the Patriarch, defending their position. The Patriarch felt himself obliged to put an end to these deliberations which were obviously now of no promise. He suggested a termination of the hopeless theological dispute, but was quite prepared to continue friendly contacts. The Lutherans wrote once more, again to express their hope that in the future a better mutual understanding and closer unity might be possible.

This early ecumenical correspondence between Wittenberg and Constantinople had no practical consequences. It was superseded by later developments, which, unfortunately, led to a serious deterioration in the relationship. There was more sincerity and openmindedness in the beginning. An extensive study of this friendly exchange of convictions between the Eastern Church and the emerging world of
the Reformation yields more than matter for historical curiosity. There was an attempt to discover some common ground and to adopt a common idiom. Melanchton's Greek version of the Augustana deserves the close attention of modern ecumenical theologians. His attempt to interpret the message of the Reformation in the wider context of an ecumenical tradition embracing the East and the West should be repeated. And all controversial points, dividing the East and the non-Roman West, should be analyzed again in the larger perspective of Patristic tradition.
CHAPTER VIII

The Greek Version of the Augsburg Confession

The first Greek translation of the Augsburg Confession was published in 1559 in Basel. This edition included only the Greek text. The name of the translator was given on the title page: Graece reddita a Paulo Dolscio Plauensi. Dolscius also wrote the preface to the translation, in Latin. In 1584 the text of Dolscius was reprinted in the famous volume Acta et Scripta Theologorum Wirtembergensium, which was a complete report on the correspondence between a group of Lutheran theologians in Tübingen and the Patriarch Jeremias II of Constantinople. This time the Latin text was also given, in parallel column, with the Greek.

This first edition had apparently a limited circulation, or only few copies were published. Already in 1574 Martin Crusius had difficulty in obtaining a copy. It does not seem that the book was widely read in Western Europe. Indeed, the peculiar character of Dolscius' edition escaped attention of scholars. Professor Ernst Benz of Marburg was the first to call attention to this curious document. Little can be added to his able analysis, although of course he did not solve definitively all the problems which the document raises. In this brief essay I can but review his findings.

First of all, the authorship of the translation is uncertain and obscure. Paul Dolscius was a competent Greek scholar...

and a convinced humanist. In his preface to the translation he emphasized the importance of the biblical languages for an adequate understanding of the Christian faith. The preface was dedicated to a certain Dr. Melchior Kling, a renowned jurist of that time. Dolscius suggested that the stimulus for the translation was given by Dr. Kling. Now, it seems that all this is a disguise, if not a deliberate mystification. Dolscius also insisted on the strict accuracy of his translation: nihil de suo addens. But in fact the Greek translation deviates widely from the original. There are strong reasons for believing that the actual initiative belonged to no lesser than Melanchthon. Already Crusius was aware of this fact: nomine Dolscii editum, sed a Phiiippo compositum. In any case, in the very year of the first publication of the Greek version, Melanchthon forwarded his copy to the then Patriarch of Constantinople, Joasaph, with a covering letter in which he suggested that the Lutheran movement was close to Orthodoxy. The letter apparently was never delivered. In the light of this overture to the East, the peculiar character of the Greek version becomes comprehensible: it was intended primarily for the Greeks. No free circulation in the West was anticipated. Melanchthon's keen interest in the Greek church is well known, and it dates from his early years. In the fifties he had various links with Greek visitors to Germany. One of them, Demetrius, even stayed with him during those years. Demetrius probably also participated in the translation. The role of Dolscius, on the other hand, is quite obscure.

Secondly, the text of the confession used for the translation was peculiar. It was not the official text of 1530. The Latin text included in Acta et Scripta is similar to the Variata of 1531, but differs even from it. Professor Benz aptly describes it as Melanchthon's Variatissima. It remains to situate it accurately in relation to all of Melanchthon's other drafts of the confession. In his study Benz offers but few hints in this direction. Strangely enough, the editors of Acta et Scripta did not mention at all that the Latin text in their edition was a very special version of the Augsburg Confession. The problem is too technical to be discussed in this essay, however.
Thirdly, the Greek translation of 1559 widely differs also from this peculiar Latin text. It was more an adaptation than a translation. A detailed analysis is outside the scope of this essay. Such an analysis would require a thorough examination of various theological terms, both in Latin and Greek. On the whole, Professor Benz is right in suggesting that the translators deliberately toned down the forensic or juridical tenor of the Augustana doctrine of redemption. Indeed, at many points the translators could not easily find in current Greek theological vocabulary exact equivalents of Latin terms. Hence inaccuracy of rendering was almost inevitable. But there was much more than that. There was an obvious desire to adjust the exposition to the traditional convictions of the Greek church. As Benz has suggested, the whole exposition is transposed from the dimension of the Rechtfertigungsreligion into the dimension of the Erlösungsreligion. Instead of the concept of justification, the dominant idea of the Greek version is that of healing.

The question then arises, to what extent was this Greek interpretation of the confession congenial to the original intent of the Augustana? Indeed, the Greek version of 1559 was the only text of the Augsburg Confession which was put at the disposal of Greek authorities and theologians, when the group of Tubingen theologians approached the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1574 with the request to study and evaluate their doctrinal position. The patriarch was not informed about the actual status of the text submitted for his examination. What was behind this move?

It is quite possible that Martin Crusius and his friends sent to Constantinople the version of 1559 simply because this was the only existing Greek text. It is interesting, however, that a second edition of this version appeared again in 1587, in Wittenberg—again, the Greek text only. For whom was this new edition intended? I have not examined this second edition personally. But it is obviously strange that it was issued after the final authorization of the main text of 1530 by its inclusion in the Book of Concord. It does not seem that this new edition was intended
for Greek readers. The patriarch's unfavorable response sorely discouraged any new negotiations between Lutherans and Orthodox. The strangest thing is (and this was not mentioned explicitly by Professor Berr) that the peculiarity of the Greek version was overlooked also by the Roman Catholic polemicists of the time, who could have exploited this fact for their own purposes—to estrange the Orthodox from the Lutherans. True, the original edition of 1559 may have been rare, but the same text was reprinted in Acta et Scripta. It is not excluded, however, that the Tubingen theologians were prepared to commit themselves to that particular interpretation of the Augsburg Confession which was embodied in the Greek version. Some further inquiry will be needed before an adequate answer can be given.

In any case, the Greek version of the Augustana was a significant theological experiment. One may ask in conclusion to what extent the main doctrines of the Augsburg Confession can be adequately expressed in the categories of the Greek patristic (and liturgical) tradition? In our day, of course, this question has not the same meaning as in the days of Melanchthon or of Martin Crusius.
CHAPTER IX

The Orthodox Churches and the Ecumenical Movement
Prior to 1910

For many centuries, the Eastern and Western Churches lived in almost complete separation from one another. Yet this separateness is always to be understood in the light of the complementary truth that these differing blocks of insights and convictions grew out of what was originally a common mind. The East and the West can meet and find one another only if they remember their original kinship and the unity of their common past.

Christian unity was not long maintained, or rather has never been fully realized. Yet there is justification for speaking of the undivided Church of the first millennium. Throughout that period, there was a wide consensus of belief, a common mind such as has not existed at any later date. Men were convinced that the conflicting groups still belonged to the same Church, and that conflict was no more than estrangement caused by some grievous misunderstanding. The disruption of the Church was abhorred by all concerned, and division, when it came, was accepted with grief and reluctance.

Permanent separation between East and West was pre-

ceded by the decay of the common mind and of the sense of mutual responsibility within the one Body. When unity was finally broken, this was not so much because agreement could not be reached on certain doctrinal issues, as because the universe of discourse had already been disrupted. The East and the West had always been different, but the differences had prevented neither Jerome from being at home in Palestine nor Athanasius in his western exile. But gradually the point was reached at which the memories of the common past were obliterated and faded away, and Christians came to live contentedly in their own particular and partial worlds, mistaking them for the Catholic whole.

This separation was partly geographical, a matter literally of east and west. It was also in part a matter of language. Greek had been the universal language of the Mediterranean world, the common tongue of civilization, as of Christian thought and expression. But this factor of unity grew weaker, as Greek came to be generally forgotten in the west. Even Augustine knew it only imperfectly. Translations of Greek Christian classics into Latin were rare, of Latin classics into Greek even rarer. When the new barbarian nations came on the scene, they were unable to assimilate more than a small part of the traditions of the classical past. When the cultural recovery of the West at last arrived, very little of the Greek heritage was saved, and living continuity with the common past of the Church universal was broken. There were now two worlds, almost closed to one another.

The division also involved a conflict between the old and the new. Byzantium continued in the old ways. The West, as it recovered its intellectual vigour, developed a new method and a new technique of thought; under the influence of the great philosophical development of the 13th century, Western Christian doctrine took its definitive shape. Between the old patristic and the new scholastic approach there is a great gulf fixed. To the Eastern, union presented itself as the imposition of Byzantinism on the West; to the Western, as the Latinization of the East. Each world chose to go on in its own way; the Westerns neglecting the Greek patristic tradition, which came more and more to be forgotten; the
Greeks taking no account of anything that had happened in the West since the separation. In all ecumenical conversations to-day, the greatest difficulty of all is the recovery of the common universe of discourse.

The papal claims appear to be the main cause of the separation, and indeed present a continual obstacle to any rapprochement. But these claims should not be considered out of relationship to political factors. All Christians were agreed that there must be one universal Christian commonwealth. It was natural to identify that spiritual body with the one existing "world-wide" commonwealth, the Roman Empire. The only question was where the centre of direction of this commonwealth was to be found. Constantine had transferred the centre to Byzantium; the West maintained that in A.D. 800, with the coronation of Charlemagne, there had been a new translatio imperii, and that now once again the whole of Christendom must be ruled from Rome. It was this extension of the schism from the theological to the social and political realm which made it clear how deep and irrevocable it had become.

The Byzantine Empire grew weaker and finally disappeared; the West flourished and grew increasingly strong. Because of its strength, the West has tended to regard its Christianity as normal Christianity, and to look upon the classical, patristic tradition of the East as an exotic or aberrant growth. Byzantium has been either tacitly ignored or disapproved. This judgement has not been without its plausibility. The centuries of Turkish bondage have grievously thwarted the development of Eastern Christendom. Regard for tradition may easily develop into a supine archaism. Byzantium has sometimes slept. But Byzantium is still alive in the things of the spirit, the representative of an authentic Christian tradition, linked by unbroken continuity with the thought of the apostolic age. Recovery of a genuine ecumenical unity will be possible only through mutual rediscovery of East and West and a wider synthesis, such as has sometimes been attempted but never yet achieved.

Even after the Reformation, the political factor played a large and unhelpful part. The point of departure was still
the centrality of the West. Participants thought in terms of two opposing blocs; there was still too much of the spirit of "conversion," and of the imposition of one system of thought on the other world. Discussions were usually on particular points, and not on the basic issues. It was only in the 19th century that better understanding of history made possible more sympathetic rapprochement. The genuine theological issues have been brought into the foreground, and its has been realized that the problem of Christian unity is primarily a problem of the doctrine of the Church. Even though no practical ways to a solution have been found, at least the lines have been set in such a way as to make meeting fruitful and ecumenical discussion a promise of ecumenical fulfilment.

II BOHEMIANS AND BYZANTINES

There was hardly any period at which negotiations of one kind or another were not in progress between the Orthodox and the Churches of the West, but over almost all these negotiations hung the heavy shadow of political opportunism. The complete failure of the union patched up between the East and the West at Florence (1439)* showed that along this path there was no true way out from division, that true solutions could be found only through unfettered theological understanding, and that this could be achieved only through a general council of the Church.

Throughout the 15th century the idea of a general council was constantly before the eyes of men. The Fathers at the Council of Basle had desired the participation of the Greeks, and had even sent a special message to Constantinople to invite the presence of a delegation—unsuccesfully, since Pope Eugenius IV was able to divert the Greeks to his own Council of Ferrara, later of Florence. But the clearest appeal to the whole of Christendom was made by a Western group which anticipated the Reformers of the 16th century, not only in a number of their convictions, but also in the hope that allies might be found among the Greeks against the nearer power of Rome. At Basle in 1434 the Hussites de-
manded that their cause should be submitted to a plenary council, at which the Greeks, including the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the Armenians should be present.

The extent to which John Hus himself was influenced by the Eastern tradition is still an open question. There is obvious exaggeration and bias in the contention of some early historians, that the whole Hussite movement was a deliberate return to the Eastern tradition, which had once been established in Moravia by St. Cyril and St. Methodius. Hus himself can hardly have been well acquainted with the Orthodox Church, and derived his teaching mainly from Wyclif. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that Wyclif did on occasion invoke the authority of the Greeks, if only because they were opposed to Rome. It is certain that not all memories of the Slavonic rite had been obliterated in Bohemia. We may with confidence go so far as to say that some of the Hussites were interested in the Greek Church chiefly as an example of what might be termed non-Roman Catholicism, but also because in the teaching and practice of the Eastern Church they could find an extra argument in favour of Communion in both kinds which to them was as the Ark of the Covenant. At a later stage of development, when it had become clear that there was no further possibility of reconciliation with Rome, there was a specially strong reason for an appeal to the East, in the hope of securing recognition from the Patriarchs, and so of dealing with the problem of a regular succession in the ordained ministry.

It is probably in this context that we are to understand the remarkable attempt made shortly before the fall of Constantinople to establish communion between the Utraquist branch of the Hussite movement and the Church of Constantinople. Although a number of official documents and the testimonies of some contemporary writers have survived, it is impossible to draw up a clear narrative of what happened. In particular, it is not clear by which side the initiative was taken. A Czech source, the Historia Persecutionum Ecclesiae Bohemicae, states plainly that the initiative was taken by Rokyzana, the Calixtine Archbishop-elect of Prague, that an
appeal was made to the Greek Church in 1450, and that a satisfactory reply was received. Some scholars doubt whether this evidence is reliable, and a rather different account is given in the Greek sources. The main facts, however, seem to be well established.

In 1452 one Constantine Platris Anglikos, "a humble priest of Christ," arrived in Constantinople and presented on behalf of the Czechs a "book of faith," i.e. a confession, on the strength of which he was favourably received by the Greeks. In this confession Constantine refers to the change of faith at a recent council, obviously the Council of Florence. He declares that he himself had been persecuted by the Papists, and had to wander from city to city, until finally he arrived at the city "of true priesthood." He utterly repudiates the claims of the Pope. In order to test the extent of his agreement with Orthodox doctrine, the Greeks required him to answer a number of questions; these were drawn up by Gennadius Scholarius, the future Patriarch of Constantinople, one of the best Greek scholars of the day, who was also well acquainted with Western doctrine. The Greeks seem to have been satisfied that Constantine held the true faith and expressed right ideas on all points of doctrine, sacraments, and orders. Upon his departure he was given an ekthesis (statement) of the Faith, signed by a number of Greek bishops and theologians. Both documents still exist in Greek.  

Who was this Constantine Anglikos? He calls himself "Constantine Platris, and otherwise Czech Anglikos, a humble and unworthy priest of Christ." No person of this name is known from any other document. Clearly he was a foreigner—otherwise there would have been no point in examining him as to his beliefs. Why was he called Anglikos? Was he an Englishman, or at least in some way connected with England? In that case, what had he to do with the Czechs? It has been suggested that he was in fact no other than the famous Peter Payne, at one time Master of St. Edmund Hall, Oxford, a fervent Wyclifite, who was deeply involved in the Hussite movement. This identification must be judged highly improbable. All that we know of Peter Payne suggests that his
associations were with the Taborites, the more radical among the Hussites, and it is hard to imagine a more unsuitable emissary from the Calixtine, or more conservative, party to the Church of Greece. Peter Payne was known in Bohemia as "Peter Anglikos," or simply as "Anglikos," but it is not necessary to conclude that he had a monopoly of this title.

In the reply of the Greeks to "the confessors of the true faith of Jesus Christ," it is stated, on the evidence of "Anglikos," that there were many people of the same conviction in various countries—Moldavia, Bohemia, and within the Teutonic and Hungarian borders—and that even in England, among emigrants from these countries, there was a considerable group of Christians inclined to the Orthodox faith. A brief exposition of Orthodoxy follows. In conclusion, it is plainly stated that a profession of true faith is not of itself sufficient, and that it is necessary to be in communion with the true Church, i.e. with the four Eastern patriarchates. The Czechs are invited to join the Greeks. Priests will be sent to instruct them, and some adjustments in matters of ritual are not impossible. As far as we can judge from the reply sent by the Czechs to the Greeks, this message was favourably received by the Prague Consistory of Hussites of the Calixtine section.*

Who were the Greeks with whom Constantine was negotiating? The signatures to the Greek document are revealing. Every single one of the signatories, including Gennadius, belongs to the group of irreconcilable opponents of the agreement of union made at the Council of Florence. The intransient enemies of the union had a special interest in negotiation with the Czechs, who were also bitterly opposed to Rome, and had been excommunicated by that same Council which had succeeded in annexing the East. We have already indicated the motives which may have led the Utraquists to seek a rapprochement with the Greeks. It was a case of two minority groups reaching out to one another in order to overcome the isolation from which each was suffering.

Confusion is thrown into this picture by the only Greek source in which the episode is mentioned—the well-known Chronicon Ecclesiae Graecae of Philip Cyprius.* Here it is
suggested that the first step in the negotiations was taken in Constantinople. When word reached the Greeks of the noble effort of the Bohemians to reform the Church, they were filled with hope and confidence that communion could be established with them, and this they greatly preferred to communion with the Italians, of whom they had learned more than enough at the Council of Florence. They therefore sent a priest, Constantine Anglikos, to Prague to inquire into the matter. The report of this Greek delegate being satisfactory, he was sent again to Bohemia with a formal proposal. But in the following year, 1453, negotiations were terminated by the fall of Constantinople.

It is difficult to reconcile the two versions of the story; yet the episode is deeply revealing. It shows that already at that date the East had become involved in the actions and reactions of west European ecclesiastical policy. While standing firm in its own tradition, it could readily find points of contact with those in the West who were in opposition to Rome. Conversely, the East presented itself as a welcome ally to all non-Roman Christians in the West.

The episode of Constantine Anglikos as such had no results. The Calixtine party grew weaker rather than stronger and the further development of the Hussite movement took other directions. Yet it is interesting to note that again in 1491 delegates of the Czech Brethren were sent to the East in search of a living faith and a pure tradition. Unfortunately, very little is known of the results of this mission, though it seems probable that one of the delegates at least reached Moscow. Even more remarkable is the fact that in 1599, at the meeting with the Orthodox at Wilna with a view to the reopening of negotiations, Simon Turnovsky, one of the prominent Brethren leaders in Lithuania, referred in his proposals to the negotiations undertaken by Constantine Anglikos nearly one hundred and fifty years before.

III EAST AND WEST RELATIONSHIPS FROM THE REFORMATION UNTIL THE 19TH CENTURY

The Reformation was a crisis of the Western Church and did not directly affect the Church in the East. But
before long the Reformation spread to some countries with a large Orthodox population, and the Orthodox were thereby compelled to face the implications of the new religious situation in the West. Poland was specially important in this respect.

The Orthodox, and especially the Greeks, were vitally interested in the political changes brought about by the religious strife in the West. They still cherished the hope of liberation, and still hoped that some help might come from the Western powers. But now the situation was markedly changed. The West itself was divided. The main political consequence of the Reformation was that Europe was split into two hostile camps; religious divisions gradually hardened into the two great political alliances which were to struggle for victory in the Thirty Years War (1618–48). The Greeks had now to decide with which of the two power blocs it was wisest to associate their hope of freedom.

These Western powers themselves were interested in the moral support of the Orthodox, at that time under Turkish domination. We can trace through the centuries the close interest taken by foreign embassies at Constantinople in all discussions between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the various European Churches. All ecumenical conversations unfortunately came to be complicated by diplomatic intrigues and political calculations. The inescapable fact was that at that period no political alliance with any European power—whether Roman Catholic or Protestant—was possible without some regulation of relationships in the religious as well as in the political field. Thus many of these ecumenical conversations were initiated, not so much because of any immediate theological concern, as from heavy diplomatic pressure arising from the general international situation.

There was another aspect of this general situation which should not be overlooked. Both religious groups in the West were interested in the witness of the Orthodox Church, which was regarded by all as a faithful representative of an ancient tradition. One of the matters of debate between Rome and the Reformers was precisely this: had Rome been loyal to the ancient tradition, or was it guilty of many
unwarranted innovations and accretions? Conversely, was the Reformation really a return to the doctrine and practice of the primitive Church, or was it a deviation from it? In this debate the witness of the Eastern Church was of primary importance. Like the great reforming Councils and Wyclif before him, Luther would on occasion invoke the Greek testimony to the fact of Roman departures from the tradition of the Faith. In the 16th and 17th centuries we find the witness of the Eastern Church quoted constantly by both parties in the Roman-Protestant controversy. Roman apologists would insist on the complete agreement between Rome and the East, recently consolidated by the Union of Florence. They would insist on the unbroken unity of doctrine between the two Catholic communions through the ages, in spite of the "schism." On the other hand, various Protestant writers, and especially German Lutherans, would try to prove that the East was basically irreconcilable with Rome. They would point out that the very fact of the separation was proof that the two Churches were not in agreement.

The Protestants were always interested in the life and destiny of the Christian East. On the one hand, they were interested in securing exact and first-hand knowledge of the Turkish Empire, and especially of the Christian population in these conquered areas, for whom Western Christians could not fail to feel sympathy. On the other, Russia was becoming an increasingly decisive factor in the shaping of European policy, especially in the East. Many books, of various types and of different degrees of competence, were written in the period after the Reformation on the life, doctrine, and ethos of the Eastern Churches, partly by travellers, partly by foreign chaplains and diplomats resident in the East, partly by scholars who could use not only written or printed material, but also information obtained from Greek exiles or from occasional visitors. No comprehensive survey of this literature exists; it was, nevertheless, of decisive importance in shaping European public opinion on oriental affairs.

It is difficult to summarize the impressions which Western readers might gather from these various sources. There
was usually a tension between two general impressions. On the one hand, Western visitors were often bewildered by the low standards of life prevailing among the Orthodox, in the main the consequence of centuries of bondage; and by the unfamiliar character of life in the Near East and even in Russia. Some concluded that this East did not really belong to Europe, but was another and an alien world, more closely linked with Asia. The Protestants tended to be unfavourably impressed by the ritualistic character of the Church, which they would describe as superstitious and even idolatrous. Some Roman Catholics shared this opinion, if for different reasons, and wished to plan a fresh evangelization of the barbarian and schismatic East.

On the other hand, true scholars could easily detect, beneath this unappealing surface, a deep spiritual life and the glorious heritage of the early Church. They were inclined to suggest that this heritage should be disentangled from its barbaric and superstitious setting, that is to say, that the Eastern Church should experience its own Reformation, and free itself from the embarrassing legacies of its own Middle Ages. In this way it might come very close to the Protestant world. Few Continental Protestants felt that there was anything they themselves could learn from the East. Anglicans, on the contrary, were inclined to believe that the prospective contribution of the Eastern Church might be considerable, simply because in the Greek Church continuity with the undivided Church of the first centuries had never been broken.

It is against this complicated background that we have to consider the various ecumenical contacts between the East and the West.

In 1557 a special Swedish delegation visited Moscow. Two prominent Church leaders were among the delegates—Laurentius Petri, the first Lutheran Archbishop of Uppsala, and Michael Agricola, the Finnish Reformer. The delegates met with the Metropolitan of Moscow (Macarius), obviously on the initiative of the Tsar Ivan the Terrible. The main topics for discussion were the veneration of icons and fasting.
Greek was the language of the conversation, but Russian interpreters were very poor. The episode is interesting as a proof of interest on both sides in the religious aspect of relationship between the two nations."

In the year 1573 a new Imperial Ambassador was appointed to Constantinople, Baron David Ungnad von Sonnegk. He took with him a Lutheran chaplain, Stephen Gerlach, a graduate of Tübingen University and subsequently professor at the same, who carried private letters for the Ecumenical Patriarch from Martin Crusius, a prominent Hellenic scholar of the time, and Jakob Andreae, Chancellor of the University. It might seem that Crusius had originally no ecclesiastical concern; he was interested rather in getting first-hand information on the contemporary state of the Greek nation under Turkish rule. Yet even in these first letters unity and fellowship in the Faith had been emphatically mentioned. A few months later a further letter was dispatched from Tübingen under the joint signature of Crusius and Andreae, to which a copy of the Augsburg Confession in Greek had been appended. Gerlach was directed to submit it to the Patriarch, and to obtain from him a reply and comments. It was suggested that the Patriarch might see that there was basic agreement in doctrine between the Orthodox and the Lutherans, in spite of an obvious divergence in ritual practice between the two Churches.

The reply of the Patriarch, Jeremiah II, was friendly, but disappointing from the Lutheran point of view. The Patriarch suggested that the Lutherans should join the Orthodox Church and accept its traditional teaching. He wrote in his own name, as an individual and not with synodical authority, but naturally he had the advice and co-operation of other Greek hierarchs and scholars. It seems that Theodosius Zygomalas was the main contributor, but the final draft was carefully revised by Jeremiah himself. The document was by no means an original composition, nor did it claim originality. It was deliberately compiled from traditional sources. The main authorities were Nicolas Cabasilas, Symeon of Thessalonica, and Joseph Bryennios, all renowned Byzantine theologians of the 14th and 15th centuries, and,
among the early Fathers, especially St. Basil and St. John Chrysostom. Great emphasis was laid on loyalty to tradition. This constituted probably the greatest difficulty for the Lutherans, with their emphasis on "Scripture only."

There were some special points on which the Patriarch could not agree with Lutheran teaching. He agreed, in general, with the Lutheran view of original sin, but wished to stress human freedom as well. Nothing can be done without the divine initiative, yet the grace of God is freely received, and therefore faith and good works cannot be separated, nor should they be opposed to each other or sharply contrasted. In the chapter on the sacraments, the Patriarch insisted that there are seven sacraments. He could not accept the doctrine of the Holy Eucharist, as expounded in the Augsburg Confession; the Eucharist is not only a sacrament, but also a sacrifice. The Patriarch stressed the importance of the Sacrament of Penance, from both the theological and the moral points of view. He disavowed all abuses which had crept into penitential practice, but strongly insisted on penitential exercises as a helpful medicine for sinners. In conclusion, the Patriarch dwelt at length on some controversial points of practice—the invocation of saints and monastic vows.

Strangely enough, the Patriarch said hardly anything on the doctrine of the Church, and nothing at all about eschatology. He seemed to be satisfied with the statement on Holy Orders in the Augsburg Confession, that no man can administer the sacraments and preach the Word of God, "unless he has been duly called and ordained to this function." This was a vague statement and could be variously interpreted. Clearly the Orthodox interpretation was not the same as the Lutheran. The Patriarch concluded his message with a concrete proposal. If the Lutherans were prepared wholeheartedly to adhere to the Orthodox doctrine as expounded in his reply, he was prepared to receive them into communion, and in this way the two Churches could be made one.

The whole document is irenical in tone, and perhaps for that very reason it failed to carry conviction. It was not so much an analysis or criticism of the Augsburg Confession
as a parallel exposition of Orthodox doctrine. It is the last doctrinal statement set forth in the East, in which little or no influence of Western tradition can be detected. It was, in some sense, an epitome of and an epilogue to Byzantine theology. It is clear that the Patriarch was interested in the new move in the West away from Rome, and he was probably asking himself to what extent it was possible to expect the Western dissenters to join the Eastern Church. For him, this was the only natural approach to the problem of unity, and possibly it was the only approach which in the 16th century could have been considered. The East had been for centuries estranged from the West, and the crux of the separation was the papal claim to supremacy. Now there was a new anti-Roman movement in the West. Might this develop as a return to that earlier tradition, which the East had for ages steadfastly maintained?

The Lutherans at Tubingen were interested in exactly the same problem, but from an opposite point of view. Was the Orthodox East prepared to accept that sound doctrine which, as they held, had been formulated in the Confession of Augsburg? The Patriarch's comments were a disappointment. The Tubingen theologians felt themselves obliged to offer explanations, and supplied the Patriarch with some fresh material. The correspondence went on for several years, but was at last terminated by the Patriarch's refusal to enter into any further discussions on doctrine. He was prepared to continue friendly contacts, and in fact some years later another series of letters was exchanged between Jeremiah and his Tubingen correspondents; in these doctrinal topics were not handled.

Two points remain for consideration. First, the Greek translation of the Augsburg Confession which was sent to Constantinople was itself a remarkable document. The translation was first published in Basle in 1559 under the name of Paul Dolscius, and was reprinted in Wittenberg in 1587. There seems to be little doubt that the translation was in reality made by Melanchthon himself, with the help of a certain Demetrios, a deacon of the Greek Church, who was on mission in Germany and was staying with Melanchthon
at the very time at which the translation was being made. The text used was not the official version, but a special version of the Variata of 1531; the translation was a free interpretation of the text, rather than a literal rendering. There is no doubt that this Greek translation was intended primarily for the Greeks and not for domestic circulation. Melanchthon was much annoyed by its publication, as he alleged, without his knowledge and consent. Was this just a diplomatic disguise or an adaptation to Greek usage? Or was the whole venture inspired by a deep conviction that basically and essentially Lutheran doctrine was in agreement with the patristic tradition? Melanchthon was a good patristic scholar and his respect for the Greek Fathers was genuine. He could sincerely believe that the Lutheran Confession might be acceptable to the Greeks. In 1559 he had sent a copy, with a personal letter, to the Patriarch Joasaph. His letter, however, probably never reached the Patriarch.

It does not seem that the Tubingen theologians intended their correspondence with the Patriarch Jeremiah for publication. They were compelled to publish by an unfortunate breach of confidence on the part of the Greeks. A copy of the Patriarch's first reply, by inadvertence or by a deliberate indiscretion, came into the hands of a Polish priest, Stanislaus Socolovius, who was chaplain to the King of Poland, Stephen Batory, and he published it in Latin, with some comments of his own, under an offensive title: *The Judgement of the Eastern Church: on the main doctrines of the heretics of our century* (**1582**). The book immediately obtained wide currency and was translated into German. Pope Gregory XIII himself, through a special messenger, congratulated the Patriarch upon his noble rejoinder to the "schismatics." This unexpected and premature publicity compelled the Lutherans to publish all the documents (**1584**). This publication at once provoked a rejoinder by the Roman Catholics. An irenical approach had proved to be a call to battle.

This intervention by a Polish priest becomes immediately intelligible in the light of the religious situation in Poland at the time." The Reformation had quickly spread to Poland, and at first had great success. Numerous Lutheran and
Calvinistic communities were established, especially in Lithuania. The attitude of the Roman Catholic episcopate and clergy was hesitant and passive. The Reformation had the support of the royal court. Poland, in the first half of the 16th century, could be described by a contemporary as a "paradise for heretics." It took a long time before the Roman Church could mobilize its forces. The invitation issued to the Jesuits (upon the initiative of Cardinal Stanislaus Hosius, one of the leaders at the Council of Trent) decided the struggle. At the same time there was a change of dynasty in Poland, and the new king was whole-heartedly on the Roman Catholic side. But there was also a large Orthodox population in the country. Roman propaganda was concerned not only with the suppression of the "Protestant heresy," but also with the abolition of the "Eastern schism." In the resulting conflicts, it was of importance whether the Orthodox attached themselves to the Roman or to the Protestant side.

Ultimately there was a split among the Orthodox themselves. Some of the higher clergy were in favour of Rome, and in the end almost all the bishops, repudiating the authority of Constantinople, went over to Rome; thus a Uniate Church was inaugurated in Poland by the so-called Union of Brest (1596).

This secession of the Orthodox bishops created a strained and difficult situation for the Orthodox. The Polish Government, now avowedly pro-Roman, contended that the action of the bishops was binding on the people, that, from the legal point of view, the Orthodox Church no longer existed in Poland, and that those Orthodox who refused to follow their bishops were nothing but schismatics and rebels, and as such outlaws. Very few, however, among the clergy and laity were ready to follow the bishops. For many years a vigorous struggle raged between the Orthodox and the Uniates, not without bloodshed and the use of violence. There was also a continuous effort, in the name of religious freedom, to secure legal recognition for the Orthodox Church. It was natural for the Orthodox to seek the aid of their Protestant brethren, who were, at least from the legal point of view, in the same situation.
In 1577 a book was published by a Polish Jesuit, Peter Skarga, on *The Unity of the Church and the Greek Apostasy*, and this was followed later by another book in defence of the Uniate Church in Poland (1596). The Orthodox published a rejoinder—the *Apokrisis* (1597)—under the pseudonym of Christopher Philalethes. This was the chief apology from the Orthodox side. It was widely distributed, and reissued even in the 19th century, as a genuine statement of Orthodox belief. But in reality it was compiled by a Protestant. A Calvinist layman, Martin Bronsky, a distinguished Polish diplomat, was the author of this pro-Orthodox volume. It was based mainly on Calvin's *institutes* and on the Calvinist anti-Roman polemical literature, a fact which could not escape detection by the Jesuits.

More important than theological controversy was the close co-operation between Orthodox and Protestants in the common fight for freedom. The Council convened at Brest in 1596 for the official promulgation of the union with Rome was broken up by the Orthodox laity. They were aided by the delegates of the Ecumenical Patriarch, one of whom, Nicephorus, was arrested and executed by the Polish Government as a political spy and rebel. The Council was split into two separate meetings—the Uniate minority with all the bishops, and an overwhelming majority of clergy and laity. The latter drafted a vigorous protest against the violation of their faith and religious freedom. The antipathy of the Orthodox to the Union was obvious, but their problem remained unsolved. The Orthodox had no legal status in Poland and no bishops. Canonically the Orthodox Church in Poland and Lithuania was under the jurisdiction of Constantinople, and thus Constantinople became vitally interested in the result of the struggle.

Politically much depended on the side taken by Poland in the general European conflict, by the result of which the solution of the Eastern question would be determined. Poland was already at loggerheads with Hungary and Sweden, which were associated with the Protestant cause. Again, the attitude of Moscow was of grave importance. Since the end of the 15th century, the Holy See had been deeply
interested in the attitude of Moscow, and had made various attempts to secure its political support. In these attempts political and ecclesiastical problems were always intermingled. In the latter part of the 16th century, Rome was desperately interested in the question of the relations between Poland and Moscow. One of the greatest of Roman diplomats, who was also an expert theologian, Antonio Possevino, was sent to Moscow in the days of the Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible). His political mission was to secure the adhesion of Moscow to the pro-Roman European league, and also its participation in the projected offensive against the Turks, in which the Orthodox living under Turkish rule were naturally vitally concerned. At the same time, Possevino was one of the promoters of the Uniate Church in Poland. At one time Ivan IV was regarded as a candidate for the Polish throne, and in the electoral campaign he had the support of both the Orthodox and the Protestants, but was strongly opposed by the Roman Catholics.

It is in this confused perspective that we have to interpret the unexpected visit of the Ecumenical Patriarch (the same Jeremiah II who had corresponded with Crusius and his friends at Tubingen) to Moscow, a few years before the Council of Brest. Certainly he had reasons of his own for making this difficult and dangerous journey. The Emperor at Moscow was at that time the only Orthodox ruler of international importance. The result of the Patriarch's visit was also unexpected. The Church of Russia was raised to the status of a new Patriarchate (1589); in the following year this was officially recognized by all the Patriarchs in the East, but was bitterly resented in Poland. As leader of the Greeks in Turkey, the Patriarch was interested both in the support of the Orthodox ruler of Russia and in the sympathy of the Protestant nations. For this reason he wished to continue friendly contacts with Protestant theologians. He wrote to Tübingen again during his stay in Moscow. All these non-theological factors weighed heavily on the ecumenical deliberations of that time.

Two special episodes must be recorded at this point. The first was more curious than important. In 1570 a Polish
diplomatic mission went to Moscow. One of the delegates, John Krotovsky, was a member of the Church of the Czech Brethren and a convinced Protestant. He was accompanied by a theologian of that Church, John Rokyta, a prominent Senior of the community in Lytomyśl. They had hoped to convert the Tsar to their faith. This was of importance, inasmuch as they were prepared to support Ivan as a candidate for the throne of Poland and Lithuania. The Tsar himself was interested in theology and was well read in patristic writings. He arranged for a public disputation about the Faith to be held. The Tsar imagined Rokyta to be a Lutheran, and dealt with Protestantism in general in his replies. Rokyta presented his statement, and Ivan answered with a lengthy theological treatise repudiating Lutheran heresies, a copy of which was handed to Rokyta." This was in no sense an original work, but the argument was conducted on a genuinely theological level. The documents were published in Latin shortly after the meeting took place.

In the meantime, the legal position of the Orthodox in Poland remained unsatisfactory. Constantinople was interested in the situation. It is of interest to record that for several years an official representative of the Patriarchate was in Poland, helping the Orthodox resistance. This was Cyril Loukaris, the future Patriarch of Alexandria and Constantinople and author of the famous pro-Calvinist Confession. It seems that he made his first contacts with Protestants during his stay in Poland, and that his experience there to a great extent determined his later position in the interconfessional situation.

In 1599 an important conference met in Wilna. A small group of Protestant ministers, including Lutherans, Calvinists, and Brethren, met with the representatives of the Orthodox clergy and laity. The Orthodox leader was Prince Constantine Ostrogsky, one of the greatest magnates under the Polish Crown and a prominent leader in the field of education and literature. It was on his initiative and with his help that the first Slavonic Bible was printed, in his city Ostrog in Volhynia, in 1580. In a sense, he can be described as one of the first supporters in the Orthodox Church of the ecumenical
idea. He was deeply concerned for Christian unity, and, above all, he desired that Christians in Poland should be united. For that reason he was interested at the same time in a rapprochement between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholics, and in a confederation of the Orthodox with the Protestants. He was more of a statesman than a churchman, and there was some ambiguity in his vision of Christian unity. Yet he did much to strengthen his own Church.

The immediate purpose of the Wilna meeting in 1599 was to agree on the policy to be followed in the struggle for religious freedom. A kind of confederation for that purpose was established, and then the further question of union was raised. The initiative was taken by the President of the Brethren Church in Poland, Simon Turnovsky, who suggested that an attempt to achieve complete religious unity should be made. The Orthodox representatives at the meeting were evasive, not to say openly hostile. Some questions for further discussion were drafted and sent to Constantinople, under the joint signature of the Protestant leaders. The letter was acknowledged by the Locum Tenens of the Patriarchate, the future Patriarch of Alexandria, Meletios Pigas. The reply was non-committal, as Meletios was anxious to avoid at that moment an open conflict with the Polish Government. No further action was taken. The initiative taken by the Brethren Church was indicative of a sincere desire for unity. Yet there was a Utopian flavour about the whole enterprise, since the authors of the proposal were unaware of the depth of the differences between themselves and the Greek Church.

Since the fall of Constantinople, the Greek Church had had to face a very grave problem. An increasing number of Greeks was going to study in western universities, especially in Italy. Even those who kept the faith of their fathers were in danger of being inwardly Westernized or Latinized. In 1577 the famous College of St. Athanasius had been established at Rome, specially for Greek students. Roman propaganda among the Greeks was steadily growing, and was usually supported by some among the Western powers.
The only alternative available was to send students to Protestant universities in Germany, Holland, or Switzerland. The real harm done by this Western education was not so much that some unorthodox ideas were adopted by the Orthodox, as that they were in danger of losing their Eastern or Orthodox mentality, and of thereby becoming estranged from the living tradition. At the same time the Orthodox Church was compelled to clarify its position in the raging conflict between Rome and the Reformation. It became usual at that time to use Protestant arguments against Rome and Roman arguments against Protestants, without checking either carefully in the light of Eastern tradition.

This was the root of a "pseudomorphosis" of Orthodox thought. This term was used by Oswald Spengler "to designate those cases in which an older alien culture lies so massively over the land that a young culture, born in this land, cannot get its breath and fails not only to achieve pure and specific expression-forms, but even to develop fully its own self-consciousness." We may use the term also in a wider sense. "Pseudomorphosis" may become a kind of schism in the soul, in cases where an alien language or symbolism, for some imperative reason, is adopted as a means of self-expression. "Thus," to continue the quotation from Spengler, "there arise distorted forms, crystals whose inner structure contradicts their external shape, stones of one kind presenting the appearance of stones of another kind."

Many reasons led Orthodox theology in those ages to speak in the idiom of the Roman or Protestant worlds. At first the influence was confined to theological vocabulary and method. The term "transubstantiation," unknown in patristic Greek, was first adopted without any desire to innovate in doctrine. The next step was to borrow the full scholastic terminology to express the doctrine of the sacraments. On the other hand, it was tempting to use Protestant terminology, e.g. on the doctrine of original sin, which had never been adequately formulated in the age of the Fathers or in Byzantine theology.

Further, we must not forget the continued pressure of non-theological factors. The Turkish Government used
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frequently to intervene in the election of Patriarchs, and paid special attention to the political orientation of the candidates. Patriarchs, especially in Constantinople, were often deposed, sometimes again re-elected. The long list of Patriarchs in the late 16th and 17th centuries gives the impression that usually a pro-Roman candidate was followed by a pro-Protestant, and vice versa.

It is in this connection that we must understand the strange and tragic career of Cyril Loukaris.

This remarkable man was born in Crete in 1572, and, after a period of study in Italy, was sent to Poland to serve as a champion of the Orthodox faith. In 1602, at the early age of thirty, he became Patriarch of Alexandria, and held this position for nearly twenty years. He was then transferred to Constantinople as Ecumenical Patriarch. His eighteen years' tenure of the patriarchal throne was marked by endless trials and reversals of fortune. From the time of his service in Poland, he had been a strenuous opponent of the Roman Catholic Church, which, supported by France, was bending all its energies towards making its position dominant in the Turkish Empire. The Roman Catholics retaliated by using against Loukaris every possible weapon of calumny, intrigue, and even violence. Four times he was deposed from his office, and four times reinstated. At last his enemies were successful in compassing his destruction: on 7 July 1638 he was executed by orders of the Sultan Murad, and his body thrown into the Sea of Marmora.

Loukaris was a high-minded man, with a profound desire to bring about a reformation in the life of the Orthodox Churches and a restoration of the life of the sorely-oppressed Greek people. But the political complexities of his time often drew him away from his religious duties on to the slippery paths of politics, and his career was marked by uncertainty of principle and inconsistency of action. He "failed to reconcile his duty as the Primate of the Orthodox Church with the exigencies of high politics and with his aims at spiritual leader of his Nation." Yet he stands out as the most remarkable figure in the history of the Orthodox Churches
since the capture of Constantinople by the Turks (1453),
and he is still widely venerated in Greece, and in Crete, his
native island, as a great national leader and martyr.

The Greek Churches, under Turkish domination, were
desperately in need of Western help. From an early date
Loukaris was convinced that the Roman Catholics were
wholly unreliable, and that such help as was desired could
be obtained only from the Protestant powers. At Constan-
tinople he was in touch with the embassies of all the Protestant
nations, and corresponded with King Gustavus Adolphus
of Sweden and his famous Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna,
and the Transylvanian prince Bethlen Gabor, the champion
of Protestantism in Hungary.

As early as 1602, Loukaris had become acquainted with
the Dutch diplomat Cornelius Haga, who was later Dutch
Minister at Constantinople, and with the Calvinistic theologian
Uytenbogaert. The exact nature of Loukaris' relations with
Protestants and Protestantism has been and is still a matter
of controversy; but it seems clear that from this time on
he became deeply interested in the study of Protestant
theology, and tended to combine certain Calvinistic ele-
ments with his Orthodox convictions.

Later on Loukaris entered into relations with the
Anglicans through the mediation of the British Ambassador
at Constantinople, Sir Thomas Roe, a man of wide ecumenical
vision and a friend and adviser of John Dury. Through
Roe, he made contact with Archbishop Abbot of Canterbury,
to whom he presented an ancient codex of the Pentateuch
in Arabic. He also presented to King James I the famous
Codex Alexandrinus of the Bible. The Anglicans recipro-
cated with the gift of a printing-press with new typography,
on which a number of theological works were printed before
it fell victim to the fury of the Jesuits. According to one
witness," Loukaris had intended to dedicate his Confession

Even during his days at Alexandria Loukaris had begun
to enter into contact with the Church of England. It was
no accident that in 1617 he sent his Protosynkellos, Metro-
phanes Kritopoulos, to study theology at Oxford. We do
not know exactly what instructions were given to Kritopoulos; but, on his way back to Greece after the completion of his studies at Oxford and Helmstedt, he stopped at Geneva, and certainly entered into discussion with the pastors and professors there as to the possibility of closer relations between the Orthodox and Protestant Churches. It was as a result of these discussions that the Geneva Church dispatched a representative to Constantinople, the Piedmontese Antoine Léger, a convinced Calvinist, who was to play a most important part in the subsequent history of Loukaris.

In 1629 Léger published at Geneva, in Latin, a work entitled The Confession of Faith of the Most Reverend Lord Cyril, Patriarch of Constantinople, set forth in the name and with the consent of the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Jerusalem and other heads of the Eastern Churches. French, English, and German translations followed almost immediately, though it appears that the complete Greek text was not printed until 1633.

The sensation was immense. Here was one of the greatest Patriarchs of the Orthodox Churches of the East setting forth his faith in the authentic terms of Calvinism. The experts could recognize in the eighteen articles of the Confession the influence of the writings of Calvin himself, and of the Confessio Belgica. Immediate use was made of the Confession by both sides in the Roman Catholic-Protestant controversy—by the Protestants to prove the essential oneness of their faith with that of the Eastern Churches, by the Roman Catholics to prove the apostasy of the Greeks.

It was not long before efforts were made to prove that the Confession was a forgery. These, however, cannot be sustained. The original of the Confession is preserved in the Public Library at Geneva. The manuscripts, allusions in the letters of Loukaris, and the testimonies of contemporaries combine to prove beyond a shadow of doubt that the Confession really was his work. Nor can this be regarded as really surprising. It is probable that the emotional and political pressure exercised by Léger strengthened the Calvinistic impress on the Confession; but Loukaris had been deeply influenced by his contacts with the West, and there is no
doubt that he had come to accept certain identifiable Calvinistic tenets. As Hugo Grotius commented, in this matter Loukaris was actuated by political rather than by theological motives. The setting forth of the Confession was an ecumenical gesture, intended to facilitate the rapprochement between the Orthodox and the Protestants which Loukaris judged to be necessary, and to secure the support of the Protestants in the conflicts which he saw to be inevitable. Yet this procedure was highly dangerous. An element of falsity was introduced into inter-ecclesiastical relationships, and reactions within the Orthodox Church were such as to make impossible the very thing that Loukaris had desired.

Loukaris was without doubt an outstanding personality. Yet his following within his own Church was comparatively small, and his position as Patriarch gave him no right to speak on behalf of the whole Church. Shortly after his death, the Confession was condemned by two synods, and this not only because the successor of Loukaris, Cyril of Beroea, was inclined to support the Roman Catholic cause; the condemnations represented fairly the Orthodox reactions to the situation. But it was not enough to condemn Loukaris; the harm, from the Orthodox point of view, could be undone only by the official substitution for the unorthodox Confession of another Confession, genuinely Eastern and Orthodox. The violence of the controversies which raged in the 17th century, and the repeated efforts to refute Loukaris, testify to the gravity of the situation.

The first theological refutation of Loukaris came from Kiev. This was the famous Orthodox Confession, commonly known by the name of its author or editor, Peter Mogila, a Moldavian by birth, of Polish education and training, and Metropolitan of Kiev. The work was a kind of catechism, and the name of Loukaris was not even mentioned. But contemporary writers unanimously regarded the document as a reply or rejoinder to the heretical Confession of Loukaris. It is difficult to say to what extent Mogila himself was the author of this catechism; probably it was a collective work. Originally it was written in Latin, and the original text has recently been discovered and published. There is no
doubt that the book was written not only under Latin influences but also on the basis of Roman sources, e.g. the Catechism of Peter Canisius. Serious objections were raised against the original draft by Greek theologians, especially Meletios Syrigos I, during the consultation on the document at Jassy in 1642, and certain changes were made in the text. Meletios translated the document into Greek, and this edited and amended text received the approval of the Ecumenical Patriarch Parthenios in 1643. It was first printed in Holland in 1667, and was immediately used by the Roman Catholics for polemical purposes.

Peter Mogila may be regarded as almost an extreme case of the pseudomorphosis of which we have already spoken. It was he who organized in Kiev the first theological school for the Church of that region. For a variety of reasons, this school was organized on a Roman Catholic pattern. It was a Latin school, in the sense that all subjects, including theology, were taught in Latin. In Kiev in the early 17th century, this method might be considered normal, since in Poland Latin was the official language of education and even of the courts. When, however, the system was extended to Great Russia, the situation became abnormal. And this is what happened. All the theological schools were established on the Kiev model, and until the early 19th century all theological education was given in Latin, which was neither the language of public worship nor the spoken language of the worshippers. Thus theology became detached from the ordinary life of the Church, while the Orthodox schools became closely linked to the theological schools of the West, in which, whether Protestant or Roman Catholic, Latin was the language of instruction. In Kiev in the 17th century, the identification went so far that Roman Catholic textbooks were actually used in the theological school.

In the 18th century, the contrary pseudomorphosis occurred. Theophanes Prokopovich (1681-1736) had studied in the Jesuit College in Rome, and had actually become a Roman Catholic. However, on returning to Kiev in 1704, he resumed his Orthodox faith, and became professor of theology and later rector of the theological academy in that
place. In 1718 he was appointed Bishop of Pskov by Peter the Great. By reaction against Roman Catholicism, he introduced a number of Protestant theological text-books into the course of studies, and his own System of Theology, written in Latin, was in the main based on the *Syntagma of Amand Polanus*, a Reformed theologian of Basle. The successors of Prokopovich followed his lead.

It is important not to exaggerate the effects of these contacts in either direction. Certain scholars were influenced by Western theological ideas, and this influence made easier a number of genuinely ecumenical contacts. But, although it took a long time for Orthodox theology to recover its native independence, those who had undergone these external influences were never truly representative of the Orthodox tradition, and there was always an element of illusion in hopeful contacts based on their presentation of the Eastern faith.

An interesting exchange of views between Russian theologians and Lutherans took place in Moscow in the early 17th century. The new Tsar of Russia, Michael Romanoff, planned to marry his daughter to a Danish prince, Valdemar, who was a Lutheran. There were difficulties in the way. The Russians would not agree to the marriage of the princess to a prince who was not Orthodox. Matters were not helped on by the decision of a Church Council held in Moscow in 1620 not to recognize any baptisms other than those of the Orthodox Church. Prince Valdemar naturally refused to be “rebaptized” and was deaf to all the attempts of the Russians to persuade him. For a considerable time discussion continued between the prince's chaplain, Pastor Faulhaber, and a group of Orthodox clergy. This was not so much an ecumenical exchange of ideas as a confessional dispute; yet it gave an opportunity for frank discussion of agreements and disagreements between the two Churches, Orthodox and Lutheran. In the end, however, the marriage proposals broke down, and Prince Valdemar went home.

The Roman Catholics had long been accustomed to invoke
the witness of the Greek Church. The most interesting example of this use of the Eastern witness is to be found in the negotiations between the French Ambassador at Constantinople, the Marquis de Nointel, and the Greek bishops in the last quarter of the 17th century. These were connected with the famous French controversy on the Eucharist between the group of Port-Royal, Arnauld, Nicole, and others, including Renaudot the Uturgiologist, and the Calvinist theologians, especially Claude, the Huguenot minister of Charenton. One of the main questions discussed by the controversialists was the Eucharistic faith and doctrine of the ancient Church, and in this connection the testimony of the Eastern Church was sought and scrutinized. A careful study of the ancient liturgies of the East became necessary, and the great liturgical publications of E. Renaudot were directly connected with the dispute. Reference to Eastern belief and practice was one of the main arguments on both sides, but the Eastern witness was differently interpreted.

The Western controversy naturally centred on the term “transubstantiation,” the shibboleth of the Roman party, and it was essential to determine the meaning attached by the Orthodox to this particular terminology. The inquiry was pursued along two lines. First, the testimonies of the Greek Fathers, including the early liturgical texts, were scrutinized; secondly, an authoritative statement and interpretation was sought from the contemporary Eastern Church. The Calvinists used regularly to invoke the Confession of Loukaris, while the Romans were anxious to discredit and to discard this document; but nothing would serve to discredit Loukaris, who after all had held for many years two great patriarchal sees in the East, except an official document of authority at least equal to his.

The Roman Catholics were searching for witnesses everywhere, using the help of French diplomatic and consular officials in the various Orthodox centres. De Nointel was able to obtain a series of statements from individuals and from hierarchical groups; but the greatest reward of his zeal was that he succeeded in securing a "conciliar" statement,
signed by all the Eastern Patriarchs and by other prelates, the famous Decree of the Council of Jerusalem of 1672. It is certain that a copy of the Decree was communicated officially and directly by the Patriarch Dionysius of Constantinople himself, and that the Ambassador was asked to produce an official acknowledgement of its receipt. It is difficult to say to what extent he had exercised any direct pressure. It seems, however, that he was urging the Orthodox to dissociate themselves, as clearly as possible, from the pro-Protestant tendency exhibited in the Confession of Lukaris.

We must not identify the "Romanizing" tendency in the Orthodox theology of the 17th century with a leaning towards union with Rome. Strangely enough, in most cases these "Romanizing" theologians were openly "anti-Roman." Peter Mogila himself, in spite of his close dependence upon Roman sources in his theological and liturgical publications, was the head of the Orthodox Church in Poland, whose very purpose and aim was to defy the Uniate Church of that country. Dositheos, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, who was chiefly responsible for the Council of 1672, was also a staunch "anti-Roman" (or "anti-Latin," as he would have been described in his own time), an ardent defender of tradition, a vigorous fighter against Roman propaganda and proselytism in the East. Later on, it was he who was persistently to dissuade Peter the Great from using in Russia any of the graduates of the Kiev college, or any "foreigners," meaning probably Greeks educated in Italy, whom he suspected of a "Latinizing" tendency.

The whole situation had a definite ecumenical significance. For historical reasons, the Orthodox had to restate their tradition with direct reference to the Roman-Protestant conflict and tension. At that time, the main problem was that of faith and doctrine, with a special emphasis on sacramental theology. The problem of Orders was touched upon but slightly and occasionally. The most interesting feature in this early phase of Orthodox ecumenical contacts was that it was recognized, in practice and implicitly, that the Christian East belonged organically to the Christian world, and that
its witness and attitude were highly relevant to the life and destiny of Christendom at large. This was in itself an ecumenical achievement: it was no longer possible for the East and the West to ignore each other.

Peter the Great (1672-1725) was seriously concerned with ecclesiastical affairs. During his first visit to Holland, England, and other countries in 1699, he was interested not only in west European techniques, but in questions of ecclesiastical organization. In London he had conversations with Archbishop Tenison of Canterbury and with Bishop Burnet of Salisbury, who wrote of him: "I have been oft with him. On Monday last I was four hours there.... He hearkened to no part of what I told him more attentively than when I explained the authority that the Christian Emperors assumed in matters of Religion and the Supremacy of our Kings. I convinced him that the question of the Procession of the H. Ghost was a subtlety that ought not to make a schism in the Church. He yielded that Saints ought not to be praied to and was only for keeping the image of Christ, but that it ought only to be a Remembrance and not an object of worship. I insisted much to show him the great designs of Christianity in the Reforming men's hearts and lives which he assured me he would apply himself to."

The interest displayed by Peter was in line with what is known of his outlook at that time. It seems that he was already fairly well acquainted with the problems of the Reformation, especially in its political aspect. He may well have been introduced to the subject by those foreigners in the "German Settlement" in Moscow, with whom he was very intimate. In London he had contacts with the Quakers. Apparently his interest in ecclesiastical problems was widely known; if so, we can understand why, as early as 1708, Leibniz should select Peter as the most suitable person for convening a new Ecumenical Council.

There was a general feeling among German Protestants at that time that a rapprochement between them and the Church of Russia was quite feasible. It was felt that the necessary adjustments in faith and doctrine could easily be
made. Only the Church in Russia had to be somehow "reformed." What is usually called "the ecclesiastical reform" of Peter was in fact a sort of political Reformation, with an open proclamation of the Emperor's ultimate authority both in spiritual and in temporal affairs, a complete disregard of the traditional Canon Law of the East. The fact that the Eastern Patriarchs agreed to the change and recognized the new arrangement does not obscure the true meaning of the reform.

What was even more important was that, in the newly organized theological schools, a kind of Lutheran Orthodoxy was established as normal teaching. The greatest representative of this "Lutheranized Orthodoxy" was Theophanes Prokopovich, a very learned man, the chief ecclesiastical adviser of Peter. Prokopovich was in constant intercourse with foreign scholars. There was a group of foreign scholars in the new Academy of Science at St. Petersburg, and one of its members published in 1723 an interesting booklet under the provocative title: *Ecclesia Graeca Lutheranizans.*

Some special links existed between Russia and the famous Pietist centre in Halle. The ecumenical interests of the Halle circle had always a missionary as well as an ecumenical connotation. Slavonic publications of the Halle centre show that there was an attempt to propagate Lutheran ideas in Russia. In connection with the marriage of Peter's son Alexius to a German princess, the Berlin Academy, upon the proposal of Heineccius, the author of an interesting book on the Eastern Church, was considering a plan for the "evangelization" of Russia, and sought the advice of Leibniz.

There was one Russian (or Ukrainian) student at Halle, Simon Todorsky, a brilliant student of Oriental languages, who was later Bishop of Pskov and instructed Catherine II in religion. Catherine II says of him that, in his opinion, there was no real difference between Lutheran doctrine and that of the Eastern Church. Under these presuppositions, a rapprochement between the two Churches could easily be achieved. No practical proposal to that effect, however, was ever brought forward on the Orthodox side. The only result
was that the concept of the Church became increasingly vague in Russian theology.

Two episodes of the early 18th century call for special attention: the attempt by the doctors of the Sorbonne to negotiate a reunion with the Church of Russia, and the proposal of a concordat made by British Non-juring bishops to the Orthodox Churches in Russia and in the Near East. These proposals were very different in scope and nature, yet in both cases the initiative was taken by a minority group which desired to escape from its historical isolation.

During his stay in Paris in 1717, Peter the Great was received in a solemn session at the Sorbonne, and the question of the restoration of unity between the Churches of the East and of the West was raised. The French Church at that time was sorely agitated by debates on the famous Bull Unigenitus, which had been promulgated by Pope Clement XI in 1713. Immediately upon the publication of the Bull, the Sorbonne had accepted it, but reluctantly, under the threats and pressure of the State. But after the death of Louis XIV the doctors reversed their decision, and voted almost unanimously in favour of an appeal to a future general council.

The Appellants, as they were then labelled, wished to strengthen their position by an alliance with other Churches. They had, as it seems, no special interest in the Eastern tradition, of which probably they had only vague notions, and no particular sympathy for the Eastern ethos. What they were interested in was prospective allies against the papacy, and doubtless they had been impressed by the growing prestige and influence of Peter the Great in the international field. Peter declined to take any action himself, but suggested that a direct approach might be made to the Russian bishops. A memorandum was drafted, signed by eighteen doctors, and registered at the Archbishop's office. It was a typical "uniate" proposal, except that the position of the Pope was explained in the Gallican spirit. The difference in rite and doctrines was admitted. On the Filioque clause it was said that both interpretations, Western and Eastern, were essentially to the same effect. The memo-
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The document was sent to Russia, and a non-committal reply was communicated to the Appellants through official channels. It was pointed out that the Church of Russia was not competent to act on its own authority, being but a part of the Orthodox Communion. It was suggested, however, that correspondence might be opened between theologians of the two groups. This reply was drafted by Prokopovich, who had no sympathy with the Roman Catholic Church, even in a Gallican disguise. Another reply, compiled by Stefan Javorski (d. 1722), was in the meantime published in Germany, with the signatures of several bishops. It was to the same effect, though drafted by a man of "Romanizing" tendencies. The Sorbonne proposal was at the same time attacked from the Protestant side by Johann Franz Buddeus, in his interesting pamphlet Reconciliation between the Roman and Russian Churches impossible. Buddeus was an intimate correspondent of Prokopovich, from whom he had obtained full information.

The second approach to Peter the Great was made by British Non-jurors." The canonical position of the Non-juring group was precarious; its bishops had no recognized titles and but a scattered flock. Some leaders of the group took up the idea that they might regularize their position by a concordat with the Churches of the East. Non-jurors maintained in theology the tradition of the great Caroline divines, who had always been interested in the Eastern tradition and in the early Greek Fathers. The Greek Church had remonstrated strongly against the execution of Charles I; the Russian Government had acted to the same effect, cancelling on that occasion the privileges of English merchants in Russia. Among the original Non-jurors was Bishop Frampton, who had spent many years in the East and had a high regard for the Eastern Church. Archbishop Sancroft himself had been in close contact with the Eastern Church a
long time before. Thus there were many reasons why Non-jurors should look to the East.

In 1712 an opportunity was given them to establish contact with the Eastern Churches through a travelling Greek bishop, Arsenius, Metropolitan of Thebais in the Patriarchate of Alexandria, who came to England with a letter from the newly elected Patriarch Symeon Capsoules to Queen Anne. Some of the Non-jurors seized this opportunity to make inquiry on certain points of doctrine, especially on Eucharistic doctrine, so loudly discussed in connection with the controversy between Claude and Arnauld. Finally they commissioned Arsenius, who was going to Russia, to present their memorandum to Peter the Great. Another copy was simultaneously dispatched to the East, through Arsenius' Protosynkellos, the Archimandrite Joseph. The signatories regarded themselves as "the Catholick Remnant" in Britain, and applied for recognition and intercommunion. Their intention was to revive the "ancient godly discipline of the Church," and they contended that they had already begun to do this.

This phrase probably referred to that liturgical reform or revision on which the same group was engaged at that time. A new "Communion Office taken partly from Primitive Liturgies and partly from the first English Reformed Common Prayer Book," was published in 1718. It was at once translated into Greek and Latin, and copies were forwarded to the Orthodox. The compilers probably thought that this new Office, deliberately shaped on an ancient and Eastern pattern (and especially on the "Clementine" Liturgy, i.e. that of the Apostolic Constitutions), would be the best proof and recommendation of their doctrinal orthodoxy in the eyes of Eastern people. The Greeks, however, were unfavourably impressed by the idea of composing a new Communion rite, and insisted on the exclusive use of the traditional Eastern Liturgy. Certain doctrinal points called, in the opinion of the applicants, for careful reserve. The Filioque clause was explained as referring only to the temporal mission of the Son; the writers were prepared to omit it, if reunion were likely to be hindered by its retention. Purgatory
should be rejected, but a "certain inferior mansion" is to be admitted as a dwelling-place of the departed. Canons of the ancient Councils must be respected, but cannot be regarded as being of the same authority as "the Sacred Text," and therefore can be dispensed with if need be. No invocation of saints should be permitted, but communion with them in their perfect charity should be maintained. Concerning the Eucharist, it was stated that no "explanation" of the Mystery can be made obligatory, so that everyone may freely receive the Sacrament in faith, and worship Christ in spirit, "without being obliged to worship the sacred Symbols of His presence." Finally, serious misgivings were recorded concerning the use of pictures in worship. Strangely enough, the question of Orders was not even mentioned. The signatories expressed the hope that a concordat could be agreed on, and that a church might be built in London or elsewhere to commemorate the achievement, "to be called Concordia," under the jurisdiction of Alexandria, in which services might be conducted according to the Eastern rite and according to the rite of "the united British Catholicks."

The Non-jurors' document was signed in London on 18 August 1716. The application was favourably received by the Tsar and forwarded to the Eastern Patriarchs. Two years passed before a synodal reply, dated 12 April 1718, was ready. The reply was drafted chiefly by Chrysanthos Notaras, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, but signed by other hierarchs as well. It proved to be wholly discouraging. It was plainly stated that "our Oriental Faith is the only true Faith." The attempt of "the Luthero-Calvinists" to misrepresent it by publication of an heretical Confession, under the name of the learned Loukaris the Patriarch, was strongly disavowed. Then followed a detailed analysis of the proposal itself. There is no room for adjustment or dispensation in matters of doctrine—complete agreement with the Orthodox faith is absolutely indispensable. Besides this, the Canons of the seven Ecumenical Councils ought to be accepted even "as the Holy Scriptures" are accepted.

On all points raised by the Non-jurors, explanation was offered. A clear distinction was made between latreia, doulia,
and hyperdoulia, in order to make plain the doctrinal implications of the invocation of saints. Icons are a silent history, while Scripture is a speaking picture. The Eucharistic doctrine, professed by the Non-jurors, was sharply rejected as "blasphemy"; it is not enough to believe that "some grace" is united with the Sacrament—otherwise there would be a communion in grace and not in the Body of Christ—the elements are truly transformed, converted, and transubstantiated, or "changed" to become one with Christ's Body in heaven. Dispensations are available "in all temporary decrees," but only after exact scrutiny and by a synodal authority. Instead of permitting liturgical innovations, the writers look forward to the day when the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom will be sung in St. Paul's Cathedral. All practical problems can be settled later; unity in faith must be the beginning of everything. Again no mention is made of the problem of Orders.

It is difficult to say to what extent the Eastern hierarchs understood the real position of their British correspondents, of the "pious remnant of the primitive faith" in Britain. No word was said of the Established Church, and no explanation of the historical situation was given. It is hard to imagine that the Eastern hierarchs did not ask themselves who those people in Britain might be. In any case, they were under deep suspicion; "for being born and educated in the principles of the Luthero-Calvinists and possess'd with their prejudices, they tenaciously adhere to them like ivy to a tree."

Two further documents were appended to the Eastern reply: (1) a synodal answer (especially on sacraments), "sent to the lovers of the Greek Church in Britain" in 1672, and (2) another synodal statement on the Holy Eucharist, dated 1691. It was obvious that the two partners in the conversation spoke different idioms. Nevertheless, the conversation was not yet terminated. In 1723 the Non-jurors sent to the East their second memorandum. They had not lost hope, probably because of "the generous encouragement" given by Peter the Great. In fact, the Russian Synod, established in 1721, was prepared to discuss the proposal, without committing itself in advance to any statement, and suggested
that for this purpose two British delegates might be sent to Russia, for "a friendly conference in the name and spirit of Christ" with two delegates of the Russian Church. The delegates were designated, but their departure was delayed. The negotiations with the Russian Church were terminated by the death of Peter the Great in 1725.

In the meantime the Greeks sent in reply to the Non-jurors' rejoinder a copy of the decrees of the Jerusalem Council of 1672. The different attitude of the Greek and Russian Churches to the Non-jurors' proposal can easily be explained, if we remember that at that time Theophanes Prokopovich was dominant in the newly formed Russian Synod, whereas the Greeks held strictly to the rigid line taken at Jerusalem under the guidance of Dositheos. It may be added that Peter the Great, for political reasons, was inclined to sympathy with the Jacobite cause. The whole enterprise was terminated by the intervention of Archbishop Wake, who wrote in September 1725 to the Patriarch Chrysanthos of Jerusalem to make clear the schismatic character of the alleged "Catholick remnant in Britain," probably in reply to the inquiries made by the Orthodox through the Anglican chaplain in Constantinople.

On the whole, the comment made by William Palmer on the negotiations is valid: "Both the Russian Synod and the British bishops seemed to treat of a peace to be made by way of mutual concession without clearly laying down first the unity and continuity of the true Faith in the true Church." He adds that the Greeks were free from this charge, since they spoke openly of "conversion." In other words, the whole ecumenical endeavour was vitiated by a lack of clear understanding about the doctrine of the Church. This was not an accidental omission. We meet with the same omission time and again, from Jeremiah's correspondence with the Lutherans up to the middle of the 19th century, when for the first time the doctrine of the Church was brought to the fore in all ecumenical negotiations. It is remarkable that in the time of the Non-jurors the question of Anglican Orders was not raised by the Orthodox correspondents.
IV THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY

The early decades of the 19th century were marked by unusual spiritual unrest in Europe. In the turbulent atmosphere of those stormy years, many were led to the **conviction** that the whole political and social life of the nations needed to be radically rebuilt on a strictly Christian foundation. Many Utopian plans were formed, of which the most conspicuous was the famous Holy Alliance (1815).

Contracted by three **monarchs**, of whom one was Roman Catholic (Austria), another Lutheran (Prussia), and the third Eastern Orthodox (Russia), this was an act of Utopian ecumenism, in which political scheming and apocalyptic dreams were ominously mingled. It was an attempt to recreate the unity of Christendom. There is but one Christian Nation, of which the nations are the branches, and the true Sovereign of all Christian people is Jesus Christ himself, "no other than he to whom belongeth might." As a political venture, the Holy Alliance was a complete failure, a dreamy fiction, or even a fraud. Yet it was a symptomatic venture. It was a scheme of Christian unity. But it was to be a "unity without union," not a reunion of Churches so much as a federation of all Christians into one "holy nation," across the denominational boundaries, regardless of all confessional allegiances.

The initiative in the Holy Alliance was taken by the Russian Emperor, Alexander I, who was Orthodox but lived under the inspiration of German pietistic and mystical circles (Jung-Stilling, *Baader*, Madame de *Krudener*). A special Ministry was created in 1817, the Ministry of Spiritual Affairs and National Instruction, and, under the leadership of Prince Alexander N. Galitzin, became at once the central office of the Utopian propaganda.

Another centre of this Utopian ecumenism was the Russian Bible Society, inaugurated by an imperial rescript in December 1812, and finally reorganized on a national scale in 1814. The Russian Society was in regular co-operation with the British and Foreign Bible Society, and some representatives of the British Society were always on the Russian committee. The immediate objective of the Society was to
publish and to distribute Bible translations in all languages spoken in the Russian Empire, including modern Russian. In the first ten years over 700,000 copies were distributed in forty-three languages or dialects. Along with the distribution of the Scriptures a mystical ideology was also propagated, an ecumenism of the heart. Positive results of this endeavour should not be overlooked; specially important was the translation of the Bible in modern Russian, undertaken by the Society with the formal consent of the Holy Synod. Unfortunately the new ideology was often enforced on the faithful by administrative pressure, and no criticism of the doctrines of "Inner Christianity" was permitted. This policy could not fail to provoke vigorous resistance. Many felt that the Bible Society was propagating a new faith, and tending to become a "new Church," above and across the lines of the existing Churches. Ultimately, the Russian Society was disbanded by order of the Government in 1826 and its activities were brought to an end. The Russian translation of the Bible was completed only fifty years later, and this time by the authority of the Church itself.

The whole episode was an important essay in ecumenism. Unfortunately, the problem was badly presented. Instead of facing existing differences and discussing controversial points, people were invited to disregard them altogether and to seek communion directly in mystical exercises. There was an obvious "awakening of the heart" at that time, but no "awakening of the mind."

In the Conversation of a seeker and a believer concerning the truth of the Eastern Greco-Russian Church (1832), by Philaret, Metropolitan of Moscow, we find the considered opinion on the basic ecumenical question of one who had been through the experiences of the age of revival, and yet was deeply rooted in the Catholic tradition. The immediate purpose of this dialogue was to give guidance to those Russians who were at that time troubled by Roman Catholic propaganda. But Philaret sets forth the problem of Church unity in all its width. He begins with the definition of the Church as the Body of Christ. The full measure and
inner composition of the Body is known to Christ alone, who is its Head. The visible Church, the Church in history, is but an external manifestation of the glorious Church invisible, which cannot be "seen" distinctly, but only discerned and apprehended by faith. The visible Church includes weak members also. The main criterion here is that of Christological belief: "Mark you, I do not presume to call false any Church which believes that Jesus is Christ. The Christian Church can only be either purely true, confessing the true and saving divine teaching without the false admixtures and pernicious opinions of men, or not purely true, mixing with the true and saving teaching of faith in Christ the false and pernicious opinions of men." Christendom is visibly divided. Authority in the Church belongs to the common consent of the Church Universal, based on the Word of God. Ultimately separated from the Church are only those who do not confess that Jesus is Son of God, God Incarnate, and Redeemer. The Eastern Church has ever been faithful to the original deposit of faith, it has kept the pure doctrine. In this sense it is the only true Church. But Philaret would not "judge" or condemn the other Christian bodies. Even the "impure" Churches somehow belong to the mystery of Christian unity. The ultimate judgement belongs to the Head of the Church. The destiny of Christendom is one, and in the history of schisms and divisions one may recognize a secret action of the divine Providence, which heals the wounds and chastises the deviations, that ultimately it may bring the glorious Body of Christ to unity and perfection.

Philaret was much ahead of his time, not only in the East, though to some extent his ideas served as the basis for the return to Orthodoxy of the Uniates in western Russia (1839). Yet his outline of the problem was clearly incomplete. He spoke of one aspect of unity only, namely unity in doctrine. He did not say much about Church order. Probably Vladimir Soloviev was right in his critical remarks: "The breadth and conciliatory nature of this view cannot conceal its essential defects. The principle of unity and universality in the Church only extends, it would seem, to the common
ground of Christian faith, namely the dogma of the Incarnation. ... The Universal Church is reduced to a logical concept. Its parts are real, but the whole is nothing but a subjective abstraction." This is an exaggeration. The Church Universal was for Philaret not a logical concept, but a mystery, the Body of Christ in its historical manifestation. It is true, however, that the sacramental aspect of the Church was not sufficiently emphasized, and for that reason the relation between the invisible unity of the Church and its historical state at present, "the Church in its divided and fragmentary condition," was not clearly explained.

Philaret was probably the greatest theologian of the Russian Church in modern times. He was a living link between several generations: born in 1782, he became Metropolitan of Moscow in 1821, and died in 1867, vigorous and active till the day of his death. He was widely read in the mystical literature of all ages and of all confessions, and he was always impressed by "warm piety" wherever he might find it. Philaret had been a student at a time when Russian theological schools were dominated by Protestant text-books, and the influence of Protestant theology can easily be recognized in his writings. All these influences enlarged his theological vision. He was aware of the existing unity of Christendom and of its destiny. Yet at the same time he was deeply rooted in the great traditions of the Orthodox Churches, and the true masters of his thought were the Fathers of the Church.

The second quarter of the 19th century was a time of theological revival in many countries. There was a rediscovery of the Church as an organic and concrete reality, with special stress on her historic continuity, perpetuity, and essential unity. The famous book of Johann Adam Moehler (1796-1838), Professor of Church History in the Catholic Faculty of Tubingen (and later at Munich), Unity in the Church, or the Principle of Catholicism (1825), must be mentioned in this connection. Moehler's conception of Church unity meant a move from a static to a dynamic, or even prophetic, interpretation. The Church was shown to be not so much an institution as a living organism, and its institutional
aspect was described as a spontaneous manifestation of its inner being. Tradition itself was interpreted as a factor of growth and life, and Moehler's appeal to Christian antiquity was by no means just an archaeological concern. The past was still alive, as the vital power and spiritual leaven, as "the depth of the present."38

In Russia, Alexis S. Khomiakov (1804-60) was very close to Moehler in his doctrine of the Church, and probably was well acquainted with his writings, though he arrived at his conclusions by an independent study of the Fathers.39 In all these cases there was a renewed interest in Christian antiquity, regarded rather as a source of inspiration than as a ready pattern to which the Church must be conformed. Identity of Christian belief must be warranted by universal consent through the ages. But this was no longer considered simply as a formal identity of doctrine, taken as a set of propositions, but rather as a perpetually renewed experience of the living Church, which professes beliefs and teaches doctrines out of its unchangeable vision and experience. The Church itself now becomes the main subject of theological study.

V BETWEEN THE CHURCHES

One of the most remarkable aspects of this general revival of interest in the Church was the Oxford Movement in England and in the Anglican Churches. The Church of England, it was and is maintained by Anglican authorities, is the Catholic Church in England. But if so, what is the relation of this Catholic body to other Catholic Churches elsewhere? The first answer was given in the "Branch" theory of the Church. As J. H. Newman succinctly expressed it: "We are the English Catholics; abroad are the Roman Catholics, some of whom are also among ourselves; elsewhere are the Greek Catholics."39 But since the co-existence of more than one form of the Catholic Church in one place involves schism, "Catholics" when in England should be Anglican, when in Rome Roman, and when in Moscow Orthodox.39

This theory amounted to the contention that, strictly
speaking, the Church was not divided at all, and that only visible communication or communion had been broken; the problem of reunion therefore consisted in the restoration of the suspended intercommunion, or in the mutual recognition of the separated branches of the Catholic Church. This view was pressed strongly and persistently by William Palmer, of Worcester College, Oxford, in the book which can be regarded as the first systematic presentation of the Tractarian doctrine of the Church: *A Treatise on the Church of Christ: designed chiefly for the use of students of Theology* (1838). In the author's opinion, external communion did not belong to the essence of the Church, and consequently the Church was still one, although the visible unity of the body had been lost. It should be noted again, that, according to this theory or interpretation, a very wide variety of doctrinal views and practices was compatible with essential unity. Or, in other words, the main emphasis was on the reality of the Church, and not so much on doctrine as such.

It was precisely at this point that a major misunderstanding between the Anglican and Orthodox Churches was bound to arise. Even though the Orthodox did not on all occasions openly and formally question the initial assumption of the Anglicans, it was inevitable that they should always insist on identity in doctrine, and make the reality of the Church itself dependent upon the purity and completeness of the Faith. The basic obstacle to rapprochement between Anglicans and the Churches of the East lay precisely here. Eastern theologians were bound to insist that the Orthodox Church is the only true Church, and all other Christian bodies are but schisms, i.e. that the essential unity of Christendom has been broken. This claim could be variously phrased and qualified, but, in one form or another, it would unfailingly be made.

The early Tractarians were not deeply interested in the Eastern Churches or in the possibility of contact with them. A world of ignorance, prejudices, and misunderstanding still existed between the Churches. But gradually a change took place. As early as 1841, we find E. B. Pusey writing: "Why should we ... direct our eyes to the Western Church alone,
which, even if united in itself would yet remain sadly maimed, and sadly short of the Oneness she had in her best days, if she continued severed from the Eastern?

There can be little doubt that Pusey had been stirred and interested by the new contacts which had begun to take effect shortly before he wrote these words.

In 1839 the Rev. George Tomlinson, at that time Secretary of the S.P.C.K., and later first Bishop of Gibraltar (1842), was sent to the East, primarily in order to ascertain the needs of the Greek Church in the field of religious literature. He was given commendatory letters, written in classical Greek and addressed to "the Bishops of the Holy Eastern Church," by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of London. He called on the Patriarch of Constantinople and explained to him the character of the English Church, stressing its Catholic character and its friendly disposition "toward the Mother Church of the East." He explained that the Church of England had no missionary objectives in the Levant, but was interested only in fraternal intercourse with the Eastern Church.

The same attitude was also taken by the American Episcopal representative at Constantinople, the Rev. Horatio (later Bishop) Southgate, the acting head of the "mission" of the Protestant Episcopal Church to the East. He was following closely the official instruction given to him by the Presiding Bishop, Alexander V. Griswold: "Our great desire is to commence and to promote a friendly intercourse between the two branches of the One Catholic and Apostolic Church." Bishop Griswold was himself a man of strong Evangelical convictions, but his directives were coloured by a characteristically Anglican conception of ecumenical relationships.

Pusey seemed to be justified in his conclusions. "This reopened intercourse with the East," he wrote to the Archbishop, "is a crisis in the history of our Church. It is a wave which may carry us onward, or, if we miss it, it may bruise us sorely and fall on us, instead of landing us on the shore. The union or disunion of the Church for centuries may depend on the wisdom with which this providential opening
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is employed.* In this perspective, "the Palmer episode" appears as much more than an eccentric personal venture, deeply as it was coloured by the individual character of the man and his private convictions and manners.

William Palmer (1811-79) was described by one of his friends as an "ecclesiastical Don Quixote." He was a man of unusual abilities: wide learning, powerful intellect, steadfastness of purpose, unbending sincerity; but rather inflexible and obstinate. His main weakness was "his inability to reconcile himself to the conditions of imperfect humanity and human institutions." In 1840 Palmer decided to visit Russia. He went, fortified by a Latin letter from the President of Magdalen College, the venerable Dr. Routh. The letter stated that Palmer was going to Russia in order to study the doctrines and rites of the Church, and to learn Russian. Then followed an unexpected sentence: "Further, I ask, and even adjure in the name of Christ, all the most holy Archbishops and Bishops, and especially the Synod itself, that they will examine him as to the orthodoxy of his faith with a charitable mind, and, if they find in him all that is necessary to the integrity of the true and saving faith, then that they will also admit him to communion in the Sacraments."

As was to be expected, Palmer's hope was frustrated. His claim to be a member of the Catholic Church was met with astonishment. Was not the Church of England, after all, a Protestant body? In 1838 and 1839 Palmer had written in Latin an Introduction to the Thirty-nine Articles, which he endeavoured to interpret in a "Catholic" sense. This he now offered to the Russian authorities as a basis for doctrinal discussion. Not everything in Palmer's explanations was satisfactory to the Russians. They insisted on complete conformity in all doctrines, and would not consent to confine agreement to those doctrines which had been formally stated in the period before the separation of East and West. The main interlocutor of Palmer was the Archpriest Basil Koutnevich, who was a member of the Holy Synod. He was ready to admit that doctrinal differences between the Orthodox and Anglican Churches, if properly interpreted,
were inconsiderable. Nevertheless, in his opinion, the Anglican Church was a separate communion. The Eastern Church was the only true and orthodox Church, and all other communions had deviated from the truth. Yet, since "Christ is the centre of all," some Christian life was possible in the separated bodies also. Naturally the Russians were staggered, as Palmer himself stated, "at the idea of one visible Church being made up of three communions, differing in doctrine and rites, and two of them at least condemning and anathematizing the others." In Palmer's opinion, Russian theologians and prelates were not at all clear on the definition of the visible Catholic Church, "but were either vaguely liberal, or narrowly Greek."

Palmer met many people with whom he could discuss problems as he could have done at home, at Oxford or elsewhere. Finally, he had an interview with the Metropolitan Philaret. The latter could not accept Palmer's initial assumption that the unity of the Church could be preserved when there was no longer unity in doctrine. "The Church should be perfectly one in belief," Philaret contended. The distinction between essential dogmas and secondary opinions seemed to him precarious and difficult to draw. "Your language," Philaret told Palmer, "suits well enough for the 4th century, but is out of place in the present state of the world . . . now at any rate there is division." And therefore it was impossible to act in an individual case before the question of relationship between the two Churches, the Anglican and Orthodox, had been settled in general terms. Moreover, it was by no means clear to what extent Palmer could be regarded as an authentic interpreter of the official teaching and standing of the Anglican Church.

In brief, the Russian authorities refused to regard Palmer's membership in the Church of England as a sufficient reason for claiming communicant status in the Orthodox Church, and could not negotiate reunion with a private individual. Yet there was readiness from the Russian side to inaugurate some sort of negotiations. Palmer returned to Russia in 1842, with slightly strengthened credentials. The Russian Synod once more refused to negotiate on his terms, but welcomed
his desire to enter into communion with the Orthodox Church. Identity of belief was stressed as an indispensable prerequisite of communion, and reference was made to the answer given by the Eastern Patriarchs to the Non-jurors in 1723. Palmer persisted and presented a new petition to the Synod, asking that a confessor should be appointed to examine his beliefs and to show his errors. Fr. Koutnevich was appointed and made it clear that, in his opinion, certain of the Thirty-nine Articles were obviously not in agreement with Orthodox doctrine. Palmer, in reply, offered his own conciliatory explanation of the Articles in question. But could he prove that his contentions would be endorsed by responsible authorities of the Church to which he belonged?

Palmer's next task, therefore, was to defend his views as being not merely personal to himself, but a legitimate exposition of Anglican doctrine, and to secure some kind of official approbation. His method was to republish in English Philaret's *Longer Russian Catechism*, together with a long Appendix, consisting mainly of excerpts from Anglican official documents and from the works of leading divines, aimed at demonstrating the existence within Anglicanism of a tradition of doctrine capable of being reconciled with the demands of the Orthodox. The whole was published anonymously at Aberdeen in 1846 under the title *A Harmony of Anglican Doctrine with the Doctrine of the Catholic and Apostolic Church of the East*. Palmer, who was by now somewhat doubtful as to how far the State-ridden Church of England was likely to be attracted to his ideas, turned to the Scottish Episcopal Church, in the hope that it might *synodically* assert such doctrine as he had commended to the Russians. Palmer's book and his appeal did meet with some response among Scottish Episcopalians, but it was wholly unrealistic to suppose that Church would endanger its relations with the whole of the rest of the Anglican Communion by coming out boldly in favour of doctrines which the majority of its bishops and faithful members did not hold.

The negative attitude of the Scottish bishops came as a great shock to Palmer; after a time of grave indecision, he
decided to seek admission to the Orthodox Church. An unexpected difficulty confused his plans. The validity of his baptism was questioned by the Greeks, whereas in Russia it had been formally recognized. He could not reconcile himself with such a flagrant dissension within the same communion on a matter of primary importance. On the other hand, he could not continue outside what he had come to regard as the visible communion of the Catholic Church. Finally, he joined the Church of Rome. In his conversations with the Russian ecclesiastical authorities Palmer was concerned mainly with those particular points of doctrine on which disagreement was alleged to exist between the two Churches. The ultimate question, however, concerned the nature and character of the Anglican Communion itself. For Palmer it was a "branch" of the Church Catholic. For the Orthodox this claim was unacceptable for two reasons. First, Palmer could prove that some individuals in the Anglican Churches did hold "Orthodox beliefs," but not that this was the faith of the whole Communion. Secondly, the Orthodox were not themselves in agreement as to the status of non-Orthodox communions. Discussion centred on this very point in the correspondence of Palmer with Khomiakov in the years 1844-54.

Khomiakov was a layman and had no official position in the Church. Yet his influence was to grow. His aim was to bring back Orthodox teaching to the standard of the Fathers and the experience of the living Church. The unity of the Church was the source of his theological vision. The Church is itself unity, "a unity of the grace of God, living in a multitude of rational creatures, submitting willingly to grace." This is a mystery. But the mystery is fully embodied in the visible, i.e. historical, Church. Khomiakov's conception was much more sacramental than mystical. The reality of the sacraments, in his conception, depended upon the purity of the Faith, and he hesitated therefore to admit the validity or reality of sacraments in those Christian bodies which were in schism or error. The "One Church" was for Khomiakov essentially identical with the Orthodox Church of the East. Just because the unity of the Church was created
by the Spirit and not by organization, a schism, in Khomiakov's opinion, would inevitably cut the separated off from the inner unity of the Church. The "Western communions," in his view, were outside the Church. Some links obviously still did exist, but they were of such a character that no theological formulation was possible: "united to her by ties which God has not willed to reveal to her." The Church on earth cannot pass an ultimate judgement on those who do not belong to its fold. It is impossible to state to what extent errors may deprive individuals of salvation.

The real question is, however, about the identity of the Church itself. What is essential here is, first of all, "a complete harmony, or a perfect unity of doctrine." For Khomiakov, this was not merely an intellectual agreement, but rather an inner unanimity, a "common life" in Catholic truth. "Unions" are impossible in the Orthodox Church—there can be but "unity." This "unity" has been actually broken: the West separated itself from the unity. Unity can be restored only by a return of those who went their own way, instead of abiding in unity. "The Church cannot be a harmony of discords; it cannot be a numerical sum of Orthodox, Latins, and Protestants. It is nothing if it is not perfect inward harmony of creed and outward harmony of expression."

Khomiakov believed that "sacraments were performed only in the bosom of the true Church," and could not be separated from that unity in faith and grace which was, on his interpretation, the very being of the Church. Variations in the manner in which the Orthodox Church received those who decided to join it made no real difference. The rites may vary, but in any case some "renovation" of the rites conferred outside the Orthodox Church "was virtually contained in the rite or fact of reconciliation." This was written before Palmer had to face the fact of divergent practice in the matter of reconciliation in his own case. When this happened, Khomiakov expressed his disagreement with the Greek practice, but refused to attach great importance to the difference. In any case, there had to be some act of first incorporation into the Church. For Khomiakov the Church
was real precisely as an actual communion in truth and in grace, both inseparably belonging together. Those who do not share in this communion are not in the Church. The reality of the Church is indivisible.

It was at this point that the first editor of Khomiakov's letters to Palmer (in Russian), Fr. Alexander M. Ivantzov-Platonov, Professor of Church History at the University of Moscow, found it necessary to add a critical footnote. On the whole, he shared Khomiakov's interpretation of the Church, but was not prepared to deny the presence of sacramental grace in the separated communions. Ivantsov had studied at the Moscow Academy, and was probably influenced by the ideas of Philaret. There was an obvious difference between the two interpretations: Philaret's conception was wider and more comprehensive; Khomiakov was more cautious and reserved. Both interpretations still co-exist in the Orthodox Church, with resulting differences of approach to the main ecumenical problem.

Palmer's approach to the Russian Church was a private and personal move. Yet it did not fail to arouse interest in the Anglican Church among the Russians. At his first departure from Russia in 1842 he was told by the Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, Count Pratassov, that a new chaplain was to be appointed to the Russian Church in London, who might be able to learn the language and study Anglican divinity. In 1843 the Rev. Eugene Popov, a graduate of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, was transferred from Copenhagen to London, and continued to serve there until his death in 1875. Fr. Popov used to send periodical reports to the Holy Synod concerning ecclesiastical affairs in England, and established close links with some leading churchmen, including Pusey and Newman. Unfortunately, these reports were published only in part, many years after the author's death, and only in Russian. Fr. Popov at first had hopes of union, but changed his attitude in later years."

Certain links were established between Oxford and Moscow, and theological professors and students in Moscow used to collate Greek manuscripts of the Fathers for the Library of the Fathers. Nor were books on Anglicanism, brought by
Palmer to Russia and presented by him to the Academy in St. Petersburg, left without use. One of the students was advised to write his thesis on Anglicanism compared with Orthodoxy, apparently on the basis of materials supplied by Palmer. In both countries there were groups earnestly interested in rapprochement between the respective Churches. John Mason Neale, by his historical studies and translations of Eastern liturgical texts, did more than anyone else to further this idea.

In 1851, when the repercussions of the famous Gorham case were at their height, an attempt was made to approach the Church of Russia in order to secure recognition of a group of Anglicans which was contemplating secession from the Established Church. Although this was not in any sense an ecumenical move, some points in the project were of interest. The proposed basis of reunion was to include recognition of the seven Ecumenical Councils, the Russian Catechism as an outline of doctrine, and repudiation of Lutheran or Calvinist leanings. Connection with the Russian Church was expected to be only temporary. Anglican rites and devotional forms were to be kept, and the English language to be used. The Synod was asked to investigate the problem of Anglican Orders, and, in the event of a favourable decision, which was expected, to confirm the clergy in their pastoral commission. The scheme led to nothing; but it affords some evidence of increasing concern in certain quarters for more intimate connection with the Orthodox East.

The Association for the Promotion of the Unity of Christendom was founded in 1857, with the intention to unite "in a bond of intercessory prayer" Roman Catholics, Greeks, and Anglicans. The Eastern Church Association was created in 1863, on the initiative of John Mason Neale, and two Orthodox priests were on its standing committee from the beginning—Fr. Popov and the Greek Archimandrite, Constantine Stratoulias. The leading Anglican members were Neale, George Williams, and H. P. Liddon. Williams had spent several years in Jerusalem as chaplain to the Anglican bishop there. His well-known book on the Non-jurors in...
their relations with the East, in which all the relevant documents were published in English for the first time, was undoubtedly related to the new ecumenical endeavour. Neale never had an opportunity of visiting the Eastern countries. But Liddon went to Russia in 1867, had an interview with Philaret shortly before his death in the same year, and was deeply impressed by all he saw in Russia. "Sense of God's presence—of the supernatural—seems to me to penetrate Russian life more completely than that of any of the Western nations." 47

The Primus of the Episcopal Church in Scotland, Robert Eden, Bishop of Moray, Ross, and Caithness, visited Russia in 1866, and also had a talk with the Metropolitan, Philaret. His concern was solely with intercommunion, as distinguished from, or even opposed to, reunion. That intercommunion should be restored which existed "between members of independent Churches in the early days of Christianity." Prejudices should be removed, and some mutual understanding between bishops of the different Churches established. Nothing else was envisaged."

The purchase of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands from Russia in 1867 by the United States, and the transfer of the Russian episcopal see from Sitka to San Francisco, brought the Episcopal Church in the United States into direct contact with the Church of Russia. It is curious to find that when, in the middle of the century, in connection with the gold rash in California, a considerable number of Anglicans established themselves there, the question could be raised whether they might not appeal to the Russian bishop on the spot, rather than to the remote Anglican bishops in the eastern states, for aid and authority, and call themselves the Church of California. At the General Convention of the Episcopal Church in 1862, one of the deputies, Dr. Thrall, raised this question. It was, he affirmed, desirable to nominate a special committee of inquiry and correspondence, which should present to the Orthodox authorities the claims of the Protestant Episcopal Church as a part of the Church Catholic, and as such qualified to assume care of Russians
in the Pacific area. A commission, the "Russo-Greek Com-
mittee," was appointed with limited authority, "to consider
the expediency of communication with the Russo-Greek
Church, to collect information on the subject," and to report
to the next General Convention."

The American delegates stopped in England on their
way to the East, and conferred with the British. Some con-
sultations were held also with the Russian experts, Fr. Popov
and Fr. Joseph Vassiliev, the Russian chaplain in Paris, who
was invited specially for this purpose. The problem under
discussion was intercommunion, i.e. mutual recognition of
the Churches, including the recognition of Anglican Orders
by the Orthodox. It was made clear that the Eastern Church
would not enter into any formal communion with Anglican
Churches, unless certain changes were made in Anglican
formularies. The Church of England was hardly in a position
to make any changes. It was hoped that the Americans,
less tied by tradition and free from the State connection,
would go ahead and create a precedent.

One of the American delegation, Dr. Young, visited
Russia in 1864, and was received by the Metropolitans of
St. Petersburg (Isidor) and Moscow. The Russian Synod was
not prepared to take any formal steps, but recommended
further study of a rather informal character. Philaret was
favourably disposed, but anticipated misunderstandings among
the laity; bishops and the learned would understand the
problem, but, as Young recorded his words, "the difficulty
will be with the people." It was a pertinent remark; in
Philaret's opinion, obviously, reunion or rapprochement could
not be brought about simply by an act of the hierarchy,
but presupposed some participation of the general body of
believers. He had some difficulties concerning the validity of
Anglican Orders. Finally, he suggested five points for further
study: (1) the Thirty-nine Articles and their doctrinal posi-
tion; (2) the Filioque clause and its place in the Creed; (3)
Apostolic Succession; (4) Holy Tradition; (5) the doctrine
of Sacraments, especially Eucharistic doctrine. It was decided
that an interchange of theological memoranda should be
arranged for between the Russian and Anglican commissions.
At the same time, the common interests of Russia and America in the Pacific area were stressed, including the missionary endeavour of both nations. The American delegates favoured the plan of establishing a Russian bishopric at San Francisco, and also of a Russian parish in New York.¹⁰

A long report on these negotiations was presented by the Russo-Greek Committee to the General Convention in 1865. It was decided to extend its commission, and to empower it to correspond with the authorities of all the Eastern Churches and to secure further information. It was made clear, however, that the Church was not prepared for any other type of negotiations."

During the next three years, various questions, especially that of the Filioque clause in the Nicene Creed, were widely discussed. A comprehensive report on the negotiations was presented to the General Convention of the Episcopal Church in 1868. The prospects seemed to be favourable, and no insuperable barriers had been discovered. The main problem was that of Orders. It was suggested that the Russian Synod might be willing to send delegates to investigate the problem. Intercommunion must be interpreted, as it had been stated by the theological commission of the Canterbury Convocation in 1867, as "mutual acknowledgement that all Churches which are one in the possession of a true episcopate, one in sacraments, and one in their creed, are, by this union in their common Lord, bound to receive one another to full communion in prayers and sacraments as members of the same household of Faith."¹⁸ A year later the Archbishop of Canterbury (Tait) approached the Ecumenical Patriarch, requesting him, in compliance with the recommendation of the Committee on Intercommunion of the Canterbury Convocation, to allow Anglicans dying in the East to be buried in Orthodox cemeteries and to be given Christian burial by Orthodox clergy. A copy of the Book of Common Prayer in Greek was appended to the letter. The Archbishop's request was granted by the Patriarch, Gregory VI, who at the same time raised certain difficulties about the Thirty-nine Articles.⁹

The most interesting episode in the negotiations at that
time was the visit of the Archbishop of the Cyclades, Alexander Lykurgos, to England in 1869 and 1870. He came to England in order to consecrate the new Greek Church at Liverpool. George Williams acted as his guide and interpreter. Archbishop Lykurgos' personal theological position was widely tolerant, his scholarly background being German, and in his early years as Professor at the University of Athens he had encountered some difficulties because of his broad opinions. During his stay in England a conference was organized at Ely, at which all points of agreement and disagreement between the two communions were systematically surveyed. The only point at which no reconciliation between the two positions could be reached was precisely the *Filioque* clause. The Archbishop insisted on its unconditional removal. Then followed some other controversial topics—the number and form of the sacraments, the doctrine of the Eucharist, the position of the priesthood and second marriages of bishops, the invocation of saints and prayers for the departed, the use of icons and the related question of the authority of the Seventh Ecumenical Council. A certain measure of understanding was reached, but the Archbishop staunchly defended the Orthodox point of view. He concluded, however, that in his opinion the Church of England was "a sound Catholic Church, very like our own," and that "by friendly discussion, union between the two Churches may be brought about." There was no discussion of the doctrine of the Church or Orders, and no attempt was made to define the prospective union or mutual recognition. The Archbishop reported favourably to the Synod of Greece on his visit and negotiations." The American General Convention in 1871 took cognizance of these new developments and decided to continue the activities of the Russo-Greek Committee.

The secession of a considerable Old Catholic group from Rome in protest against the decrees of the Vatican Council challenged the Orthodox Churches to form an opinion as to the nature and ecclesiastical status of the new body, and
as to the attitude to be taken with regard to this non-conforming Catholic minority in the West.

In this connection the name of Franz Baader must be mentioned once more. His interest in the Eastern Church dated from earlier times. In the 1830’s he had to consider the whole problem afresh, in the context of a growing resistance to the Ultramontane trend of thought and practice. "Catholicism" has been disrupted since the split between the East and the West, and it is in the East that the true Catholic position has been kept and continued. The Eastern Church has therefore much to contribute to the prospective reintegration of the life of the Church. Baader summarized his ideas in the book Eastern and Western Catholicism, published in 1841. This book has been recently described (by Dr. Ernst Benz) as "the greatest ecumenical writing of the 19th century." It would be difficult, however, to find out to what extent it exercised direct influence on wider circles.

In the years immediately preceding the Vatican Council there had been increasing unrest among the Roman Catholic clergy, especially in France. In 1861 a learned French priest, the Abbé Guettée, whose History of the Church in France had been put on the Index, joined the Orthodox Church in Paris and was attached to the Russian Embassy chapel. In co-operation with the Russian chaplain, Fr. Joseph Vasiliev, Guettée founded a magazine dedicated to the cause of reform and reunion, L’Union Chrétienne, which had for many years a wide circulation in the West. At first Guettée was interested in co-operation with Anglicans, but later became bitterly hostile to them. He regarded a return to the faith and practice of the early Church and reunion with the East as the only way out of the Roman impasse. In a sense, this view was an anticipation of the later Old Catholic movement.

Another name to be mentioned in this connection is that of Joseph J. Overbeck, who published in the 1860’s a number of booklets and pamphlets, in German, Latin, and English, advocating not only a return to Orthodoxy, but also a re-establishment of the Orthodox Church in the West. Overbeck (1821-1905) was originally a Roman Catholic priest and
for a time on the Theological Faculty at Bonn. He left the Roman Catholic Church and migrated to England, where he remained till the end of his days. In 1865 he joined the Russian community in London as a layman. But he had a larger plan in his mind. He expected to see the secession of a considerable group of priests and laymen from the Roman obedience in the near future, and was eagerly concerned with the problem of restoring an Orthodox Catholicism in the West. Reunion with the East he regarded as the only practical solution, but he desired to preserve the Western rite and all those Western habits and traditions which might be compatible with the faith and canons of the Orthodox East. He had in fact formed an ambitious project for an Orthodoxy of the Western rite, somehow parallel to the Catholicism (Uniate) of the Eastern rite.

A formal appeal was presented to the Russian Synod (and probably to the Ecumenical Patriarchate) in 1869, and in 1870 and 1871 Overbeck visited Russia. A provisional draft of the proposed rite was prepared by Overbeck, based mainly on the Roman Missal, with certain insertions from the Mozarabic rite. In principle, the Holy Synod was prepared to approve the scheme, but the final decision was postponed in connection with the further development of the Old Catholic movement. The Synod was anxious to ascertain whether there was a sufficient number of people in the West prepared to join the project in question. The scheme was forwarded to the Ecumenical Patriarch in the same year (or in 1872), but it was only in 1881 (and after Overbeck's personal visit to the Phanar) that action was taken. A committee was appointed to examine the project. It reported favourably in 1882, and the Patriarch gave his provisional approval, provided that the other Churches concurred. It seems that a protest was made by the Synod of the Church of Greece. The whole scheme came to nothing and was formally abandoned in 1884 by the Russian Synod, on the advice of the new Russian chaplain in London, Fr. Eugene Smirnov.

There was an obviously Utopian element in the scheme, and it failed to rally any considerable number of adherents.
And yet it was not just a fantastic dream. The question raised by Overbeck was pertinent, even if his own answer to it was confused. His vision was of an original primitive Catholicism, restored in the West with the help of and in communion with the Orthodox Churches of the East, which had never been involved in the variations of the West. Overbeck's project was strongly resented by Anglican partisans of intercommunion with the East. It was denounced as "a schismatic proceeding, and a mere copying of the uncatholic and uncanonical aggressions of the Church of Rome." It was described as an attempt to set up "a new Church," with the express object of proselytizing, "within the jurisdiction of the Anglican Episcopate."

On the other hand, Overbeck was suspected by those who could not imagine Catholic Orthodoxy in company with a Western rite. This was the attitude of a small group of English Orthodox, led by Fr. Timothy Hatherly. This man had been received into the Orthodox Church in London in 1856 by "rebaptism" and ordained to the Orthodox priesthood at Constantinople in 1871. He had a small community at Wolverhampton. His missionary zeal was denounced to the Patriarch of Constantinople, and he was formally forbidden by the Patriarchate "to proselytize a single member of the Anglican Church," as such action would undermine a wider scheme of ecclesiastical reunion. It seems that this disavowal of Hatherly's intentions was the cause of his joining the Russian Church. He had no sympathy for Overbeck's plan. He wanted simply Eastern Orthodoxy, probably with the use of English as the liturgical language.

In Russia Overbeck's project was heartily supported by the Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, Count Dmitry A. Tolstoy, a staunch opponent of all Roman claims and the author of a book on Romanism in Russia. Tolstoy's interest and sympathy were probably determined by non-theological considerations. The whole scheme can be fully understood only in the context of the intricate historical situation in Europe in the years preceding and following the Vatican Council. Ecclesiastical questions could not be separated from
political, and the Vatican dogma itself had obvious "political" implications."

The hope of reunion was clearly expressed in the Munich Manifesto of the German Old Catholic group in June 1871, and reunion with the Greek-Oriental and Russian Church was mentioned in the Programme of the first Old Catholic Congress, held at Munich in September of the same year. The purpose and the guiding principle of the new movement was to reform the Church in the spirit of the early Church. An Orthodox visitor was present at the Congress, Professor J. Ossinin of the Theological Academy at St. Petersburg, who was to play a prominent rôle in the later negotiations between Orthodox and Old Catholics. Orthodox visitors also attended later Congresses, among them Fr. John Janyshev, at that time Rector of the Theological Academy at St. Petersburg, Colonel (later General) Alexander Kireev, and from Greece Professor Zikos Rhossis of Athens, as a semi-official representative of the Holy Synod of the Greek Church.

In Russia the cause of the Old Catholics was sponsored and promoted by a group of clergy and intellectuals, united in the Society of the Friends of Religious Instruction. Russian visitors to Old Catholic conferences were members and delegates of this Society, and not official representatives of the Church. A special Commission to carry on negotiations with the Orthodox was appointed at the Old Catholic Congress at Constance, under the chairmanship of Professor J. Langen. This Commission at once established very close contact with the Russian group. The main problem under discussion was that of doctrinal agreement. An "Exposition of the principal differences in dogmas and liturgy which distinguish the Western Church from the Eastern Orthodox" was prepared by the Russian Society and submitted to the Old Catholic Commission early in 1874. It was actively discussed by correspondence.

Finally, a Reunion Conference was convened at Bonn in September 1874. This was an informal conference of theologians, not a formal meeting of official delegates. Its historical significance was that for the first time theologians
of the two traditions met for frank and impartial conference on the basic tenets of the Catholic faith. The first point of divergence was the *Filioque* clause. After a long debate it was agreed that the clause had been inserted irregularly, and that it was highly desirable to find a way by which the original form of the Creed could be restored, without compromising the essential truth expressed in the article.

The second Conference met, again at Bonn, in 1875. Membership was larger. The Orthodox group also was much larger and more representative, including delegates officially appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Church of Rumania, the Church of Greece, the Metropolitan of Belgrade, and others. The main problem was that of reconciliation between the Western and the Eastern doctrines of the Holy Spirit. After a protracted and rather strained debate, the Conference finally agreed on a common statement, based on the teaching of St. John of Damascus, which could be regarded as a fair summary of the doctrine held in common by the East and the West in the age of the Ecumenical Councils. Orthodox delegates hesitated to commit themselves to any statement on the validity of Anglican Orders. On the other hand, they could not agree that invocation of the saints should be regarded as an optional practice and left to the private discretion of individual believers or communities. The general feeling was that the Conference had succeeded in providing a basis for agreement on the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, a feeling which unfortunately proved to be based on unwarranted optimism."

Some Orthodox were prepared to favour immediate recognition of, and intercommunion with, the Old Catholics, as constituting, as it were, a faithful Orthodox remnant in the West, even though it had been temporarily involved in the Roman schism. All that was needed was that the existing unity should be acknowledged and attested without any special act of union. This point of view was represented, among the Russians, by A. A. Kireev, Fr. Janyshev, and Professor Ossinin. On the other side, it could be argued that, even after their secession from the Vatican, the Old Catholics were still in schism, since Rome had been in schism for
centuries, and separation from Rome in the 19th century did not necessarily mean a true return to the undivided Church of the early centuries. Unfortunately, the doctrine of the Church was never discussed at this period of the negotiations, and the meaning of reunion was not adequately defined.

Contacts between the Orthodox and Old Catholics ceased for a period, and were renewed only after the formation of the Old Catholic Union (1889) and the second International Old Catholic Congress at Lucerne (1892). In 1892 the Russian Synod appointed a special Committee under the chairmanship of Anthony (Vadkovsky), at that time Archbishop of Finland (later Metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Presiding Member of the Synod). By the end of the year this Committee was ready with its report, which was approved by the Synod and communicated to the Eastern Patriarchs. Conclusions were generally in favour of recognition. This was also the tenor of the book *Old Catholicism*, published in 1894 by V. Kerensky, later Professor at the Theological Academy of Kazan. In Greece there was a sharp division of opinion; Archbishop Nicephoros Kalogerias of Patras and Professor Diomedes Kyriakos of the University of Athens defended the Old Catholic cause, whereas two other Professors, Zikos Rhossis and Mesoloras, opposed it violently. The Patriarch Anthimos of Constantinople, replying to the Reunion Encyclical of Leo XIII, *Praeclarae gratulationis*, in 1895, cited the Old Catholics as defenders of the true Faith in the West.

In the meantime, the third International Congress of Old Catholics at Rotterdam in 1894 appointed its own Commission to examine the Russian report. Three points were singled out for further study: the *Filioque* clause; the doctrine of *Transubstantiation*; and the validity of the Dutch Orders. This time there was division among the Russian theologians: two Kazan Professors, Gusew and Kerensky, found the Old Catholic interpretation of the points under discussion evasive and discordant with the Orthodox position; Janyshev and Kireev, on the contrary, were perfectly satisfied with them. A vigorous controversy ensued. The most important contribution to the discussions was an essay by Professor V. V.
Bolotov, of the Academy of St. Petersburg, *Thesen über das "Filioque."

Bolotov suggested a strict distinction between (1) dogmas, (2) theologoumena, and (3) theological opinions. He defined a theologoumenon as a theological opinion held by those ancient teachers who had recognized authority in the undivided Church and are regarded as Doctors of the Church. All theologoumena should be regarded as permissible, so long as no binding dogmatic authority is claimed for them. Consequently, the Filioque, for which the authority of St. Augustine can be quoted, is a permissible theological opinion, provided it is not regarded as expressing a doctrine which must be believed as a necessary article of the Faith. On the other hand, Bolotov contended that the Filioque was not the main reason for the split between the East and the West. He concluded that the Filioque, as a private theological opinion, should not be regarded as an impedimentum dirimens to the restoration of intercommunion between the Orthodox and Old Catholic Churches. It should be added that the clause was omitted by the Old Catholics in Holland and Switzerland, and put in parentheses in the liturgical books in Germany and Austria, to be ultimately omitted also. That is to say that it was excluded from the formal profession of the Faith.

At this point in the negotiations the doctrine of the Church was mentioned for the first time, to the effect that the Old Catholic movement should be regarded as a schism, and could be received into communion with the Orthodox Church only on the basis of a formal acceptance of the full theological system of the contemporary Church. This thesis was first maintained by Fr. Alexis Maltzev, the Russian chaplain at Berlin and a distinguished liturgiologist, in 1898, and then developed by Bishop Sergius (Stragorodsky), at that time Rector of the Theological Academy of St. Petersburg (later the second Patriarch of Moscow after the Revolution). This contention was strongly opposed by another Russian theologian, Fr. Paul Svetlov, Professor of Religion in the University of Kiev. In Svetlov's opinion, the Church was "an invisible or spiritual unity of the believers, scattered in all Christian Churches," ultimately embracing all who
could describe themselves as Christians. The Orthodox Church is no more than a part of the Church Universal, of which the Old Catholic Church in its own right is another part. This radicalism could not commend itself to the ecclesiastical authorities. Nevertheless, theological conversation was continued till the outbreak of the first world war, and Orthodox visitors and observers attended all Old Catholic Congresses. But no official action has yet been taken.

VI TOWARDS THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Friendly contacts between Anglican and Eastern Orthodox hierarchs and individuals, especially in the East, were numerous in the 1870's and 1880's but usually they were acts of ecclesiastical courtesy, and did not perceptibly promote the cause of reunion or rapprochement.

In 1888 the third Lambeth Conference adopted an important resolution: "This Conference, rejoicing in the friendly communications which have passed between the Archbishop of Canterbury and other Anglican Bishops, and the Patriarchs of Constantinople and other Eastern Patriarchs and Bishops, desires to express its hope that the barriers to fuller communion may be, in course of time, removed by further intercourse and extended enlightenment." It seems, however, that the "barriers" were felt to be formidable, if not insuperable. "It would be difficult for us to enter into more intimate relations with that Church so long as it retains the use of icons, the invocation of the Saints, and the cultus of the Blessed Virgin," even if the Greeks disclaim the sin of idolatry.

In the same year, in connection with the celebration of the 900th anniversary of the Conversion of Russia, the Archbishop of Canterbury (Benson) decided to send an official letter of congratulations and good wishes to the Metropolitan of Kiev. In the letter he referred to common foes of the Russian and Anglican Churches, meaning obviously Rome, and to their unity in the faith of the Gospel as expounded by the Ecumenical Councils of the undivided Church. In his reply, the Metropolitan Platon unexpectedly raised the question of formal reunion. "If you also, as
appears from your letter, desire that we may be one with you in the bonds of the Gospel, I beg you to communicate to me distinctly and definitely upon what conditions you consider the union of your and our Churches would be possible." Archbishop Benson replied in the name of the bishops of England and made two points: "First and above all, the drawing together of the hearts of the individuals composing the two Churches which would fain be at one together.' Secondly, a more or less formal acceptance of each other's position with toleration for any points of difference: non-interference with each other upon any such points." The first point amounted to the authorization of intercommunion, which Benson regarded as a preliminary to reunion rather than as its goal; and in the second the recognition of Anglican Orders was implied. No action was taken by the Russian Church on this proposal.**

Nevertheless, in the next decade official contacts between the Church of England and the Church of Russia were strengthened and multiplied. Bishop Creighton of Peterborough (later of London) attended the Coronation of the Emperor Nicholas II in 1896, as an official envoy of the Church of England, and Archbishop Maclagan of York visited Russia in the following year. In 1897 Archbishop Anthony (Vadkovsky) of Finland went to England to represent the Russian Church at the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria. These visits belong rather to the history of attempts to promote friendship between nations through Churches than to the history of Christian reunion.*

There was, however, one feature in the general situation which could not fail to draw the Church of England and the Orthodox Churches together. Discussion of Anglican Orders in Rome in the middle 1890's and the final repudiation of their validity by the Pope in 1896 were followed in Russia with a keen interest, and the Responsio of the English Archbishops was accepted with satisfaction. Copies of this document were officially communicated to all Russian bishops, and probably to all Orthodox bishops in various countries of the East. It is interesting to observe that the reply of the
Roman Catholic bishops in England to the epistle of the Anglican Archbishops was also forwarded officially to all Orthodox bishops by Cardinal Vaughan, with a covering letter, in which the Cardinal expressed his awareness that the Orthodox were as solicitous in guarding the true doctrine of priesthood and sacraments as the Church of Rome.

It was natural that at this moment an inquiry into the validity of Anglican Orders should be initiated in Russia, albeit in an unofficial way. An Enquiry into the Hierarchy of the Anglican Episcopal Church was published in Russian by Professor V. A. Sokolov of Moscow Theological Academy. It included a critical analysis of the papal Bull, and the author concluded with the suggestion that Anglican Orders could be recognized by the Orthodox. To the same conclusion came another Russian scholar, Professor Athanasius Bulgakov of Kiev Theological Academy. Both tracts were translated into English and published by the Church Historical Society.**

In 1898 Bishop John Wordsworth of Salisbury paid a visit to the East and visited the Ecumenical Patriarch (Constantine V). A "friendly relationship" between the two Communions was initiated, and direct correspondence between the Phanar and Lambeth Palace established. A special Commission was created at Constantinople in order to survey the doctrinal position of the Anglican Church, and an Anglican representative, Archdeacon Dowling, was invited to participate. An explanatory pamphlet was published in 1900 by Bishop Wordsworth, with the approval of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and immediately translated into Russian and Greek: Some points in the Teaching of the Church of England, set forth for the information of Orthodox Christians of the East in the form of an answer to questions. This was a semi-official statement.

In 1902 the new Ecumenical Patriarch, Joachim III, formally invited all autocephalous Orthodox Churches to express their opinion on relations with other Christian bodies. The Russian Synod replied by an elaborate epistle. The Synod was inclined to consider baptism conferred outside the Orthodox Church as valid, respecting the sincerity of belief in the Holy Trinity; and apostolic succession in the Latin
Christianity as regularly preserved. With regard to the Anglican Churches, the Synod felt that, first of all, "it was indispensible that the desire for union with the Eastern Orthodox Church should become the sincere desire not only of a certain section of Anglicanism, but of the whole Anglican community, that the other . . . Calvinistic current . . . should be absorbed in the above-mentioned pure current, and should lose its perceptible, if we may not say exclusive, influence . . . upon the whole Church life of this Confession which, in the main, is exempt from enmity towards us." All charity should be extended to the Anglicans, "but at the same time a firm profession of the truth of our Ecumenical Church as the one guardian of the inheritance of Christ and the one saving ark of divine grace" must be maintained.

In the same year Chrestos Androutsos, Professor of Dogmatics in the University of Athens, published his great essay on The Validity of English Ordinations, from an Orthodox-Catholic point of view. He made two preliminary points. First, intercommunion cannot be separated from dogmatic union. Secondly, it was impossible to discuss the validity of the Orders of any body separated from the true Church, and no statement can be made on them. Consequently the only question that could profitably be discussed by Orthodox theologians was a practical one—what attitude should the Orthodox Church adopt in the case of reception of individual Anglican clerics into the Church? The external, i.e. ritual, aspect of Anglican ordinations could be regarded as adequate. There was, however, some uncertainty as to the purpose of these rites, as the Anglican doctrine of the ministry seemed to be ambiguous if judged by Orthodox standards. Yet, provided that this ambiguity had been removed by a formal declaration of the Church, it would be possible to accept as valid the Orders of those Anglican priests who desired to join the Orthodox Church. This was a document of momentous importance. It became at once, and still is, the basis of the ecumenical policy of the Greek Church.

The problem was shifted from the realm of theology to that of canon law or pastoral discretion. For the first
time the concept of "Economy" was applied to ecumenical relations. This concept has never been clearly defined or elaborated. Its meaning was nevertheless intelligible: for a solution based on theological principles some occasional practical arrangements were substituted. It was assumed that the Orthodox Church could not say anything at all about the ecclesiastical status of the separated bodies, as they had none. At this point there was an obvious difference between the Greek approach and that of the Russian Church. Russian theologians would not dispense with the theological, i.e. ecclesiological, problem as such, difficult and, in the last resort, "antinomical" as it might be. The problem of unity was for them essentially a theological, and not primarily a canonical, problem.

In 1904 Archbishop Tikhon of North America, later the first Patriarch of Moscow after the restoration in 1917, formally requested the Holy Synod to make an official statement on the procedure to be used in the case of reception of Anglican clerics into the Orthodox Church. In particular, he wished to know whether it was permissible to allow them to continue the use of the Book of Common Prayer for services. A special Commission was appointed by the Holy Synod and presented a detailed report, analysing the offices of the Prayer Book. The conclusion was that the offices were rather "colourless and indefinite" with regard to their doctrinal content, and therefore, if they were to be used "in Orthodox parishes, composed of former Anglicans," certain corrections and additions must be made in the text, in order to bring it into agreement with Orthodox doctrine. Concerning the reception of Anglican clergy, the Commission recommended, "pending a final judgement" of the Church, "a new conditional ordination."

The fifth Lambeth Conference (1908) requested the Archbishop of Canterbury to appoint a permanent Committee to deal with the relations of the Anglican Communion with the Orthodox East, and suggested that certain forms of intercommunion could be brought into effect at once (i.e. in cases of emergency). In 1912 a Russian Society of the Friends of
the Anglican Church was inaugurated in St. Petersburg. The first President was Eulogius, at that time Archbishop of Volhynia and Member of the Governmental Duma, later Metropolitan of the Russian Church in Western Europe and Exarch of the Ecumenical Patriarch. He was succeeded by Sergius, Archbishop of Finland, later Patriarch of Moscow. The Statutes of the Society were approved by the Holy Synod. A branch of the Society was organized in the United States. On the invitation of this Society a group of Anglican bishops and clergy joined the parliamentary delegation of Great Britain to Russia in 1912. Series of lectures were organized at St. Petersburg and Moscow, delivered by Dr. Walter H. Frere, C.R., on the Life of the Anglican Church, and by Fr. F. W. Puller, S.S.J.E. Fr. Puller's lectures were published (in English and in Russian) as *The Continuity of the Church of England.* They formed an impressive vindication of the Catholic claims of the Anglican Communion. During his visit, Fr. Puller had several theological conversations with the Orthodox, of which he speaks in the Preface to his book. The question of the Filioque was surveyed once more, to the effect that on this point there was in principle no disagreement between the two Churches. Puller attributed this "change of attitude" on the Russian side "to the influence of the great Russian theologian, Bolotov." The world war interrupted the work of the Society.

It must be added that the great All-Russian Church Council of 1917-18, at its very last meeting (on 20 September 1918), passed the following resolution, upon the proposal of the Section on the Union of the Christian Churches: "The Sacred Council of the Orthodox Russian Church, gladly seeing the sincere efforts of the Old Catholics and Anglicans towards union with the Orthodox Church on the foundation of the doctrine and tradition of the ancient Catholic Church, bestows its benediction on the labours and efforts of those who are seeking the way towards union with the above-named friendly Churches. The Council authorizes the Sacred Synod to organize a Permanent Commission with departments in Russia and abroad for the further study of Old Catholic and Anglican difficulties in the way of union, and for the
furtherance as much as possible of the speedy attainment of the final aim." No commission could be organized in Russia at that time, but the work of Russian theologians in western Europe in the ecumenical field was in line with the desire and commendation of the Council.

Negotiations with the Old Catholics and Anglicans revealed a serious divergence of opinions among the Orthodox theologians themselves, and these internal polemics were sometimes very heated. Christian unity implies two things: unity in faith or doctrine, and unity in the life of the Church, i.e. in sacraments and worship. In the first period of the ecumenical conversation between the East and the West the main attention was given to the first aspect. The first discovery was disappointing: there was a difference indeed, and a difference of such character as to make agreement hardly possible. The Filioque, the doctrine of the Eucharist, the invocation of saints, Mariology, prayers for the departed—on all these points no concession could be made by the Orthodox, though a clear distinction could be made between a binding doctrine and theological interpretation.

In the later period of discussion, the whole problem of the doctrine of the Church was brought to the fore. The main issue was: what is the Church Universal? and in what sense do schismatic bodies still belong to the Church? Some Orthodox theologians held that the separated bodies did not belong to the Church at all, and therefore were not only historically but also spiritually outside it; others that they were still, in a certain sense and under special conditions, related to the Church existentially. On the latter view, the sacraments of the non-Orthodox were not necessarily repeated on their becoming Orthodox, it being understood that they had some real charismatic significance even outside the strict canonical boundaries of the Church. This has determined the common practice of the Russian Church in the 19th and 20th centuries.

On the other hand, this practice could be interpreted in the light of the theory of Economy, which is characteristic of modern Greek theology; in this case, the fact of non-
repetition of sacraments would not imply any recognition of these non-Orthodox ministrations, and should be interpreted simply as a pastoral dispensation. This point of view was represented in Russia by Khomiakov, and in recent times was elaborated with daring radicalism by the late Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitski).

Anthony, at that time Archbishop of Kharkov and a permanent Member of the Holy Synod, replied to an invitation to participate in the Conference on Faith and Order by a long letter, in which he frankly stated his point of view. There was no spiritual reality, "no grace," outside the Orthodox Church. All talk about "validity" is just "talmudic sophistries." What is outside the Orthodox Church is just "this world, foreign to Christ's redemption and possessed by the devil." It makes no difference, Anthony argued, whether the non-Orthodox have or have not "right beliefs." Purity of doctrine would not incorporate them in the Church. What is of importance is actual membership in the Orthodox Church, which is not compromised by doctrinal ignorance or moral frailty. But, in spite of this categorical exclusion of all non-Orthodox from Christendom, Anthony was wholeheartedly in favour of Orthodox participation in the proposed Conference on Faith and Order. "Indeed, we are not going to concelebrate there, but shall have to search together for a true teaching on the controversial points of faith." 70

This survey would be incomplete if we omitted the name of Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900). Soloviev was never interested in the ecumenical problem, in so far as it concerned the search for unity between the Orthodox and the world of the Reformation. His attitude towards the Reformation and Protestantism always tended to be negative, though in his later years he did speak occasionally of a "super-confessional" Christianity, and even of a "religion of the Holy Spirit." Nevertheless, his contribution to the discussion on Christian unity was momentous. "The broken unity" of Christendom, "the Great Controversy," i.e. the "Separation of the Churches," were in his opinion the main fact and the main tragedy of the Christian world. The reunion of Chris-
tendom was for him, therefore, not merely one special and particular problem of theology and of Christian action, but the central problem of Christian life and history. Soloviev was mainly concerned with the question of reconciliation between the East and Rome, and in a sense he was pleading for a very particular kind of Unia. In fact, he simply did not believe that Churches were separated. There was an historical estrangement, an external break, but, in an ultimate sense, there was still one (mystically) undivided Catholic Church.

He was right in his basic vision: the Church is essentially one, and therefore cannot be divided. Either Rome is no Church at all, or Rome and the East are somehow but one Church, and separation exists only on the historical surface. This thesis can be interpreted in a limited sense, i.e. as including only Rome and Eastern Orthodoxy. But it could be reinterpreted in a wider sense, and in that case an important and truly ecumenical plea would be presented. The merit of Soloviev was that he tried to clarify the presuppositions that underlie the Catholic doctrine of the Church. His ultimate ecumenical vision, so vividly presented in his Story of the Antichrist, included the whole of Christendom and the fullness of Christian tradition—the spiritual insight of the Orthodox East, the authority of Rome, and the intellectual honesty of Protestantism. But this unity transcends history.

The true legacy of Soloviev is neither his "Romanism" nor his Utopian theocratic dream, but his acute sense of Christian unity, of the common history and destiny of Christendom, his firm conviction that Christianity is the Church.

This was his challenge. An earnest attempt at an inclusive Catholic reintegation would be the answer. It would take us beyond all schemes of agreement. The issues, discussed time and again in the abortive ecumenical negotiations in previous centuries, are still burning. It is necessary to realize the nature and the scope of those questions which the Orthodox were bound to ask, and will ask again and again, in order to understand and interpret the meaning of the ecumenical encounter between the Orthodox East and the West at large.
CHAPTER II


2Gerhard Kittel, "The Jesus of ' History," in Mysterium Christi, ed. by G. K. A. Bell and Adolf Deissman (Longmans, 1930), pp. 31 ff.


5An interesting discussion of this issue took place at the Anglo-American Conference of Historians, July, 1926; three addresses given at the conference by C H. McIlwain, A. Meyendorff, and J. L. Morison are published under the general title, "Bias in historical writing," in History, XI (October, 1926), 193-203.

6M. Bloch, pp. 64-65.


11Collingwood, p. 214.

12Leopold von Ranke, Weltgeschichte, Theil I, 3 Aufl. (Leipzig, 1883), "Vorrede," s. VI.


17Fr. Ad. Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. II. 2, s. 408.

18G. Spet, "Istorija kak predmet logiki" ("History as the Matter of Logic"), in Nauchnyja Investija, coll. 2 (Moscow, 1922), pp. 15-16.
For the whole section 2 of this article see my essay, "O tipakh istoricheskogo istolkovanija" ("The types of historical interpretation"), in Sbornik včeš na Vasil N. Zlatarski (Sofia, 1925), pp. 523-541 (in Russian). It is gratifying for the author to discover that this conception is now widely shared by many historians and philosophers, although his Russian article was hardly likely to have been read by many. In addition to the studies by Croce, Collingwood, and Marrou, already quoted, one should mention: Raymon Aron, Introduction à la Philosophie de l'Histoire, Essai sur les limites de l'objectivité historique (Paris, 1948); La Philosophie critique de l'Histoire, Essai sur une théorie allemande de l'histoire (Paris, 1950). Of earlier writers one should mention Wilhelm Dilthey; on him see H. A. Hodges, Wilhelm Dilthey, An Introduction (London, 1944); The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey (London, 1952). On Benedetto Croce see J. Robert Caponigri, History and Liberty: The Historical Writings of Benedetto Croce (London, 1955). For other points of view see, e.g., Patrick Gardiner, The Idea, Its purpose and method (Boston, 1950).


41For a further elaboration of this topic see my Dudleian Lecture, The Christian Dilemma, delivered at Harvard University on April 30, 1958. (still unpublished).

42The problem of "Christian history" (in the double meaning of the word: "actual history" and "historiography") has been extensively discussed in recent years, and literature is enormous. There are several competent surveys: G. This, "Bibliographie sur la theologie de l'histoire," in Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 26 (1950), pp. 87-95; F. Olgiati, "Rapporti fra storia, metafisica e religione," in Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica (1950), pp. 49-84; P. Henry, "The Christian Philosophy of History," in Theological Studies, XIII (1952), 419-433; see also R. L. Shinn, Christianity and the
Problem of History (New York, 1953); M. C. Smit, *De Verouding van Christendom en Historie in der huidige Rome-Katholische gescholbeschouwing* (Kampen, 1950) [with a French résumé].


CHAPTER IV


A brief note on Andreev's unpublished work has been given in the
This is the title of an admirable booklet by Eric Peterson, *Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem* (1935).


The best presentation of the Orthodox theory of icons is in the articles of P. Lucas Koch.

9See B. M. Melioransky, Georgij Kyprianin z Ioann Jerusalimskij, *dva maliizviestnykh borza za pravoslavie v 8 vikie* (St. Petersburg, 1901); and Ostrogorsky, *Studien*.

10Cf., e.g., A. Vasiliev, *Histoire de l'Empire Byzantine* (Paris: Picard, 1932), I, 379: "Quant au parti de la cour et an haut élergé, on peut dire que ces fonctionnaires du gouvernement et évêques n'obéirent pas pour la plupart aux ordres de leur conscience, mais qu'ils professèrent les doctrines qui s'harmonisaient avec leurs crainte et leur ambitions." This view is widespread in the literature.

11This point has been emphasized by H. Grégoire in his review of Ostrogorsky's "Studien," in *Byzantion*, IV, 765-771.


"It is a commonplace in the literature. See, in recent times, Christopher Dawson, *The Making of Europe* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1946 (1932), p. 136: "It has behind it, not the explicit doctrines of a theological school but the vague and formless spirit of an oriental sectarianism which rejected the whole system of Hellenic dogma." Cf. George Every, *The Byzantine Patriarchate*, 451-1204 (London: S.P.C.K., 1946), p. 105: "The Iconoclastic Schisms of 730-86 and 815-43 were not the schisms between East and West, but between an Asiatic party at Constantinople and the Greek and Latin party in Greece, Italy and Rome."


16Karl Schwartzlose, *Der Bilderstreit* (Gotha, 1890), pp. 77-78.

17In any case Paulicians were invoked in vain, for it is most doubtful whether they had any iconoclastic tendencies, as much as would have agreed with their dualistic presuppositions. See Henri Grégoire, in *Atti del V Congresso internazionale di Studi Bizantini* (Roma, 1939), 177; and recently D. Obolensky, *The Bogomils* (Cambridge, 1949), p. 53.


happy indeed are those who in their need for the Son of God have yet


See H. Berkhof, Die Theologie des Eusebius von Caesarea (Amsterdam, 1939).

The theology of St. Maximus was intensively discussed by scholars in recent years. The following studies should be listed: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie. Maximus der Bekenner: Höhe und Krisis des griechischen Weltbilds (1941; 2nd edition, revised and amplified, 1961); Polycarp Sherwood, O.S.B., The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor, "Studia Anselmiana," fasc. XXXVI (Rome, 1955); Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator. The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor (Lund, 1965); Walter Völker, Maximus Confessor als Meister des geistlichen Lebens (1965). The earlier monograph of S.L. Epifanovich, St. Maximus the Confessor and Byzantine Theology (Kiev, 1915 [in Russian]) is still to be consulted.


Origen, Commentary in Joannem, I. 9 and 10, Migne PG, XIV, c 35-40. Origen sharply distinguishes and contrasts the somatic (or "historical") Gospel and the spiritual (and "eternal"). Before His bodily coming Christ was already appearing to the advanced or "perfect" individuals under the Old Dispensation, like Moses and prophets, to whom His glory was revealed, in an intellectual (or "noetic") manner. Comparing, or rather contrasting, the two Dispensations, Origen uses the same term epidemia: a visit or appearance, coming among people, and a sojourn. Thus the noetic vision is put on the same level as historic encounter, and, in fact, much higher. Cf. IL 3, c. 113: The prophets, like Isaiah, Hosea, Jeremiah, encountered the Logos. The majority of Christians, however, do not know but Christ, and Him crucified, "considering that the Word made flesh is the whole Word, and knowing only Christ after the flesh." On many occasions Origen used the terms Logos and Christ as synonyms.

In Joannem, VI. 2, Migne, PG, XIV, c 201 ss. Cf. I. 23, c 60: "And happy indeed are those who in their need for the Son of God have yet
become such persons as not to need Him in his character as a physician healing the sick, nor in that of a shepherd, nor in that of redemption, but only in His character as Wisdom, as the Word and righteousness, or if there be any other title suitable for those who are so perfect as to receive Him in His fairest characters."

**Contra Celsum**, II. 69: "The truth of the events recorded to have happened to Jesus cannot be seen fully in the mere text and historical narrative, for each event to those who read the Bible more intelligently is clearly a symbol of something as well." In fact Origen was prepared to go much further. There are in the Scriptures obvious contradictions and certain historical statements cannot be historically true. Yet, "the spiritual truth was often preserved, as one might say in the material falsehood." Origen would not condemn the writers, "if they even sometimes dealt freely with things which to the eye of history happened differently, and changed them so as to subserve the mystical aims they had in view." "Spiritual" must be put above "material." Cf. *In Ioannem*, X. 3 and 4, Migne PG, XIV, c 312-313. Ultimately the Bible was for Origen not so much a book of Sacred History, as an enormous Allegory to be understood by intuition.

**In Ioannem**, XIX. I, *Migne PG* XIX, c 524 ss.

**Contra Celsum**, III. 41: "We affirm that his mortal body and the human soul in him received the greatest elevation not only by communion but by union and intermingling, so that by sharing in his divinity he was transformed into God" and his body acquired "an ethereal and divine quality."

**Contra Celsum**, II. 64; Commentary in *Mattheum*, XII. 30 and 36, Migne PG, XII, c 1050 and 1066.

**Contra Celsum**, VI. 77; cf. IV. 16 and 18.


**Contra Celsum**, I. 33: "Why then should there not be a certain soul that takes a body which is entirely miraculous," or paradoxical?

**Contra Celsum**, II. 9; cf. *In Ioannem*, XXXII. 17, *MPG*, XIV, c 812-818.

**Commentaria in epistolam ad Romanos**, I. 7, *MPG*, XIV, c 852.

**In Jeremiam homilia** XV. 6, *MPG*, XII, c 436-437.

**In Lucam homilia** XXIX, *MPG*, XIII, c 1876: *qui tune homo fuit, nunc autem esse cessavit*.

See especially *C. Cell.* VIII. 17 and 18: "in all those, then, who plant and cultivate within their souls, according to the divine word, temperance, justice, wisdom, piety, and other virtues, these excellences are the statues they raise, in which we are persuaded that it is becoming for us to honour the model and the prototype of all statues: *the image of the invisible God/ God the Only-begotten* . . . And everyone who imitates Him according to his ability, does by this very endeavour raise a statue according to the image of the Creator, for in the contemplation of God with a pure heart they become imitators of Him. And in general, we see that all Christians strive to raise altars and statues as we have described them, and these not of a lifeless and senseless kind," etc.; cf. VII. 65: "All those who look at the evil productions of painters and sculptors and imagemakers sit in darkness and are settled in it, since they do not wish to look up and ascend in their mind from all visible and sensible things to the Creator of all who is Light." See Elliger, *op. cit.*, s. II ff. and Hugo Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 19 ff.

St. John of Damascus, *De imaginibus*, III.
CHAPTER VII

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Acts of the Iconoclastic conciliabulum of 753 were read at the Nicene Ecumenical Council of 787, Mansi, vol. XII, c 276.


44 The boras of the Nicaenum II in Mansi, v. XIII, c 373 ss.


46 Porphyrios, Vita Plotini, I.

47 Plotinus, Enneades, V, 8. 8.

48 Enneades, II. 9. 11.


51 Origen is still a controversial figure. It was beyond the purpose of this essay to give a comprehensive picture of his theological thought. The only point which it was intended to make was to suggest that certain aspects of his thought could have influenced the growth and formulation of the iconoclastic position. The texts of Origen quoted in this paper were selected for this purpose. The findings of this paper were supported by Professor P.J. Alexander in his article: The Iconoclastic Council of St. Sophia (815) and its definition (Horos), in "Dumbarton Oaks Papers," VII, p. 37-66.

CHAPTER VIII

1 A German translation of this important correspondence has recently been published: Wort und Mysterium (Witten/Ruhr: Luther-Verlag, 1958) [reviewed in Lutheran World, June, 1959, p. 90 f. Editor]; cf. my article, "An Early Ecumenical Correspondence," in World Lutheranism of Today (1950), pp. 98-111 [in this volume].

2 Turcograecia, Tubingen, 1584, p. 488. Prof. Benz was able to locate copies of this edition in Tübingen, Stuttgart and Wittenberg. I had at my disposal, on microfilm, the copy of the library of Leipzig University. The Leipzig copy differs, however, from those known to Benz: he indicates the number of pages as 73 in 8vo; the Leipzig copy has 113.


4 Turcograecia, p. 264.

CHAPTER II

"Transference of the seat of empire.


6Mansi, Concilia, XXVII, pp. 857f.


8Sub utraque, hence the title Utraquists by which some of the Hussites were known.

9Ed. of 1648, Chap. xviii, p. 60.

They were published by the Patriarch Dositheos, in his Tomos Agapes, Jassy, 1698. A copy of this work was sent in 1725 by the Patriarch Chrysanthos of Jerusalem to Archbishop Wake, who deposited it in the Bodleian Library at Oxford.

10In Freger, Rerum bohemicarum Scriptores, Hanoviae, 1602.

11Latin trans. by Blancardus, Leipzig and Frankfort, 1687. It must be said that the statements of Philip Cyprius give a far weaker impression of reliability than the Czech sources.


13A very picturesque description of the meeting is given in the old biography of Olaus and Laurens Petri: Johan Gostof Hallman, The Tvenne Broder och merikboer, som then Evangeliska Luran Infôrde uti Nordlander, then Aldre Mest. Olaff Petri Phase, Första Evangeliska Kyrioberde Öswer Stockholms Stad, then Yngle Mest. Lars Petri bin Garnie, Porsta Evangeliska Erkbishop uti Uppsala, Til Lefwerne och Wandel, Stockholm, 1726, pp. 118-21.

14On earlier ecumenical activities in Poland, see Chap. i, pp. 60 ff in A History of the Ecumenical Movement (London: SPCK, 1954).


16It seems that this very copy is now in private hands in the United States—a photostat copy is available in the New York Public Library.

17The judgement is that of the late Archbishop Germanos of Thyateira, Kyrillos Loukaris, p. 31.

18This precious gift arrived in England after the death of James I.

19Thomas Smith, in his Narratio.


21The Roman Catholic documents and treatises related to this controversy were collected in the great book: Perpetuité de la foi de l'Église catholique sur l'Eucharistie (new edition by Migne, in four volumes, Paris, 1841).

22Unpublished letter to Dr. Fall, Precentor of York Cathedral, in Bodleian Library, MS. Add. D.23.


24See Bibliography (Kohlius).


Unigenitus condemned 101 propositions alleged to have been found in the writings of the Jansenists. The Bull was not officially received until 1720, owing to the strength of the opposition it aroused in the French Church.

Ecclesia Romana cum Ruthenica irreconciliabilis, Jena, 1719.


Three different degrees of worship or veneration,


For recent studies in the thought of Khomiakov, see Bibliography in A History of the Ecumenical Movement (London: SPCK, 1954).

Sermon on "Submission to Church Authority," 29 November 1829, in Parochial and Plain Sermons, III, ed. of 1885, pp. 191 ff. Where and when the "Branch" theory was first worked out is uncertain, but something very like it is already found in the prayer of Bishop Lancelot Andrewes for "the Catholic Church—Eastern, Western British."


W. Palmer of Worcester College is to be clearly distinguished from "Deacon" W. Palmer of Magdalen College, whose visits to Russia will be described later in this chapter.


George Tomlinson, Report of a Journey to the Levant.

See P. E. Shaw, American Contacts, pp. 35 ff.; and for the earlier American "mission" of Dr. Hill, see S. D. Denison, A History of the Foreign Missionary Work of the Protestant Episcopal Church, I, New York, 1871, pp. 142 ff.

E. B. Pusey, A Letter to His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury, on some Circumstances connected with the Present Crisis in the English Church, Oxford, 1842, p. 118.

A Greek translation of this book was published at Athens in 1851.

Bishop Torry of St. Andrews, Dunkeld, and Dunblane did consent to write an "advertisement" to Palmer's appeal. J. M. Neale, regretting that more attention was not paid to Palmer's book, expressed the judgement that "it will probably stand, in the further history of our Churches, as the most remarkable event that had occurred since the disruption of the Non-jurors," Life and Times of Patrick Torry, D.D., 1856, p. 224.


Khomiakov's letters to Palmer were first published in Russian, in Pravoslavnoe Obozrenie ("The Orthodox Review,") 1869, with notes by Fr. A. M. Ivantsov-Platonov. The full text in English appears in Birkbeck, Russia and the English Church.

"Letters of the Very Rev. E. J. Popov on Religious Movements in England" were published by L. Brodsky in Khristianskoe Chtenie ("Christian Reading") April, May, June 1904, and June, July, September 1905 (they cover the period from 1842 to 1862); cf. also "Materials concerning the question of the Anglican Church," consisting of notes and letters of
Fr. Popov and Fr. Joseph Vassiliev (Russian chaplain in Paris), in 1863-65, in the same magazine, July and August 1897.

This student was later Russian chaplain in Stuttgart, Fr. J. J. Bazarov.

Pr. Eugene Popov to the Chief Procurator, Count Pratassov, Chriszcanskoe Chtenie, May and June 1904.


John Octavius Johnson, Life and Letters of Henry Parry Liddon, London, 1904, pp. 100 f. To W. Bright he wrote about the services: "there was an aroma of the fourth century about the whole."


The latter was established in 1870, but closed down in 1883.

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Journal of the Proceedings in 1868, pp. 148, 169, 256, 258 f, 276, 421 f, 484 f.


G. Williams, A Collection of Documents relating chiefly to the Visit of Alexander, Archbishop of Syros and Tenos, to England in 1870, London, 1876; D. Balanos, "Archbishop A. Lykourgos," in Theologia, Vol. I, 1923, pp. 180-94 (in Greek); cf. Karmiris, op. cit., pp. 337 f. There seems, however, to have been a darker side to the visit of Alexander. He was closely in touch with the group of Timothy Hatherly (see p. 206), for whom he carried out ordinations; and there is reason to believe that he went so far as to "reordain" one who was already an Anglican priest.

For the full German title of this book, and for other material on Baadet, see Bibliography in A History of the Ecumenical Movement (London: SPCK, 1954).


For literature on Overbeck, see Bibliography in A History of the Ecumenical Movement (London: SPCK, 1954).


Brief survey and analysis: Dr. Otto Steinwachs, "Die Unionsbestrebungen

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